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Abstract 
A small state with no armed forces of its own Iceland formed a close defence 
relationship with the United States after gaining full independence from Denmark 
in 1944. In 1951 the two states signed a bilateral defence agreement allowing 
for a U.S. military base in Iceland. Following failed burden sharing negotiations 
in 2005/2006 between the two governments the U.S. government unilaterally 
closed down Keflavík base and handed all defence functions over to the Icelandic 
government. This dissertation analysis through process tracing and the use of primary 
source material the defence functions of the U.S. military at Keflavík base, the failed 
2005/2006 burden sharing negotiations and how from 2006 until 2013 consecutive 
Icelandic governments adapted to the closure of Keflavík base. While this study 
is anchored within the theoretical schools of Neorealism and Institutionalism its 
conclusions are that to gain a holistic understanding of the decision making process 
during the burden sharing negotiations and the aftermath of the closure of Keflavík 
base it is important to look beyond the state centric approaches of Neorealism and 
Institutionalism and factor in alternative theories on the motives of individual actors 
involved in the decision making process.  
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Tiivistelmä
Islanti, pieni valtio ilman omia asevoimia, loi läheisen puolustussuhteen Yhdysval-
tain kanssa vuonna 1944saavutettuaan täydellisen itsenäisyyden Tanskasta. Vuonna 
1951 maat allekirjoittivat kahdenvälisen puolustussopimuksen, joka salli Yhdys-
valtain perustaa sotilastukikoht(i)a Islantiin. Kustannustenjakoa koskevien epäon-
nistuneiden neuvottelujen (vuosina 2005-2006) seurauksena Yhdysvaltain hallitus 
sulki Keflavikin sotilastukikohtansa yksipuolisella päätöksellään ja luovutti kaikki 
puolustustoiminnot Islannin hallitukselle. Primaariaineistoon pohjautuen tämä 
väitöskirjatutkimus jäljittää ja analysoi Keflavikin tukikohdan puolustustoimintoja, 
em. epäonnistuneiden neuvottelujen kulun, ja miten Islannin hallitus mukautui 
Keflavikin tukikohdan sulkemiseen. Vaikka tutkimus ankkuroituu Neorealismin ja 
Institutionalismin koulukuntiin sen keskeinen johtopäätös on, että kokonaisvaltai-
sen ymmärryksen saavuttamiseksi  tämänkaltaisessa kustannustenjakoa koskevassa 
päätöksentekoprosessissa on tärkeätä katsoa Neorealismin ja Institutionalismin 
valtiokeskeisen näkökulman yli sekä ottaa huomioon vaihtoehtoisten teorioiden 
näkökulma yksilötoimijoiden motiivien merkityksestä päätöksenteossa. 
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1. Introduction
In the autumn of 2006, the United States closed down its military base in Keflavík 
Iceland and handed over all defence related responsibilities to the Icelandic 
authorities. From 1951 the U.S. operated the base on the basis of a bilateral defence 
agreement with the government of Iceland whereby the U.S. provided Iceland with 
military defence on the basis of both states being members of NATO. The purpose 
of this research is to analyse through the use of process tracing, anchored within the 
theoretical schools of Neorealism and Institutionalism, the nature of the defence 
relationship between Iceland and the United States, why the base was closed down 
and how successive Icelandic governments adapted to the closure of the base up until 
national elections in 2013. 
To that end, I ask three research questions:
1. What benefits and international leverage did Iceland gain through its defence 
relationship with the U.S. historically?
2. What goals did U.S. and Icelandic policymakers have in the 2005/2006 base 
negotiations and why was Keflavík base closed down?
3. How did Icelandic decision makers adapt to the closure of the base in the years 
that followed until national elections in spring 2013? 
Scholarly work on Iceland’s defence relationship with the United States is few 
and far between with most of the literature concentrated in the field of history. 
The earliest post-war account is Donald E. Nuechterlein’s Iceland reluctant ally 
(Nuechterlein, 1961), a study into the U.S.- Icelandic defence relationship from 
1940 until a move by the left of centre government in 1956 to terminate the 1951 
Defence Agreement. In 1971, Benedikt Gröndal published Iceland from Neutrality 
to NATO Membership (Gröndal, 1971) an historical account of the events preceding 
Iceland’s membership of NATO in 1949 and the strategic importance Iceland played 
during the Cold War. In 1990, Albert Jónsson wrote Ísland, Atlantshafsbandalagið 
og Keflavíkurstöðin ( Jónsson, 1990) authored by the Commission on Security and 
Defence and International Affairs of the Icelandic Parliament. Jónsson provided 
a detailed account of Keflavík base, it’s function and what role it played within 
NATO’s system of collective defence during peace and war. 
Compared to earlier decades the 1990s and early 2000s saw a wealth of research 
into Iceland’s defence relationship with the United States. In 1996, the historian 
Valur Ingimundarson published Í Eldlínu Kalda Stríðsins, Samskipti Íslands og 
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Bandaríkjanna 1945-1960 (Ingimundarson, 1996). In his work Ingimundarson 
focused on the Icelandic-U.S. defence relationship during the time period of 1945-
1960 and its interdependence with Icelandic domestic politics and Icelandic foreign 
policy goals, such as the extension of Iceland’s fisheries limit. In 2001, Ingimundarson 
followed with Uppg jör við Umheiminn, Íslensk Þjóðernishyggja, Vestrænt Samstarf 
og Landhelgisdeilan (Ingimundarson, 2001). In this work, Ingimundarson, turned 
his attention to the U.S.-Icelandic defence relationship during the time period of 
1960-1974. As in his earlier work, Ingimundarson meticulous research revealed the 
interplay between defence, domestic politics and the strenuous interactions Iceland 
had with the United States and other allies in NATO over Iceland’s extension of its 
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). In 2002, another important scholarly work was 
published on Icelandic-U.S. defence relations. Its author, Professor Michael Corgan, 
served as the political adviser to the Keflavík base commander during the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s and his work Iceland and its Alliances, Security for a Small State 
(Corgan, 2002) focused on Icelandic security policy 1979-1986, drawing attention, 
among other things, to the role of language in shaping defence and security discourse 
and dialogue in Iceland.
The Icelandic-British Cod Wars of the 1950s and the 1970s have been extensively 
studied. Most prolific of those writers is Guðni Th. Jóhannesson who has published 
numerous scholarly works on the topic. In 2003 Jóhannesson published Troubled 
waters. Cod war, fishing disputes, and Britain’s fight for the freedom of the high 
seas, 1948-1964 ( Jóhannesson, 2003) a study of the first Cod War, its origin and 
conclusion. In 2005, Jóhannesson followed with Sympathy and self-interest, Norway 
and the Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars ( Jóhannesson, 2005). In this study the author 
shone light on the role Norway played in attempting to mediate the Cod War 
disputes between Iceland and Britain, in an attempt to limit their damage to NATO. 
Another prominent Cod War scholar is Guðmundur J. Guðmundsson who has 
published extensively (Guðmundsson, 1999, 2006, 2007) on the interplay between 
Iceland’s defence policy and its use by Icelandic decision makers to reach a favourable 
outcome in its dispute with Britain over fishing rights in the North Atlantic.  
Following the closure of Keflavík base and the departure of U.S. forces from Iceland 
two scholarly works followed surveying the event. Óvænt áfall eða fyrirsjáanleg 
tímamót by Gunnar Þór Bjarnason (Bjarnason, 2008) reviewed the events leading up 
to its closure and its immediate impact on Icelandic decision makers. That same year, 
Valur Ingimundarson published Frá óvissu til upplausnar: “Öryggissamfélag” Íslands 
og Bandaríkjanna (Ingimundarson, 2008) an account of Icelandic government 
defence policy vis-à-vis the United States and Keflavík base from the 1990s until 
the base closure in 2006. In addition to building on some of these earlier works, 
this research uses secondary as well as primary research material to re-evaluate the 
importance of the U.S. defence relationship for Icelandic economic development in 
the first decades after the end of Second World War, and the role the relationship 
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played for Iceland to successfully extend its EEZ in the late 1950s and throughout 
the 1970s. 
Moving beyond those historical episodes, this research offers insights, through 
published and unpublished government reports and interviews with government 
officials the implementation of the day to day defence relationship between Iceland 
and the U.S. prior to the 2006 Keflavík base closure, such as sharing of responsibility 
of defence related tasks at the base. Based on primary source material that includes 
government minutes and interviews with those involved in the negotiation process, 
this research then moves on to analyse the 2005/2006 base negotiation that resulted 
in the abrupt closure of Keflavík base and removal of all U.S. military personnel from 
Iceland. The final part of this study is then devoted to how consecutive Icelandic 
governments until 2013 responded to the closure of Keflavík base and how they 
tried to adapt for the loss of U.S. military forces from Iceland. 
This research has considerable value within the field of political science, and in 
particular the subfields of political history and international relations. First of all, 
it examines the dynamics of a defence relationship between two states that are on 
the extremes in the international system when it comes to size and power. Iceland, 
a small state that gained its independence in 1944 and the United States which has 
held the status of a superpower since the end of the Second World War. Secondly, 
this study offers valuable insight into how the United States integrated its defence 
structures with a small state with no defence structure of its own. And thirdly, this 
study assesses the negotiation process that led to the closure of Keflavík base despite 
the fact that neither negotiating side was actively working towards its closure and 
how the shock of the base closure influenced the decision making of consecutive 
Icelandic governments until spring 2013. 
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2. Methodology and theory
2.1. Research methods
For analysing the defence relationship of Iceland and the United States and the 
closure of Keflavík base and its aftermath the most fitting research method is that 
of an explanatory case study. No single definition exists but there are some shared 
assumptions to be found among scholars engaged with the topic. Jack S. Levy notes 
that “Most of us think of a case study as an attempt to understand and interpret a 
spatially and temporally bounded sets of events” (Levy, 2008, p. 2). While Bruce L. 
Berg defines a case study as “… a method involving systematically gathering enough 
information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the 
researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (Berg, 
2009, p. 317). 
For Robert K. Yin, a case study is a two-step procedure. Within the first step 
a case study is defined as “…an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). This 
first step definition, according to Yin, helps us to differentiate between case study 
methods and other research methods, be they qualitative ones, such as ethnography, 
or research done within a controlled environment. The second step incorporates 
data collection and data analysis strategies into the definition: 
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions 
to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
Therefore, the case study method gives the researcher the ability to increase the 
level of conceptual validity as well as aid the construction of hypothesis through the 
exploration of causal mechanisms and complex causal relations (George & Bennett, 
2005, pp. 19-22). 
On this view, the case study research method is not simply a data collection 
approach or even an explicit method of data analysis but a comprehensive technique 
that also embraces the research design itself and its logic. The value of such a design 
is that through a case study method the researcher can reveal the interactions of 
important dynamics and characteristic of a specific phenomenon; as well as enabling 
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the researcher to observe some possible hidden elements and other nuances that 
other research methods might overlook (Berg, 2009, p. 318). 
Data and data collection is an important element in every research and in this 
study I rely on previous publications, newspaper articles, government reports, records 
of the Icelandic Parliament, political party manifestos; archived material in archives 
both in Iceland and abroad as well as semi-structured interviews with individuals 
close to the decision making process in government and public administration. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. In this research the rule of anonymity is 
respected and interviewees are not referred to by name but position only as it relates 
to their role in the events under discussion. When I began planning for this research 
I decided to adhere to the rule of anonymity in the belief that interviewees would 
feel less restrained and more at ease knowing they would be quoted according to 
position rather than name. 
The chapters in this dissertation rely on different sources of data collection. 
Chapter three offers a historiographical account of Iceland’s defence relationship 
with the U.S. and as such relies more on existing literature than later chapters. 
However, important primary sources are also used. Foremost of those are; archived 
documents of the Security Collection (Öryggismálasafn) at the Icelandic National 
Archives; British government documents relating to the Cod Wars, stored at the 
British National Archives in Kew; U.S. embassy cables from the time period 1971-
1973 stored at the U.S. National Archives in Washington D.C accessible through 
online archival databases (AAD); private papers of NATO Secretary General 
Joseph Luns stored at the NATO archives in Brussels also available at NATO 
archives online; private papers of Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson 
in the possession of his son Guðmundur I. Guðmundsson; and the private papers 
of former Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stored at Reykjavík City Archives. 
The private papers of Guðmundsson have been sourced in previous academic works 
( Jóhannesson, 2004 and Ólafsson, 1999). I would like to extend my sincerest thanks 
to Guðmundur I. Guðmundsson to grant me access to his father’s personal papers 
and be allowed to source them for this dissertation.
Chapter four, five and six, rely to a large extend on primary sources such as internal 
Icelandic government documents of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and the archives of the Coast Guard which inherited the archives of the Radar 
Agency and the Defence Agency when the Defence Agency was shut down and most 
of its tasks moved to the Coast Guard. Other sources include primary sources from 
the online archives of former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, interviews 
with relevant actors directly involved in the Icelandic/U.S. defence negotiation, 
decision making on the Icelandic side and implementation of the defence tasks at 
Keflavík base.
Most of those archives I visited in person to gather data. Reykjavík City Archives, 
Icelandic National Archives and the British National Archives in Kew I visited in 
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the winter of 2011/2012. The archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
Coast Guard I visited in the autumn of 2015. Although the internal documents 
sourced have not been published both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
Coast Guard were gracious enough to grant me access after I had presented my 
letter of introduction presenting myself and my research. Special thanks to Jónas G. 
Allansson, at the time Director of the Office of Defence at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and Jón B. Guðnason Chief of Aeronautical Division at the Coast Guard. 
Eternal gratitude to both men for their help and assistance in sourcing relevant 
material used in this dissertation. 
2.2.  Validity and reliability
A valid case study according to Robert K. Yin “…is one that has properly collected 
and interpreted its data, so that the conclusions accurately reflect and represent the 
real world that was studied” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Therefore, the quality of validity 
cannot be underestimated as it is the benchmark for good research. The validity 
tests commonly applied to research projects to assess their quality are threefold: (1) 
construct validity; (2) internal validity; and (3) external validity. External validity 
relates to how applicable research findings are generalised to a general population. 
As a case study of the defence relationship between the United States Iceland this 
research does not claim generalizable findings applicable to defence relationships 
between other states. However, elements influencing the defence relationship, the 
negotiation process that led to the closure of Keflavík base and how the government 
of Iceland attempted to compensate to the departure of U.S. military force from 
Iceland provides insights and lessons learned that can be applicable to similar 
relationships. 
In scientific studies the function of construct validity is the assessment of how 
accurately the dependent and independent variables of the research hypothesis 
measure or reflect what they are supposed to measure (Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002, 
pp. 33-35). The believe that a construct is actually measuring what it is supposed 
to measure is strengthened if a causal relationship is established between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable through two or more data points. 
Construct validity is thus increased by using multiple sources of evidence and by 
measuring each construct in more than one way (Yin, 2009, pp. 41-42). This is often 
referred to as triangulation which is the process of balancing various evidentiary 
sources obtained through a combination of methods. The logic is that similar or 
same results obtained through different techniques validate and confirm the research 
findings (Berg, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
Of course, there are various strengths and weaknesses associated with sourcing 
different material. By relying heavily on secondary sources, I risk accepting other 
17
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
researchers’ interpretation of events instead of reviewing the primary material 
and drawing my own conclusions. However, archival material may be fragmented 
or incomplete giving a partial or one-sided account of events. Equally, interviews 
may not be so reliable. Even though interviews are recorded and transcribed the 
interviewee may not necessarily give an accurate account of the topic under 
discussion. People’s memory can be faulty, it is possibly not in their best interest to 
be truthful or interviewees can be tempted to embellish or exaggerate their own role.
To minimise such biases I have strived to strengthen the construct validity of 
my research by establishing causal links between my research questions and policy 
actions through two or more separate sources of data. Such as by interviewing people 
close to decision making and by sourcing relevant government policy documents. 
A second approach to increase construct validity involves establishing a chain of 
evidence throughout the research. That in essence means building a visible bridge 
between my research questions, data collection and data analysis. In short:
The principle is to allow an external observer to – in this situation the reader of the 
case study – to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to 
ultimate case study conclusions (Yin, 2009, p. 122).
In practical terms it means that every piece of data I source, whether documents, 
archived material, interviews etc. must be stored and cited in such a way that an 
observer can follow the steps I have taken throughout the research. 
Lastly, internal validity of a research project “…concerns the extent to which 
conclusions can be drawn about the causal effects of one variable on another” 
(Hoyle et al., 2002, p. 32). That is to say, how secure am I in claiming that y was in 
fact caused by x but not by z or some other variable. Through this study I apply the 
research method of process tracing. Process tracing is a valuable tool in dissecting 
chain of events and strengthening internal validity as:
The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal processes – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206).
Thus, by scrutinizing each step along the causal pathway, the researcher is able 
to assess whether there are any other possible causes for a particular outcome other 
than those that the research hypothesis assumes to be correct. 
Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman (Bennett & Elman, 2006, pp. 459-460), list a 
number of criteria’s that should be present within a case study analysis for a persuasive 
application of a process tracing method: (1) process tracing analysis should have a 
convincing beginning when analysing a historical episode or a social phenomenon. 
(2) A process tracing account should run continuously with no or as few breaks as 
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possible in the narrative. The reason for this is simple, a missing link in the chain of 
causal processes could mean that an important piece of the puzzle is being left out. 
(3) Within every process tracing analysis, there is evidence that is consistent with a 
number of explanations as well as some evidence that will support one explanation. 
Subsequently, a process tracing analysis will be strengthened if evidence is provided 
for a specific link within the hypothesized chain of events that cannot be substituted 
by any other explanation. (4) Our belief that the hypothesised explanation is 
correct, will be improved, if by process tracing we find tangible evidence through 
data collection that plausible alternative explanations cannot explain specific events 
or decisions. This is especially useful in eliminating rival alternative explanations. 
Lastly, but relating to all of the aforementioned steps (5) process tracing analysis 
becomes more convincing if the issue of confirmation bias is addressed head on by 
the researcher. That is to account for other possible and plausible explanations for a 
chain of events, or in the words of Elman and Bennett (Elman & Bennett, p. 460) 
“…to give these explanations a “fair shake” vis-à-vis the evidence, and to develop 
sufficiently diverse, detailed, and probative evidence to elevate one explanation over 
all others.” 
While the focus of this dissertation is the 2005/2006 U.S.-Icelandic defence 
negotiations and the adaptation of the government of Iceland to the closure of Keflavík 
base, the present is always shaped by past events. Consequently, chapter three gives 
a historiographical account of pivotal historical episodes in Iceland’s relationship 
with the United States and NATO to tweeze out the main characteristics that have 
shaped that relationship. In chapter four the method of process tracing is used to 
analyse the defence function of Keflavík base, what did those functions consist 
of and how were they carried out prior to the closure of Keflavík base in 2006. In 
chapter five process tracing is used to analyse the impact of the defence relationship 
with the U.S. on domestic politics in Iceland, the formation of an Icelandic base 
policy in the 1990s and U.S. policy towards Keflavík base before moving on to the 
2005/2006 base negotiation. Chapter six process traces the assumption of defence 
tasks by the government of Iceland previously the responsibility of the U.S. defence 
force and how successive Icelandic governments adapted to the closure of the base 
during the time period 2006-2013. Chapter seven draws together the results of this 
dissertation in a conclusion chapter.
This study is anchored within the schools of Neorealism and Institutionalism. 
Both schools share the assumption that states are rational unified actors whose 
behaviour is regulated (Monroe & Maher, 1995, p. 2) by specific goals that reflect 
perceived self-interests. As this is a study of a defence relationship between two 
sovereign states bilaterally and through NATO those two schools of thought provide 
appropriate perspective of analysis. 
Both schools assume that preferences of state actors are considered to be stable 
and consistent with highest expected utility chosen. Actors are considered to 
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be informed on the outcome of all alternatives and fully aware of the most likely 
outcome of their choice. However, the assumption that a state actor is able to view all 
possible alternatives and weigh every possible outcome against a function of utility 
does overlook some fundamental issues (Simon, 1995, pp. 46-47). In reality actors 
are not omnipotent entities and the possibility remains that a quicker more efficient 
way to attain a specific goal exists while a wrong action may be taken on the basis of 
incomplete information about a given situation. Additionally, every action carries 
multiple consequences that are impossible to calculate with unintended results 
while pursuing multiple goals at the same time may interfere with the attainment of 
one particular goal. 
These limitations on substantive rationality imply that a theory of rational 
behaviour needs to be supplemented with assumptions about the goals i.e. the actor’s 
conceptualization and information of a given situation, as well as an understanding 
of how an actor interprets the information at hand (Simon, 1985, pp. 294-296). As 
we have set ourselves certain boundaries and expectations regarding how the actor 
behaves this bounded rationality can thus be applied to analyse real-life events. These 
assumptions are then the building blocks of theory which in turn guide research 
and analysis. It follows then that the role of theory is to “…abstract, to generalize, 
and to connect” (Hollis & Smith, 1991, p. 61); as well as “…to explain generalized 
patterns of social behaviour and to guide an interpretation of a particular episode 
or sequence of events” (Levy, 2001, p. 48). The following discussion draws out the 
relevant assumptions of Neorealism and Institutionalism and how these perspectives 
relate to this study.
2.3. Theoretical approach
2.3.1. Neorealism and defence
Arguably the most influential theory, historically, within the field of international 
relations in explaining state behaviour seeking to preserve its existence in the 
international system. Its assumption is that states are driven by self-preservation in 
an anarchical international system with no supranational authority. Fundamental to 
that study is the role power plays in state to state relations. In Theory of International 
Politics Kenneth Waltz defined the international political structure as consisting of 
three components “… the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, 
second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and 
third by the distribution of capabilities across units” (Waltz, 1979, p. 88). 
Borrowing heavily from classical economic theory, Waltz asserted that as with 
firms in a market the international system is a self-help system whose structure is 
defined by the interactions of sovereign states whose basic motivation is to secure 
their own survival (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). The second defining attribute of Waltz 
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political structure is the differentiation of units. But as the lack of any supranational 
authority in an anarchical system forces the units to remain alike Waltz only accepts 
sovereign states as units of the international system and this factor remains constant 
(Waltz, 1979, pp. 93-96). With sovereign states as a constant factor in the system 
it is the distribution of capabilities across the units that prevents the system from 
becoming static. As states face the same goals and tasks their ability to do so varies. 
States are unequal in their military, economic and political power which translates 
into existential concerns over how much power a state has in comparison with others 
(Waltz, 1979, pp. 129-131). States can never be certain about each other’s intentions 
and the lack of any supranational authority translates into a looming possibility of 
force being used in state relations. Therefore, a state must be mindful of relative gains 
in any transaction, i.e. that its share is more than that of the cooperating state. 
Despite inherent caution states must exercise in international cooperation the 
theory of Neorealism is not blind towards the fact that since the end of the Second 
World War international cooperation has steadily increased. This, however, is the 
result of one state gaining a hegemonic status within the international system and it is 
this hegemon which is the guarantor of stability (Gilpin, 1981, p. 144). For stability 
to be maintained within the international system the hegemon must maintain its 
comparative superiority. This hegemonic stability theory frames the foundation of 
the liberal international economic system as being created by the United States as 
a result of its predominant position in the post-war international system and the 
current liberal order will continue to thrive as long as the United States maintains 
its hegemonic status within the international system or is displaced by another state 
which chooses to preserve the stability of the system. 
But how can a state survive in such a system and avoid being gobbled up a rival? 
There are two courses of action available for a state. The first option is to augment its 
own internal strength that manifests in its human capital and economic and material 
basis as well as its organizational capabilities (Handel, 1990, p. 68). However, small 
state attempts to expand its own internal strength to counter external pressure from 
a would-be aggressor are often hampered by a small population base, limited natural 
resources and small geographic area. Consequently, in fielding soldiers and churning 
out economic output a smaller state will always be at a disadvantage compared to a 
larger state. The second option is for states to seek formal alliances with one another 
– or at least an informal support – to deter and fight aggressors. The ideal strategy 
for weaker/small states is to ally with other small states1 and create a balance of 
power against the more powerful states. 
1     In the words of Kenneth Waltz: “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, 
for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and 
safer, provided of course that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to 
dissuade adversaries from attacking (Waltz. K, 1979, p. 127).
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An influential thinker within the school of Neorealism, Stephen Walt, argued 
that it is a particular threat that a state balances against but not power in isolation. 
Having to choose whether to balance or bandwagon a state will always look towards 
what type of threat a power is to that particular state. In this context, threats consist 
of a number of state attributes that include aggregate power, geographic proximity 
and offensive power as well as aggressive intentions (Walt, 1987, pp. 22-26). A 
physically close state with greater industrial and military capabilities, the ability to 
project that military power abroad and with aggressive ambitions to boot will be 
viewed as a threat by other states. And as each state seeks to guarantee its existence 
instances will arise when states are compelled to form an alliance against a greater 
power. In a bipolar international system, the capabilities of each superpower dwarfs 
those of other alliance members which in turn translates into marginal contribution 
of smaller members to the alliance and fundamentally does not affect the overall 
balance of power (Waltz, 1979, pp. 168-170). Leeway for alliance members to 
influence the balance of power between states is therefore severely reduced.
On this view the Cold War period can be explained by the interests and actions 
of the two dominant states within NATO and the Warsaw Pact i.e. the United 
States and the Soviet Union as those blocks were created and shaped by the most 
powerful actors in the international system to provide effective tools for managing 
threat against each other (Mearsheimer, 1995, pp. 13-14), and should be more 
aptly described as security guarantees rather than alliances among equals as the two 
opposing blocs sought to balance each other through build-up of internal capabilities 
and alliance formation. 
However, some scholars (Morrow, 1991 and Leeds & Savun, 2007) argue that 
symmetrical alliances as described above, i.e. alliances that are formed to increase 
the security of its members are in fact less stable than what they term as asymmetric 
alliances (Morrow, 1991). The latter term applies to alliances whereby a state 
receives security guarantees from a larger state in exchange for support or benefits, 
for example the right to set up military bases on its territory. By bartering security for 
autonomy, the members of on asymmetric alliance strike a more balanced alliance 
that is more likely to continue to provide benefits to its members after the original 
threat has receded. 
Leeds & Savun (Leeds & Savun, 2007) build on that assertion and contend that 
alliances between democratic small and larger states are less likely to be abrogated 
opportunistically by its members, and more so if the alliance includes provisions for 
non-military cooperation which in turn increases the cost of abrogation. Although 
alliances between small and large powers are deemed by those scholars as more stable 
than symmetrical alliances Leeds & Savun identify four factors that are crucial to the 
value of an alliance to its members: the level of external threat, military capabilities 
of its members, shared policy goals among the allies and the availability of substitute 
allies (Leeds & Savun, 2007, p.1118). 
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How much autonomy a small state is willing to relinquish in exchange for security 
is open for debate. A crucial factor is of course the vulnerability of a particular state. 
One particular school of thought (Þórhallsson et al. 2018) advances the thought 
that political, economic and societal vulnerability of smaller states relative to larger 
states pushes them towards seeking shelter by allying with larger states, joining 
international organizations and by promoting international norms and rules that 
benefit smaller states to a larger extent than bigger powers. In its most extreme form 
vulnerabilities of a small state may compel it to subordinate itself to a larger state. 
That is to say, severely restrict its autonomy in exchange for security. 
The fate of an alliance after a threat or the power balanced against has disappeared 
is ambivalently addressed by Neorealism. Alliance’s don’t come cheap. Members align 
their defence policies and troops and material must be committed and if the need 
arises members will ultimately go to war. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
unity of an alliance and the willingness of its members to honour their obligations 
(McCalla, 1996, pp. 451-452) depends to a large extend on the perception of a 
threat or the threatening behaviour of a great power. Falling short of forecasting the 
death of NATO, McCalla predicted (McCalla, 1996, p. 454) that the absence of a 
common threat coupled with the pressure of costs would drive NATO members to 
cut military expenditure while members become more assertive and independent 
as inter-alliance disputes over alliance policy grows and members gravitate towards 
other less costly arrangements of international cooperation. 
Other Neorealists bluntly stated their views that the Cold War had indeed been 
the binding glue in alliance cohesion and with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact had lost their purpose and would both end up on the 
ash heap of history (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 5-6). At the same time Stephen Walt 
prophesised (Walt, 1990, p. vii), that “Although NATO’s elaborate institutional 
structure will slow the pace of devolution, only a resurgence of the Soviet threat is 
likely to preserve NATO in anything like its present form.”
While other theorists (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991, p. 124) envisioned NATO 
replaced by a European collective security arrangement similar to the 19th century 
Concert of Europe. Comparable to its predecessor a new European concert 
should consist of the major European powers while also including the United 
States. To succeed the concert would have to be founded on a rule-based system 
and its ability to counter the power of any single state. Of course, the members of 
the concert would have to have a common view of what necessitates a stable and 
acceptable international order and a shared understanding of a specific international 
community founded on the shared belief that preserving that community is in the 
interest of individual nations.
Neorealist predictions that NATO would fade into obscurity have not come true. 
Since the end of the Cold War the alliance has expanded to include 29 states. As 
before the core of the alliance is article V of the Washington Treaty stating that an 
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armed attack against one of its members in Europe or North America is considered 
an attack against all members. Of course, it could be argued that NATO’s survival is 
inherently linked to the unipolar nature of the post-Cold War international system 
(Waltz, 2000, p. 20). The threat instrumental for cohesion among NATO members 
has disappeared but NATO lives on because it serves the interest of the hegemon 
of the alliance i.e. the United States since through the alliance it is able to influence 
the foreign- and security policies of its members, an influence that would be severely 
reduced without the alliance. 
Iceland is a small state with a population well under half a million and has 
been under foreign rule for most of its existence since settlement in the ninth and 
tenth century AD. Throughout the ages, Iceland’s small population base translated 
into lack of a critical mass of people to raise armies while its small material base 
of production and limited natural resources has been far from providing credible 
or effective defences. From a Neorealist perspective, since building up its own 
capabilities to deter and resist possible aggression has not been an option the wisest 
course of action has been to seek formal alliances with other states which has been 
the policy of Icelandic decision-makers since 1941. 
From the signing of Iceland´s first defence agreement with the United States in 
1941 Iceland was firmly placed in the U.S. sphere of influence. A position further 
entrenched with NATO membership in 1949 and the signing of the second 
defence agreement with the United States in 1951. From a Neorealist standpoint 
the defence agreements served both the interests of the United States and Iceland. 
The United States gained an important strategic military base in the North Atlantic 
while Iceland gained an alliance that credibly deterred any future military threat or 
aggression. The decision by the United States in 2006 to close its base in Keflavík 
spelled the end of 65-year continuous U.S. military presence in a country with no 
armed forces of its own.
As an asymmetrical alliance the defence relationship between Iceland and the U.S. 
translated into U.S. use of Icelandic territory for a military base in return for security 
at the expense of national autonomy. After all, the 1951 Defence Agreement between 
Iceland and the U.S. entrusted the U.S., on behalf of NATO, with the defence of 
Iceland and thereby absolving Icelandic governments of individual defence planning 
and preparedness. For most of the post war period the level of external threat and 
shared policy goals remained the same: to deter and resist Soviet aggression in the 
North Atlantic. However, as the Cold War came to an end the policy goals of the U.S. 
shifted away from territorial defence towards intervention during the Yugoslavian 
wars of succession in the 1990s to fighting wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East 
in the early 2000s. 
However, although the Soviet Union was gone Icelandic priorities remained the 
same: keeping the U.S. defence force in Iceland and retain as much of the status 
quo as possible without offering up a credible rational why U.S. military forces 
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should be kept in Iceland. As a result, a logical conclusion should be that the defence 
relationship between Iceland and the U.S. should become less stable in the 1990s and 
onward into the early 2000s as U.S. policy goals shifted to other regions of the world. 
On that view, Icelandic decision makers should have been driven to ensure continued 
U.S. military presence in Iceland during the 2005/2006 defence negotiations, or, at 
the very least, a continued U.S. military guarantee after the base closed down. In the 
years following the closure it should also be expected that Icelandic decision makers 
should move towards deepening defence cooperation with other regional states and 
move towards building up domestic defence capabilities in Iceland to compensate 
for the loss of the U.S. defence force and the defence capabilities that it provided. 
2.3.2. Institutionalism and defence
Institutional theory builds on the foundation of Neorealism but supplements its 
focus on power and interests with international cooperation through informal or 
formal institutions. Or as phrased by Robert Keohane: 
Realist theories that seek to predict international behaviour on the basis of interests and 
power alone are important but insufficient for an understanding of world politics. They 
need to be supplemented, though not replaced, by theories stressing the importance of 
international institutions (Keohane, 2005, p. 14). 
Neorealism gives prominence to power and security while Institutionalism 
focuses on how states benefit by fostering trust by cooperating through institutions. 
Institutionalist theory is not in disagreement with Neorealism about the nature of 
the international system. As in Neorealism the state is viewed as the primary unit 
of an international system that is anarchical in nature. And, as with Neorealism, 
the state is assumed to be a rational self-preserving unit that seeks to maximise its 
own interests. However, what sets Institutionalists apart is the value they place on 
international regimes/institutions in fostering cooperation among states. 
Fully self-interested states in an anarchical international system with no 
supranational authority acknowledge the fact that international cooperation 
provides states with Pareto-efficient gains i.e. optimal solutions that leave all parties 
better off after a transaction (Varian, 2003, pp. 15-16). However, in a self-help system 
cooperation is always threatened by the risk of a state defaulting on its commitment 
for selfish gains. 
In the context of defence, in particular nuclear arms reduction talks, such a 
prisoner’s dilemma runs the risk that after country A and B have agreed to reduce 
their nuclear arsenals the incentive remains for both states to cheat in the hope that 
the other party honours the agreement, thus tilting the balance of power in its favour. 
Of course, by both cheating they will find themselves in the same relative position as 
if no agreement had been reached. Therefore, to ensure that both sides honour their 
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agreement and reach a Pareto-efficient equilibrium a regime or an institution needs 
to be in place that ensures that participants overcome their incentive to cheat (Stein, 
1993, p. 41) as mechanisms to identify co-operators and defectors and means to 
punish and reward provide participants with the incentive to cooperate (Axelrod & 
Keohane, 1985, p. 249). Such regimes or institutions are defined as: 
Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice (Keohane, 2005, p. 57). 
Regimes usually don’t have the power to enforce its rules but through consistency 
in behaviour states gain a reputation for being a reliable partner making them 
desirable for cooperation which becomes reinforced and institutionalized through 
reciprocity (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 250). Through regimes states will come 
to expect certain benefits such as lower transaction costs and patterns of expected 
behaviour that reduces uncertainty and introduce mechanisms to pool resources 
together (Keohane, 2005, pp. 88-94) thus bringing the added value of economics of 
scale. Far from being a perpetual motion machine or depending on the patronage of 
a hegemon a regime will continue to survive as long as its members derive benefits 
that exceed the cost of maintaining that regime. 
While majority of members of a regime see the benefits of maintaining that 
structure the nature of the self-help anarchic international system means that 
the defection of one member can have disastrous consequences. In particular if 
the defection is from a security regime. Consequently, the threat associated with 
defection of others makes states wary of security cooperation (Lipson, 1993, pp. 70-
71). But security regimes can evolve into security institutions if participating states 
“…engage in a formal and contractual obligations to co-operate on security matters, 
and they may choose to create a formal organization to facilitate the pursuit of their 
collective objectives” (Rafferty, 2003, p. 344). For Institutionalists the motivation is 
to provide a more effective balancing against any possible aggressor with the added 
benefit of building trust and alleviating the security dilemma2 among members 
themselves through deepened security cooperation (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995, 
pp. 56-57). Therefore, while security institution, such as NATO, are expensive to 
2     In an anarchical system states can never be certain about each other’s intentions. Therefore, it follows 
that a nation’s military build-up, although intended for defensive purposes, will be perceived by its 
neighbour as a threat – since the weapons can be used for offensive purposes as well. For further discussion 
of the security dilemma see (Jervis, 1982).
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create and maintain its members will chose to do so as long as they perceive that such 
an alliance outweighs the costs. That is to say, the institution provides its members 
with credible collective security while at the same time reducing through pooling 
of resources over-all financial burden on individual states, (Rafferty, 2003, p. 345). 
According to the Institutionalists thinkers Wallander and Keohane (Wallander 
& Keohane, 2002, p. 96) durability and issue density are key factors in determining 
whether members are willing to invest in a security institution. Durability refers 
to how long a specific threat or a challenge is expected to last as members are more 
willing to pay for institutions intended to deal with a long-term security problem. 
While issue density refers to the number and type of issues within a given policy 
area. Within a dense policy area, the members are expected to cooperate on related 
issues through the institution in question. An example is the role NATO played 
during its first years in deterring the Soviet Union but also by rearming Germany 
without provoking fears among France, the United Kingdom and other NATO 
members of a resurging militarily strong Germany since German armed forces were 
placed under a NATO command structure (Tuschhoff, 1999, pp. 141,144) thus 
denying Germany a national chain of command. An arrangement that persisted 
until unification of the two Germany’s in 1990 when a national military chain of 
command was established. 
The importance of norms has been briefly touched upon as they are instrumental 
in complying members to adhere to an expected behavioural process. Development 
of norms and procedures within a security institution such as NATO permits 
members to create a joint understanding of collective rules of behaviour and the 
sharing of different tasks within the alliance (Wallander & Keohane, 2002, p. 94). 
A member that does not comply with certain norms can thus be deemed a defector 
from agreed behaviour.
To build on the example of NATO as an ideal security institution, NATO 
started out in 1949 as an alignment of states but quickly evolved into a highly 
institutionalised security coalition. By the early 1950s NATO had a sophisticated 
institutional structure in place that consisted of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
and a unified military command structure, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE), under the command of a Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR). By institutionalising the alliance its members made individual defection 
more costly as leaving would relinquish benefits inherent in an effective and credible 
nuclear deterrence and a cluster of joint command centres with integrated military 
staff from member countries. Consequently, an attack on a single centre would 
de facto be an attack on all members (Rafferty, 2003, p. 349). By the mid-1950s, 
NATO had settled in its Cold War role of deterring the Soviet Union and managing 
inter-alliance commitment to collective defence. To prevent members from free 
riding within the alliance and contributing their fair share (Tuschhoff, 1999, p. 151) 
members were required by the NATO defence planning system to annually report 
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their current defence capabilities as well as their industrial and financial capacities 
on a standardised NATO questionnaire. The information was then made available to 
all member countries, making it possible for each state to assess on its own how well 
other members were performing Member adherence to norms proved resilient and 
was often the deciding factor in maintaining stable troop levels in Central Europe 
throughout the Cold War (Duffield, 1992, pp. 846-853). 
An institutional account as to why NATO survived the Cold War differs 
fundamentally from the Neorealist narrative. The Institutional narrative argues 
that for member states to use existing NATO procedures and mechanisms to deal 
with new security issues was far less expensive in economic and political terms than 
starting anew (McCalla, 1996, p. 464). Therefore, its members will continue to rely 
on its institutional functions to address security and defence challenges as long as 
the alliance is able to do so at a lower cost than any alternative arrangements. An 
example of such successful adaptability is NATO’s role in post-Cold War conflicts 
such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Wallander, 2000, pp. 708-
709) and involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kay, 2006, pp. 62-74 and Suh, 2007, 
pp. 13-14) from the early 2000s and onward. 
A NATO founding member in 1949, the alliance membership has served as the 
second pillar of Iceland’s defence policy. However, NATO membership was always 
a by-product of its defence relationship with the U.S. that sprung out of the post 
war security environment and the only way for Iceland of securing formal security 
guarantees. In that sense, NATO membership was a continuation of the 1941 
Defence Agreement and the 1946 Keflavík Agreement that gave the U.S. access to 
Keflavík airport. 
The Institutional perspective sheds light on the gains Iceland attained through 
NATO membership. From the signing of the 1951 Defence Agreement Iceland 
was free from investing in its own defence. While willing to engage in formal 
contractual obligations and participate in a formal organization to further collective 
defence objectives Iceland was to a large extent exempt from the costs associated 
with being a NATO member. Iceland would not have contributed soldiers to armed 
conflicts and was excempted from contributing to common defence funding while 
benefitting handsomely from U.S. and NATO defence investment in Iceland. From 
an Institutional perspective Iceland enjoyed a preferential position. Able to gain 
advantages from belonging to a security alliance while being exempt from pooling 
defence resources with other members, apart from the use of Icelandic territory.
Therefore, the closure of the U.S. military base was a blow for the Icelandic 
government. Not only did it have to give serious consideration to how to respond 
to the closure in the context of safeguarding its national defence but it also had 
to assume and maintain defence tasks in Iceland that had previously been the 
responsibility of the United States. Since not doing so would have been a defection 
from expected behavioural norms by other NATO member states.
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While Institutionalists place value on the durability and issue density of a 
security institution to predict the behaviour of alliance members, two separate 
governments threatened in 1956 and 1971 to expel U.S. military forces from Iceland 
and thus undermine the fundamentals of collective defence, thus breaking from 
institutionalized norms and expectations of behaviour. On both occasions, left of 
centre governments used the defence agreement and Iceland’s NATO membership 
to achieve its goal of extending Iceland’s EEZ against forceful opposition of other 
NATO members, in particular the U.K. 
With the original threat of NATO gone by the 1990s usefulness of NATO for 
Icelandic defence and security interests still continued. Defence infrastructure 
funded through common NATO funding remained in place benefitting the 
Icelandic government, such as Search and Rescue provided by the defence force, air 
traffic safety through the forwarding of primary military radar signals to civilian 
aviation authorities and a host of other functions relating to the running of Iceland’s 
primary international airport.
From an Institutional perspective, during the 2005/2006 defence negotiations 
Icelandic decisionmakers should have been driven by the need to preserve those 
defence processes and mechanisms carried out by the U.S. defence force in Iceland as 
they aligned with Icelandic defence interests and NATO expectations. Furthermore, 
after the closure of Keflavík base Icelandic decision makers should have been 
expected to increase Iceland’s activity within NATO structures and agencies in an 
effort to strengthen the institutional pillar of its defence policy seeing how the U.S. 
was no longer willing to provide stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland. 
2.3.3. Alternative theories of explanation
As stated earlier, the perspective of this study is anchored within the theoretical 
schools of Neorealism and Institutionalism and while both schools of thought view 
the state as a rational unified actor other theories of state behaviour look beyond the 
rational unified approach and place emphasis on the influence of domestic politics 
on foreign policy making and the interests and motives of agents i.e. people involved 
in the decision-making process.  
In the context of this study the perspectives of Political Economic thought and 
Social Constructivism offer interesting contending approaches to the explanations 
off actor’s motives offered by Neorealism and Institutionalism during the 2005/2006 
defence negotiation phases and the setup of Icelandic defence arrangements for the 
period 2006-2013.
A valuable insight offered by the Political Economic approach is the light it shines 
on state-society relations as the state is viewed as composing of a multitude of societal 
actors (institutions, individuals, ideas and groups) that shape state preferences 
(Viotti & Kauppi, 2020, p. 87) as such, the Political Economic approach blurs the 
lines between domestic politics and foreign policy goals as they are intrinsically 
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linked with domestic politics: domestic politics shape foreign policy goals which in 
turn impact domestic politics. 
In his study Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games 
Robert D. Putnam (Putnam, 1988) argues that international negotiations between 
states consist both at the international level between governments and at the 
intranational level where domestic interest groups influence the negotiation goals 
with their preferred outcomes. A negotiated agreement therefore reflects outcomes 
acceptable to domestic interest groups.  
The Icelandic defence relationship with the U.S. created economic windfalls that 
benefitted different groups in society representing the business sector, labour unions 
and different regions in Iceland, in particular the communities on the Reykjanes 
peninsula that depended on Keflavík base for employment throughout its 55-year 
existence. In some instances, services provided by Icelandic companies to the defence 
force, such as Icelandic Prime Contractor (Íslenskir Aðalverktakar, ÍAV) formed 
in mid 1950s with an exclusive right to bid on construction projects at Keflavík 
base, had direct financial links to the Independence Party and the Progressive Party 
that formed the backbone of most Icelandic governments throughout the post war 
period. 
Explanations falling under the rubric of Political Economy, i.e. the effect of 
political economic factors on Iceland’s defence relationship with the U.S. would 
predicts that the position of Icelandic decision makers in the 2005/2006 defence 
negotiations with the U.S. would be shaped by economic considerations and 
financial gains of influential interest groups that benefitted from the presence of 
the U.S. defence force in Iceland. Following the closure of the base future defence 
arrangements and domestic setup should also be dictated by groups and individuals 
best situated to shape state preferences. 
A second alternative approach looks at the perception and worldview of the 
individual actors engaged in the defence negotiation process. This is referred to 
as the Constructivist approach. According to the Constructivist approach policy 
makers are not empty vessels but approach policy goals and problems imbued with 
preconceived notions about the world and how it works. 
Social Constructivism brings a sociological perspective onto the field of 
international relations and its subfield of security studies. Social Constructivism 
does not refute the Neorealist and Institutionalist assumption that material 
capabilities are important in analysing matters of state security (Katzenstein, 1996, 
p. 2), but their argument is that the interests of states, including security interests, are 
defined by actors, individuals, who in turn are influenced by factors such as norms, 
identity, and culture. Identity is a key component of actors and can be multiple. In 
its essence, identity are the sets of meaning that an actor has about himself and gives 
him a cognitive sense of what his social role is as well as imbuing him with shared 
expectations and understanding of the social world (Wendt, 1994, p. 385) and 
30
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
actors can acquire various socially constructed identities through their interaction 
with other actors.
When identities and interests are relatively stable, or set within a structure, an 
institution is formed. An institution, in constructivist terms, is basically a cognitive 
phenomenon that does not exist outside the idea of the actor of how the world 
functions. Institutions encompass a shared knowledge that constitutes more than 
simply individual participants. The way that an institution functions is set down in 
norms and formal rules. These norms and rules will only be obeyed though, if those 
involved participate in the collective knowledge of the institution (Wendt, 1992, p. 
399). On this view, institutionalization does not just change the behaviour of actors; 
but internalizes norms and rules that become part of an actor’s social identity, which 
in turn will affect a state’s interests.
From 1991 until late 2005 policy formulation and defence negotiations on 
the Icelandic side with the U.S. were handled by a handful of people thanks to an 
unusually stable political environment that saw Davíð Oddsson holding the office of 
Prime Minister continuously from 1991 until 2004 and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2004-2005. Oddsson left politics in the autumn of 2005, during a critical period of 
the defence negotiation process. And replaced at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by 
Geir H. Haarde. According to the Constructivist approach, the change of a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs during a delicate defence negotiation should lead to a change in 
tactics or negotiation goals if those two actors are notably different in terms of world 
view and outlook and who have internalized different norms which would translate 
into different state interests. 
Equally, following the closure of the base state preferences for future defence 
arrangements are made by individuals that have differing identities and ideas 
about how the world functions. This in turn may affect the state decision making 
preferences in the setup of domestic defence institutions and arrangements during 
the time period of 2006-2013.
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3. Iceland’s defence relationship with the United States
Until the early and mid-20th century Iceland was an isolated part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark on the periphery of Europe. Technological developments and two world 
wars made Iceland an indispensable ally for the United States and the Western 
block during the Cold War. This chapter provides an overview of the fundamental 
vulnerabilities facing Iceland until entering a defence relationship with the United 
States in 1941 and how the defence relationship benefitted Iceland during the 
Cold War. In particular in economic terms in the 1950s and in providing a political 
leverage for Iceland in achieving its major foreign policy objective in the latter part 
of the 20th century, the gradual extension of Iceland’s EEZ until the current 200 
nautical mile EEZ was reached in 1976. 
3.1. Early history 
Iceland was settled in the 9th and 10th century with the arrival of Norse settlers from 
Norway and the British Islands. After decades of conflict between the ruling families 
of Iceland in the 13th century Iceland came under the rule of the Norwegian monarchy 
in 1262 through signing of the Old Covenant (Gamli sáttmáli). In 1380 control of 
Iceland passed over to the Danish monarchy through a marriage between the Danish 
and Norwegian royal houses. Following the eventual abolition of the Kingdom of 
Norway in 1537 Iceland was ruled directly by the Danish king and his officials. 
During the centuries of Danish rule Iceland’s remoteness from Denmark translated 
into difficulty for the Danish monarchy to provide Iceland with adequate defence 
(Thorsteinsson, 1992b, p. 10). In the early 15th century English merchants and 
fishermen increasingly set sail for Iceland and while relations were usually peaceful 
English raiders occasionally robbed the residency of the Danish governor of Iceland 
and looted churches. Throughout the 16th and 17th century there were instances of 
pirates raiding the coast of Iceland with the most notorious raid taking place in 1627 
when Algerian pirates killed up to 50 people and abducted roughly 400 Icelanders. 
Danish warships in Icelandic waters were a rare sight and if seen provided escort to 
Danish merchant vessels. No local military force existed in Iceland although in 1580 
king Fredrik II of Denmark dispatched a shipment of six guns and eight spears to 
every county in Iceland ( Jóhannesson, 1968, p. 123-126) and in 1586 ordered the 
construction of a small fortification in Vestmannaeyjar Island of the south coast of 
Iceland. 
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As a part of the Kingdom of Denmark there loomed the risk that Iceland would 
be dragged into conflicts that Denmark was embroiled in with other nations. A 
notable episode took place in 1809 during the Napoleonic wars. After Denmark 
sided with Napoleonic France the British Navy began to intercept shipping between 
Denmark and her territories in the North Atlantic.
By restricting trade between Iceland and Denmark the British Navy opened up 
lucrative business venture for others (Agnarsdóttir, 1979, p. 29-36) and in January 
1809 a London based soap merchant Samuel Phelps set sail for Iceland on an armed 
merchant vessel. Arriving in Iceland Phelps and his companions were forbidden to 
trade by the local authorities. Not intending to let a good business opportunity go to 
waste Phelps was eventually able to sign a trade agreement with the representatives 
of Danish authority in Iceland. However, the trade agreement Phelps secured was 
nullified by the highest-ranking Danish official in Iceland, Count Trampe, who 
also declared that trading with British merchants would be punishable by death. 
After forcing the Count to honour the previous agreement Phelps and his crew of 
eleven men decided to stage a coup. Trampe was arrested and Phelps appointed a 
Danish prisoner of war, Jørgen Jørgensen, as Lord Protector of a free independent 
Iceland.
In mid-August this little coup came to an abrupt end with the arrival in Reykjavík 
of the British frigate HMS Talbot. Its commander, Alexander Jones, took the view 
that the British government would not sanction the coup as Phelps had violated not 
only British but also international law (Agnarsdóttir, 1999, p. 129). On 21 August 
Jones handed over all power in Iceland to Danish officials. The adventure of Phelps 
and Jørgensen underlines Iceland’s vulnerability, as well as Denmark’s inability to 
provide the island with adequate defences. Iceland’s greatest guarantee lay in its 
remoteness, but as the modern era drew closer that assurance became more and 
more outworn.
In 1874 King Christian IX granted Iceland a separate constitution and in 1904 
the Ministry for Icelandic affairs was transferred from Copenhagen to Reykjavík 
and Icelanders granted home rule.
With the outbreak of war in 1914 Iceland’s dependency on open trade routes in 
the North Atlantic became painfully obvious. After the British government initiated 
an embargo on the Central Powers the British Navy began to intercept merchant 
vessels sailing between Iceland and Denmark and confiscate cargo considered at 
risk of being sold onward to Germany. Understandably the Danish government 
protested this violation of Danish sovereignty. Under the threat that the United 
Kingdom would stop supplying Iceland with coal ( Jónsson, 1969, p. 578-579) the 
Icelandic home rule government agreed in August 1915 that all ships sailing from 
Iceland to European ports would have to make a port-of-call in a British harbour for 
inspection. In the winter of 1915-1916 the British grip on Icelandic foreign trade 
became tighter and tighter.
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In early spring 1916 a trade agreement was signed between the British 
government and the Icelandic home rule government that gave special consideration 
to Icelandic-Danish trade ( Jensdóttir, 1980, p. 105). The British authorities set a 
quota of Icelandic exports that could be traded to Denmark. However, Icelanders 
were allowed to export freely to Britain and other allied and neutral nations except 
for those bordering Germany ( Jensdóttir, 1980, p. 45). For its part, the British 
government was obliged to purchase Icelandic exports that Iceland was unable to 
sell to other markets and to provide Iceland with essential goods such as coal and 
salt. 
This was of course highly unusual as any negotiations on foreign trade should have 
been between the British government and their Danish counterpart in Copenhagen. 
However, the British embargo and British- Icelandic trade relations revealed a 
simple truth: Iceland was within a British sphere of influence and Britain could do 
as it pleased. Danish powerlessness was apparent and all that the Danish government 
– in the form of Minister for Foreign Affairs Erik Scavenius – could hope for was a 
briefing from the Icelandic negotiators on the content of the British-Icelandic trade 
agreement (Björnsson, 1957, p. 101). British interference with Icelandic trade lasted 
until the end of the war. The trade agreement was renegotiated in 1917 and 1918 
and remained valid until 1 May 1919. 
Determining Iceland’s foreign trade policy during the war was not the only 
British interference in Icelandic matters as they also dictated through their Consul 
in Reykjavík that all telegrams sent abroad had to be in either English or French. The 
only telegrams exempt from this rule were ciphered telegrams the British Consul 
sent to his supervisors in London ( Jensdóttir, 1980, p. 17). Why the Icelandic home 
rule government complied with such intervention is quite simple. The only telegram 
cable connecting Iceland with the outside world lay between Iceland and Scotland. 
Therefore, for the British to severe completely Iceland’s communication with the 
outside world was quite easy. 
The 1918 Union Act between Denmark and Iceland was a milestone towards 
Icelandic independence. The Act defined the status of Iceland and Denmark as 
two sovereign states in a personal union that shared as head of state the Danish 
monarch. Giving both states the option to terminate the Union Act after 25 years 
which would grant Iceland a fully independent statehood. The highest level of the 
judiciary remained in Copenhagen until the establishment of the Icelandic Supreme 
Court (Hæstiréttur) in 1920. And in matters of foreign affairs and defence the 
same symbiotic relationship remained between the two states. Without any foreign 
service of its own the Icelandic government formulated its own foreign policy which 
was then implemented on Iceland’s behalf by the Danish foreign service. 
The Union Act stated that Iceland was a neutral state which has to be viewed 
in context of the personal union between Iceland and Denmark as its purpose was 
to prevent Iceland or Denmark from being automatically involved in a conflict 
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alongside the other state. However, Iceland was free to withdraw its neutrality and 
take side in a conflict. The merits of the neutrality clause were hotly debated at the 
time among the political elite in Iceland (Arnórsson, 1923, p. 119). Some were of the 
view that it provided an adequate safeguard against aggression while others argued 
that declarations of neutrality were of limited use and had not protected Belgium 
or Luxembourg from aggression in 1914 and that a declaration of neutrality would 
not protect Iceland during times of war if the great powers believed they could use 
Iceland for their own advantage. 
3.2. The defence relationship with the United States
What remained of the bond between Iceland and Denmark was severed by the Nazi 
invasion and occupation of Denmark on 9 April 1940. On the same day British 
authorities invited the Icelandic government to join the allied cause and requested 
use of facilities in Iceland. The offer was turned down on the basis of the neutrality 
clause of the Union Act (Whitehead, 2006, pp. 30-32) while Icelandic cabinet 
members privately expressed their view to the British ambassador in Reykjavík that 
they hoped British naval dominance in the North Atlantic would deter any German 
aggression against Iceland. 
The British, mindful of their own interests, sprang into action and on 10 May 
1940 a British expeditionary force invaded and occupied Iceland. Later that evening 
Prime Minister Jónasson in a national radio address gave an account of the invasion 
and described the British occupation as a precaution against possible German action 
against Iceland while emphasising that the British government had no intention of 
involving itself in Icelandic domestic affairs.
The United States, still a neutral country in the winter of 1940-1941, was 
increasingly becoming more involved in the allied war cause and actively sought 
ways to alleviate pressure on overstretched British forces. For President Roosevelt 
such a course of action might include replacing British forces in Iceland with U.S. 
troops (Corgan, 1992, p. 139). In late 1940 tentative discussions took place between 
U.S. officials and the Icelandic government. As discussions progressed it became 
clear that the U.S. government was only willing to take over the defence of Iceland 
through a formal invitation from the Icelandic government (U.S. Department of 
State, 1959, pp. 777-780). The issue was debated within the Icelandic government 
since such an invitation signified a fundamental change in Icelandic defence policy 
as it meant abandoning the position of neutrality and joining the allied camp 
(Stefánsson, 1966, pp. 190-194). After all, Iceland was an occupied country and 
had no say in the presence of British troops on its territory. However, by inviting 
U.S. troops to Iceland the government of Iceland was making a sovereign decision to 
accept U.S. military protection. 
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Eventually, the government agreed to renounce neutrality and on 1 July 1941 
an exchange of notes took place between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Jónasson whereby the government of Iceland invited the U.S. government to 
supplement and eventually replace British forces in Iceland. However, the invitation 
depended on a number of conditions that the U.S. government was required 
to meet. Chief among them was a promise that all U.S. military forces would be 
immediately withdrawn from Iceland on the conclusion of the war. The government 
of Iceland would not have to contribute any funding to the defence of Iceland. 
The United States would recognize the independence and sovereignty of Iceland, 
secure shipping to Iceland, grant Icelanders favourable trade agreements and to 
supply Iceland with necessities (U.S. Department of State, 1959, pp. 785-787). 
Simultaneously the Icelandic government reached an agreement with the British 
government to recognise Iceland´s independence after the war and to promote trade 
between the two countries (Thorsteinsson, 1992b, p. 214). After the governments of 
the three countries had reached a final agreement the road was paved for the arrival 
of U.S. troops on 7 July 1941. Two days later the Icelandic Parliament ratified the 
1941 Icelandic-U.S. Defence Agreement and U.S. forces gradually replaced most of 
the British troops in Iceland although some remained in Iceland until 1945.
Throughout the war both U.S. and British military authorites constructed 
a number of military facilities in Iceland. Chief among them were the aiports in 
Reykjavík and Keflavík. Reykjavík airport, constructed by the British in 1940, was 
handed over to the Icelandic authorities but a more complicated picture emerged 
with the handover of Keflavík airport (built by the U.S. in 1942). As early as 1942 
policy makers in Washington D.C. realised that it remained a U.S. strategic interest 
to retain military bases in Iceland after the end of the war and by 1944 the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff concluded that Iceland was second only to England and Greenland 
for U.S. offensive and defensive purposes in Europe (Whitehead, 1998, pp. 18-19). 
Shortly after the end of hostilites in October 1945 the U.S. government formally 
requested a 99-year lease of land for military bases at Keflavík airport and two naval 
facilities close to the capital of Reykjavík. The Icelandic government was willing to 
enter exploratory talks (Whitehead, 1976, p. 144) but rejected the proposal for 
domestic political reasons.
However, in August 1946 the two sides reached an alternative arrangement 
that allowed continued U.S. military use of the airport (Thorsteinsson, 1992b, 
pp. 313,314). Keflavík airport was to be handed over to the Icelandic authorities. 
However, air traffic control and all other aspects of running the airport would 
remain in the hands of a U.S. civilian contractor funded by the U.S. government. 
The so called Keflavík Agreement revoked the Defence Agreement of 1941 and in 
early 1947 all U.S. troops had been removed from Iceland. Far from what the U.S. 
government had been planning for in 1945 the agreement nevertheless gave the U.S. 
a foothold in post-war Iceland.
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Among the Icelandic political establishment there was little support for long term 
U.S. military bases in Iceland but there were clear gains to be had from continued 
U.S. interest in Iceland and miniscule U.S. military presence in Iceland in the form 
of transit flight at Keflavík airport between North America and Europe. There was 
a certain element of deterrence in having American contractors present at Keflavík 
airport and clear financial gains to be had since the Icelandic authorities were fully 
exempt from funding the airport and the Icelandic government could of course 
hope in turn for favourable trade concessions from the United States.
The1918 Union Act came to an end in 1944 and Iceland emerged as a fully 
independent state. Following the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 the wartime 
alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union quickly unravelled and by 
1947 it was clear that the two powers were becoming locked in a Cold War. 
The precarious world situation was not lost on Iceland’s coalition government3 
formed in February 1947 or the political leadership in neighbouring Scandinavian 
countries who shared their concerns of Soviet expansion and aggression with their 
Icelandic colleagues (Stefánsson, 1967, pp. 42-43 and Jónsson, 1973, pp. 132-133). 
The formation of a regional security defence regime in Scandinavia was dreamt up 
and the leaders of Sweden, Denmark and Norway discussed the creation of a Nordic 
defence alliance. Deliberations began in May 1948 but soon reached a dead end 
because of a fundamental disagreement to the premise of such an alliance. Sweden 
insisted that the alliance would have to be based on the concept of neutrality and 
non-alignment (Lundestad, 1980, pp. 211-212) while Norway and Denmark 
insisted on close alignment with western powers.
The Icelandic government followed the discussions from afar but was looking 
westward rather than eastward in seeking defence guarantees. In the autumn of 
1948 the U.S. ambassador in Reykjavík, Richard P. Butrick, brought up with 
Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson the possible creation of a defence alliance 
that would include North America and Western Europe and sought his views on 
a possible Icelandic participation (BB, 1948). Benediktsson informed Butrick 
that he would have to consult his government before a formal invitation could 
be received and that the position of the Icelandic government would be greatly 
influenced by what position the Danish and Norwegian governments had towards 
such an alliance. 
In late January 1949 Benediktsson consulted with both Danish Foreign Minister, 
Gustav Rasmussen, in Copenhagen and the Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard 
Lange in Oslo. The Danish position was that the government was considering 
the U.S. proposal as an alternative option in case the Scandinavian defence talks 
would fail (BB, 1949a), however, the political parties were divided on the issue 
3     The coalition government consisted of Social Democrats, Progressive Party and the Independence 
Party, headed by the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Stefán Jóhann Stefánsson.
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and the Danish government would have to obtain more information about what 
membership entailed before making any commitments. 
In Oslo Benediktsson received a similar pragmatic and cautious reply as in 
Denmark. Foreign Minister Lange explained that the Norwegian government 
would most likely choose to participate in treaty talks with the United States as he 
did not expect the creation of a Scandinavian alliance to become a reality. However, 
the Norwegian government would insist that there should be no foreign bases in 
Norway during peacetime (BB, 1949b). Having mapped out the position of Iceland’s 
fellow Nordic nations Benediktsson informed Lange that his government desired to 
be able to consult with Norway on these matters since Icelanders lacked expertise 
and knowledge in military matters to which Lange responded favourably. 
Eventually in March 1949 the Department of State invited the government of 
Iceland to send a delegation to Washington D.C. for further discussions about the 
proposed alliance. Made primarily up of representatives of the three-party coalition 
government the delegation consisted of Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson 
(Independence Party), Minister for Commerce and Trade Emil Jónsson (Social 
Democratic Party), Minister for Education, Eysteinn Jónsson (Progressive Party), 
the ambassador to the United States Thor Thors and Hans G. Andersen from the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
The delegation was greeted at the State Department by Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson who was flanked by a number of high-ranking officials. Acheson framed the 
discussion by acknowledging that Iceland had no armed forces of its own and that 
the government of Iceland had no desire for foreign troops to be stationed in Iceland 
during peacetime. After giving a brief introduction to the general principles of the 
treaty articles Acheson took his leave and allowed the talks to continue without his 
presence. 
The discussion that followed centred on the obligations Iceland would be 
expected to assume as a member of the alliance (U.S. Department of State, 1975). 
The primary goal for the Icelanders was to ensure that foreign troops and bases would 
not be placed in Iceland during peacetime while there were also concerns that that an 
agreed treaty would oblige Iceland to renew the 1946 Keflavík Agreement. Director 
of the Office of European Affairs John D. Hickerson was the one to answer by saying 
that alliance members would need certain facilities in Iceland and Keflavík airport 
would have to be available during emergencies. However, maintenance would most 
likely be funded by the U.S. government. With regard to foreign forces in Iceland, 
rather than relying on static forces the intention was to ensure the protection of 
Iceland through the control of the air and sea lines of communication. 
The Icelanders were content with leaving the issue of bases aside for the time being 
but inquired whether the U.S. and the U.K. would not be automatically compelled to 
aid Iceland if attacked because its importance to their interests regardless of whether 
Iceland became a member of the alliance or not. Not disagreeing with that statement 
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Charles E. Bohlen, counsellor at the State Department, replied that Iceland would 
be sending out signals that the Soviet Union might take advantage of and help would 
only arrive after an attack had taken place. The Icelanders also inquired whether 
Iceland could stand outside the treaty but declare instead that Iceland would provide 
the U.S. and the U.K. with facilities in Iceland if war broke out. In turn, the U.S. and 
the U.K. would announce that an attack on Iceland equalled an attack on them. 
Bohlen and Hickerson replied that the Icelanders were talking about a separate 
alliance between Iceland and the U.S. and the U.K. which was not on the table and 
neither was a unilateral U.S. security guarantee for Iceland. 
Reconvening the day after the U.S. side was reinforced by officials from the 
Pentagon. The purpose of this second meeting was to discuss Iceland’s military 
vulnerability and provide answers to any questions of a defence and military nature 
the delegation might have. For the Icelanders the fundamental issue remained 
that no foreign forces should be based in the country during peacetime while at 
the same time not jeopardizing Iceland´s security. It came to Air Force Major 
General Anderson to answer this question. Anderson pointed out that Iceland 
was strategically well placed for an attack both on the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, in the event of war both sides would try to prevent the other 
from using Iceland for military purposes. Navy Admiral Wooldridge backed up his 
colleague and pointed out that it would be possible to reinforce Iceland prior to 
outbreak of war as hostilities are usually preceded by a period of escalation. 
With good planning and facilities in place Iceland would be reasonably secure 
without permanent troops in the country as a Soviet attack would most likely 
involve landing small number of troops in submarines and freighters or the use of 
paratroopers to capture important airfields. Anderson and Wooldridge emphasised 
that the United States would never tolerate Soviet controlled Iceland regardless of 
whether Iceland would be a member of the planned military alliance or not (BB, 
1949c). A counter attack to retake the island would incur huge damage and loss of 
life since most of the population in Iceland was concentrated in the South-West of 
the country in close vicinity to the main airports and harbour. 
The final meeting was convened in the State Department on 16 March. Holding 
firm to its position that no foreign troops should be stationed in Iceland during 
peacetime the Icelanders sought a confirmation that facilities in Iceland would not be 
required unless a member state had been attacked which invoked article V of the treaty 
agreement stipulating that attack on one-member equalled attack on all. Hickerson 
agreed that article V would have to be invoked or a state of an emergency declared 
in which the government of Iceland would have to decide whether to accept foreign 
troops or not of its own free will. At the conclusion of the final session Hickerson 
stated that the United States would be willing to publicly declare that alliance 
member’s understood Iceland’s special status as a country without armed forces and 
that no foreign troops or bases should be stationed in Iceland during peacetime.
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Shortly after the delegation returned to Iceland the government put forth a 
resolution in Parliament that would commit Iceland to membership of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Intense debates ensued in Parliament 
with the Socialist Party vehemently against membership as they saw it as one step 
towards delivering Iceland into the hands of American imperialism (Guðlaugsson 
& Jónsson, 1976, p. 130). Parliament voted on membership on 30 March 1949 
under a hailstorm of broken glass as socialist demonstrators in front of Parliament 
bombarded the parliament building with rocks. Accession was approved with 37 
votes against 13. Opposed were all the members of the Socialist Party, two members 
of the Social Democratic Party, and one member of the Progressive Party while two 
Progressive Party members abstained. 
As previously discussed, one of the main concerns of the Icelandic delegation 
during the Washington talks in March 1949 had been that no military bases or 
foreign troops should be placed in Iceland during peacetime. During the Second 
World War, tens of thousands of foreign soldiers lived amongst the 120,000 natives 
of Iceland and although relations between Icelanders and allied soldiers were mostly 
amiable such high numbers of foreign soldiers did cause tension within an Icelandic 
society coming to grips with its own post-independence identity and was viewed by 
many Icelanders as a threat to Icelandic cultural integrity.
However, the Icelandic insistence not to accept foreign troops in Iceland – coupled 
with the absence of any Icelandic defence force – was a source of frustration for 
policy makers in Washington D.C. as evidenced in a report by the U.S. Department 
of State, dated 15 May 1950:
This inconsistency between Iceland’s unwillingness to undertake any measures in its 
own defence on the one hand, and its desire for protection on the other, is manifested 
in the attitude of Icelanders toward the Keflavik airport. Recognition of its strategic 
importance had led the government to acquiesce in its existence – and to use it as a 
bargaining point in obtaining such financial and other assistance as they have desired. 
Nevertheless, they have not only remained opposed to any military measures designed 
to protect Keflavik against sudden attack but have shown a continuing urge to assume 
full control over the airport even though they are neither technically nor financially 
able to operate it (U.S. Department of State, 1977, p. 1466).
Justified or not, what the U.S. Department of State perceived as an apathetic 
Icelandic approach to its own security would soon change with events taking place 
in South East Asia. On 25 June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. Coinciding 
with mounting tensions in Europe between East and West was the appearance of a 
Soviet herring fleet in the fishing grounds off the coast of northern Iceland. 
Icelandic decision makers could not dismiss the possibility that this was a 
disguised Soviet naval convoy as gun mountings were spotted on ship decks although 
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no visible weaponry was in sight (FO-371/86501, 1950c). Foreign Minister Bjarni 
Benediktsson voiced his concerns to the U.S. and British ambassadors and the U.S. 
response was to offer to send four destroyers to Icelandic waters. Shortly after the 
destroyers arrived in Reykjavik harbour rumours spread that locals had spotted a 
submarine in the waters off Reykjanes peninsula close to Keflavík airport. The U.S. 
and British authorities confirmed that none of their submarines were in the area 
prompting the Icelandic government to request for the destroyers to be stationed 
in Iceland until the Soviet herring fleet had departed later in the autumn (FO-
371/86501, 1950d). The U.S. and British authorities were inclined to regard the 
mysterious submarine as a mere rumour while considering whether this scare could 
be used to press Icelanders into improving the defences of Iceland. 
Instead of relying on direct pressure the U.S. State Department and the British 
Foreign Office decided to make an appeal to Nordic solidarity and see if Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, during a visit to Iceland, would be willing to try 
to influence Icelandic decision makers (FO-371/86501, 1950e). Initially, the State 
Department decided to remain in the background and only approach Lange in 
case the British felt it necessary. The purpose was to prevent the Icelanders from 
getting the impression that Lange was simply serving U.S. and British interests (FO-
371/86501, 1950e). In his conversation with the British ambassador in Oslo Lange 
promised to do his best and understood the importance of framing his concerns as 
genuine Norwegian defence concerns (FO-371/86501, 1950a). 
In late August Benediktsson and Lange met at a reception held by the Norwegian 
Embassy in Reykjavík (INA, 1950). As promised, Lange made it clear to 
Benediktsson that it was unacceptable that the airports in Keflavík and Reykjavík 
were without any defences. Nordic cooperation, Lange continued, was worth little 
if the Nordic countries did not realise that they belonged to a group of free nations. 
Therefore, Icelanders should take the initiative and organize a defence force to 
defend its airports. Such a move would be beneficial to Iceland and increase the sense 
of security among Iceland’s neighbours. If the creation of such an Icelandic defence 
force was unfeasible for the Icelandic government then other measures would have 
to be taken Benediktsson replied that the Icelandic government had already decided 
to act on the matter and was exploring a number of alternatives. 
Following his return to Norway, Lange informed the British ambassador on 
his conversation with Foreign Minister Benediktsson (FO-371/86501, 1950b). 
Although vague, Benediktsson’s reply was not intended to brush Lange off. The day 
they met the government had deliberated about how to respond to Iceland´s lack 
of military capabilities in the light of recent world developments. It seemed that the 
choice stood between formation of an Icelandic defence force, the reintroduction 
of foreign troops in Iceland, or some combination of both (Ingimundarson, 1996, 
p. 205). Cabinet was unable to reach a conclusion but it decided that Benediktsson 
should use an upcoming NAC meeting in New York to question what precautions 
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would be necessary in Iceland. In preparation for the Foreign Ministers visit to 
New York a NATO Standing Group delivered a memo to the Icelandic embassy 
in Washington D.C. outlining the vulnerability of Icelandic airports and seeking 
response from Iceland decision makers to how the security of these facilities could 
be guaranteed.
On 19 September 1950, Benediktsson and his aides meet with the NATO 
Standing Group in Washington D.C. Representing the NATO Standing Group 
were its chairman Lt. General Paul Ely, General Sir Neil Ritchie, and General Omar 
Bradley. The meeting focused on what possible Soviet threats Icelanders could be 
faced with and how the United States on behalf of NATO could respond to those 
threats. 
Chairman Ely began by stating Iceland’s importance for the western powers as 
the centre for domination of the sea lines of communication through the Atlantic 
Ocean connecting Europe and North America. Iceland’s geographical location, 
straddling the sea zone between Greenland, Norway and the U.K., created a land 
barrier that prevented free movement of Soviet naval forces from their northern 
bases into the Atlantic. Consequently, if war broke out the Soviet Union would most 
likely try to occupy Iceland through an attack in the early stages of hostilities that 
would involve external attack and actions by Icelandic communists to undermine 
the government (BB, 1950). Excluding invasion, the Soviets would use air raids, 
naval blockade, sabotage or raids by special forces to prevent the allies from using 
Iceland. 
Following the Chairman’s opening statement, it was time for the Icelanders to 
speak. Benediktsson reiterated the understanding of his government when it decided 
to join NATO that Iceland could be defended without foreign troops or bases on its 
soil (BB, 1950). Relations between east and west had taken a turn for the worse but 
Icelanders lacked understanding of military matters and their fundamental concern 
remained that stationing foreign troops in their country would lead to gradual loss 
of Icelandic sovereignty. 
After both sides had framed their opening positions discussion turned to short- 
and long-term plans already approved by the Standing Group for troop movement 
to Iceland in case of war. The plans envisioned between 3,500-10,000 troops 
deployed to Iceland after hostilities had broken out. Chairman Ely pointed out that 
these were wartime plans while Iceland’s peace time requirements were a total of 
1,200 men consisting of a security battalion of ground troops accompanied by one 
squadron of fighter planes plus certain elements of air warning and anti-aircraft guns. 
Benediktsson and his aides made it clear that his government would only reverse its 
previous position and allow foreign troops in Iceland because it believed that they 
were needed to ensure the security of Iceland. Therefore, it would be a decision by 
government of Iceland to decide whether the danger had receded enough for them 
to leave. 
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As during the negotiations that led to the 1941 Defence Agreement the topic 
of who would pay for the defence force was bound to crop up. Benediktsson 
rightly pointed out that Icelandic participation in such a defence force would be a 
disproportionate burden for the small nation. After all, the capital Reykjavík was a 
city of 55,000 people with only 110 police officers in total. Chairman Ely clarified the 
issue and said that the term “Icelandic participation” referred to the simple fact that 
all alliance members were expected to participate in their own defence. Benediktsson 
argued that in light of Iceland’s precarious financial situation and limited resources 
this was one of the most important question which both parties must understand 
to the fullest (BB, 1950). Besides, it was not Iceland itself that other countries were 
interested in but rather its strategic value. Chairman Ely responded that the role of 
this Standing Group was to evaluate the military aspects of troop deployment to 
Iceland but he was confident that the costs would not be borne by Iceland. 
A month later the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping formally 
recommended that negotiations should begin between the Icelandic and United 
States government regarding the defence of Iceland. However, neither government 
took the initiative to begin negotiations. In early January 1951 the Icelandic 
government received a formal communication from the NATO Standing Group 
with detailed assessment of a required peace time defence force for Iceland which 
had risen to 2,600-3,300 troops (Thorsteinsson, 1992b, p. 366). On 14 January the 
government of Iceland opened up negotiations with the United States with a formal 
response to the Standing Group. 
The first meeting took place in Reykjavik in mid-February and by early March 
the two sides had almost reached an agreement on the stationing of 3,900 U.S. 
military personnel in Iceland on behalf of NATO. The issues that remained to be 
ironed out were aspects relating to civil aviation and the duration of the agreement 
(U.S. Department of State, 1985). In late March Benediktsson attended a meeting 
of Nordic Foreign Ministers in Oslo and used the opportunity to brief Foreign 
Minister Lange on the state of affairs (Thorsteinsson, 1992b, p. 370). Lange began 
by thanking Benediktsson for keeping the Norwegian ambassador in Reykjavik 
informed about the defence negotiations after which Benediktsson began to sketch 
out the remaining point of contention, i.e. the duration of the agreement. The U.S. 
preference was that the agreement should be valid for either 20 years or the duration 
of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. However, to the Icelandic government an 
agreement that could not be terminated unilaterally by either party was unacceptable. 
Lange lent support to the Icelandic position and promised to support Iceland if the 
matter would be brought in the NAC. 
The negotiations continued after Benediktsson returned to Iceland and the U.S. 
side eventually swung to the Icelandic position. Shortly afterwards the content of the 
negotiated defence agreement was introduced in Parliament to the parliamentary 
groups of all political parties apart from the Socialists. On 5 May the agreement 
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was signed by Benediktsson and the U.S. ambassador to Iceland. The 1951 Defence 
Agreement incorporated the previous Keflavík Agreement and stipulated that on 
behalf of NATO the United States would provide Iceland with a defence force at no 
cost to the Icelandic government and the agreement could be terminated unilaterally 
by either party. Two days after its signing the first U.S. troops arrived at Keflavík 
airport. 
The defence agreement (U.S. Department of State, 1951) gave the U.S. military 
an important foothold in Iceland and a valuable base in the North Atlantic. 
While this goal had been actively pursued by the U.S. since 1946 the agreement 
also benefited Iceland. Icelandic decision-makers were apprehensive about 
Iceland’s vulnerabilities and did actively seek military protection. While the 
defence agreement allocated land and facilities to the U.S. military it also gave the 
government of Iceland an important leverage. Article III of the agreement stated 
that both governments had to agree to how the U.S. military utilized its facilities 
in Iceland and article IV stated that the government of Iceland had the authority 
to decide the total number of military personnel stationed in Iceland. The biggest 
headache during the negotiation process had been the terms of termination. 
According to Article VI either party could request the NAC to review the need for 
military facilities in Iceland and make subsequent recommendations whether to 
continue the defence agreement or not. Following NAC assessment either country 
could after six months’ time abrogate the agreement which would render it invalid 
after a further period of twelve months. 
 
3.3. The relationship as a source of financial assistance 
By anchoring Iceland in NATO and by negotiating a bilateral defence agreement 
with the U.S. Icelandic decision makers had secured a credible deterrence against 
possible Soviet aggression. However, in 1953 The Korean War came to an end with 
the signing of an armistice and the scare of Soviet expansion into Europe receded. 
As relations between East and West seemed to be normalizing the issue of foreign 
troops stationed in Iceland crept into the agenda of the democratic political parties4 
in Parliament. In particular the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party.
Opposition among the Progressives and Social Democrats originated in the 
Icelandic precondition in 1949 when joining NATO that foreign troops should 
not be stationed in Iceland during peacetime. But the opposition also had a tactical 
element more to do with electoral manoeuvring than matters of defence. 
4     The socialist People’s Alliance, formerly the Socialist Party and before that the Communist Party of 
Iceland, was ferociously against Icelandic membership in NATO and the defence agreement since many 
of its members were ardent communists.
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Since 1950 the government had consisted of a two-party coalition of the 
Independence Party and the Progressive Party. Following national elections in 1953 
the parties renewed their coalition but became increasingly strained in the next two 
years. As the 1956 elections drew closer the Social Democratic and Progressive Party 
leadership formed an election alliance (Þórarinsson, 1986, pp. 263-264) intending 
to form a coalition government after the election. On 28 March 1956 the Social 
Democratic Party and the Progressive Party introduced in Parliament a resolution 
calling for revision of the defence agreement. The resolution was passed with the 
support of members of all parties in Parliament except the Independence Party. On 
22 June the NAC received a formal request from the Icelandic government to review 
continued necessity for defence forces in Iceland. 
On 24 July 1956 the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party formed 
a coalition government with the pro-Soviet People’s Alliance. In matters of foreign 
policy the leaders of the three parties agreed to revise the defence agreement with 
the intention of removing U.S. forces from Iceland while domestically the coalition 
set itself a goal of increasing investment in industry and agriculture and to construct 
a new hydropower plant in the south of Iceland ( Jónsson, 1969, p. 770). 
The formation of a coalition government in Iceland with a pro-Soviet party 
on board sent shock waves through other NATO members. This was a particular 
concern since unlike other NATO members Icelandic trade with the Soviet Union 
had steadily increased throughout the early 1950s. Raising fears in capitals in Europe 
and North America that Iceland was drifting into a Soviet sphere of influence. 
Ironically, a 1953 trade agreement between Iceland and the Soviet Union had 
been triggered by a landing ban on Icelandic fish products in the U.K. instigated by 
trawler owners in Hull and Grimsby as a response to a decision by the government 
of Iceland to extend Iceland’s territorial sea from three to six miles. 
Gaining the attention of the Soviet leadership had not been hard since it had 
already decided to renew trade with Iceland after a few years’ lull. However, the 
Soviet leadership had decided that the renewed trade relationship should be used 
strategically to support the Icelandic Socialists and influence political developments 
in Iceland (Ólafsson, 1999, pp. 164-165). Following the signing of the 1953 trade 
agreement 13% of Icelandic exports found its way to the Soviet Union and would 
remain at 17% throughout the 1950s, a much higher percentage than in any other 
NATO country ( Jónsson, 2004, p. 75). 
The U.S. government responded to Socialist infiltration of the government by 
requesting NATO headquarters in Paris to cease forwarding confidential documents 
to Iceland out of concern they might end up in the hands of Socialist government 
ministers (Ingimundarson, 1999, pp. 91-92). The ban only lasted few months as 
in September 1953 the Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jónasson threatened 
the British ambassador in Reykjavik that Iceland would leave NATO if transfer of 
confidential documents was not resumed. 
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Roughly a month after receiving the formal request to review the necessity of 
the defence agreement the NAC handed its recommendations to the Icelandic and 
U.S. government on 26 July. In short, the assessment asserted that Iceland remained 
an important link in safeguarding the air and sea communications between North 
America and Europe and a key point in providing defences for supply convoys 
crossing the Atlantic and aircrafts making the crossing from America to Europe. 
The NAC assessment concluded that if the defence agreement would be terminated 
then:
…it would be possible for an aggressor to seize control of Iceland with very small forces, 
either airborne or of the seaborne commando type, before effective assistance could 
be rendered. […] It should be borne in mind that an aggressor planning to attack the 
Alliance would in such conditions be strongly tempted, as a preliminary for such an 
attack, to seize an unprotected Iceland because of its geographical position. Action 
necessary to evict the invader would in all probability involve great destruction and loss 
of life (U.S. Department of State, 1956, p. 307).  
Furthermore:
It is the tangible and visible evidence of forces and installations in being, in place and 
ready, which constitutes an effective deterrent against aggression. An effective deterrent 
is our greatest safeguard against the outbreak of war. The North Atlantic Council, 
having carefully reviewed the political and military situation, find a continuing need 
for the stationing of forces in Iceland and for the maintenance of the facilities in a state 
of readiness (U.S. Department of State, 1956, p. 308).
Following the circulation of the assessment among other alliance members the 
Icelandic ambassador to NATO, Haraldur Kroyer, requested the NAC to withhold 
its public release until the Icelandic government had been given time to study it in 
detail. The request irritated the U.S. ambassador, George Walbridge Perkins, on the 
ground that Iceland had already gone ahead prior to the release of assessment and 
issued a press statement explaining its rationale in revising the defence agreement. 
The issue came to blows during a NAC meeting on 31 July. The U.S., backed by 
U.K., France, Belgium and Canada, argued that the Icelandic press statement 
made no reference to the fact that the Council was discussing its recommendation 
on needed revision of the defence agreement. Therefore, the Council would be 
put in an embarrassing position by complying with the Icelandic demand (FO-
371/124888, 1956e). Supported by Denmark and Norway Kroyer maintained that 
the press release had merely been a general statement of policy and warned that 
immediate publication could poison the atmosphere between Iceland and other 
NATO members. The eventual decision was that, regardless of Icelandic wishes, the 
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Council would release the text of its recommendation to the public on 3 August 
1956. 
The press release that caused irritation among other alliance members had been 
circulated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the press and embassies in Reykjavík 
on 30 July. The statement explained the government policy towards the defence 
agreement and asserted that this was not a new policy but a reversion to Iceland’s 
original policy of 1949 that no foreign troops should be stationed in Iceland during 
peacetime. Therefore, all U.S. military forces should be withdrawn and the Icelandic 
authorities should take over protection and maintenance of defence facilities that 
would be kept in a condition of readiness if needed. The statement concluded that: 
The objective of the government in revising the Agreement is therefore by no means 
to alienate itself from NATO but, on the contrary, to preserve its participation in the 
Organization and to keep the defence installations intact, without however, stationing 
foreign forces in the country (FO-371/124888, 1956b). 
The government policy of abrogating the defence agreement was rattling nerves of 
the leaders of fellow Nordic NATO members. In late July Iceland’s Foreign Minister, 
Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson, paid a private visit to Norway to discuss the base 
issue with Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange. 
A Social Democrat, Guðmundsson, was both a supporter of Iceland’s membership 
in NATO and privately backed continued U.S. military presence in Iceland. During 
their four-hour long talk (FO-371/124888, 1956a) Guðmundsson outlined his 
preferred course of action. Following the revision of the agreement Icelanders would 
take over much of the work carried out by the Americans at the base. Within the 
government he would advocate continuation of U.S. reconnaissance flights out of 
Keflavík airport as they were important for the security of Iceland. A squadron of 
fighter planes would possibly be allowed to continue to operate at the base although 
getting his fellow socialist coalition partner to agree to that would certainly be more 
difficult. Since the plan called for removal of U.S. troops to guard Keflavík base 
facilities Guðmundsson hoped that the U.S. government would find it technically 
feasible to station some form of a defence force in Greenland that could respond to 
any threats to Keflavík base. 
However, leaving Keflavík base in civilian hands was completely unacceptable 
to the U.S. government. The U.S. ambassador to Norway made this point to the 
Norwegians government with the hope that they would convey the information 
to the Icelanders (Berdal, 1997, p. 144), while the U.S. ambassador in Denmark 
was advising the Danish Prime Minister, H. C. Hansen, that “Danish and other 
Scandinavian influence should be brought to bear as fully as possible on Icelandic 
official and public opinion, in the direction of sanity” (FO-371/124888, 1956d). 
Hansen, not downplaying the gravity of the situation, chose to emphasise that there 
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were many NATO supporters in the new Icelandic government, not least the new 
Foreign Minister.
The first preparatory talk between the Icelandic government and the U.S. 
government for revision of the defence agreement took place in early October 1956 
at the State Department in Washington D.C. (INA, 1956a). The revocation of the 
agreement had been coaxed in terms of freeing Iceland from hosting foreign troops 
but during the meeting Icelandic negotiators drew clear lines between economic 
assistance and the retention of the defence agreement. Present at the first meeting, 
were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Undersecretary Herbert Hoover Jr., 
and Assistant Secretary of Defence Gordon Gray. Representing the government of 
Iceland was acting Foreign Minister Emil Jónsson, in the absence of Foreign Minister 
Guðmundsson, Ambassador Thor Thors, and Vilhjálmur Þór Þórarinsson on behalf 
of the Progressive Party. 
Secretary Dulles opened the talks by emphasising that the United States and 
Iceland had through NATO membership, taken on certain obligations. This said, 
however, revisions in light of changed circumstances were of course understandable. 
Dulles stated that the United States would happily remove their troops from Iceland 
if the NAC came to the conclusion that they were no longer needed. He understood 
that foreign military forces, although in slight numbers, might cause difficulties 
for a small nation. But Iceland could not escape its military importance arising 
from its geographic position. Acting Foreign Minister Jónsson thanked Secretary 
Dulles for his opening words before outlining the policy of his government which 
remained that during peace time no foreign troops should be stationed in Iceland. 
After framing the Icelandic position Jónsson advised that a possible way forward 
would be to give Þórarinsson a change to discuss Iceland’s economic problems before 
resuming talks on the future of the defence agreement. A decision was made to make 
room for Þórarinsson to meet with representatives from the State Department, the 
U.S. Treasury and the U.S. foreign assistance program International Cooperation 
Administration before resuming negotiations. The meetings with Þórarinsson 
revealed to U.S. officials that the Icelandic government was going to make survival 
of the defence agreement dependant on financial aid. On behalf of the Icelandic 
government Þórarinsson requested large loans to be used for the construction of the 
River Sog hydropower project (Ingimundarson, 1996, p. 328) and favourable loans 
to fund imports to Iceland. 
When formal discussions resumed Undersecretary Herbert Hoover Jr. – 
substituting Secretary Dulles – was able to inform Jónsson that the United States 
government would carefully study Iceland’s economic and financial problems 
as outlined by Þórarinsson and that the U.S. was willing to lend Iceland up to $5 
million to complete the Sog hydropower plant. However, the loan was to be granted 
on the condition that electricity generated by the plant would be sold to the defence 
force at Keflavík base. Additionally, the U.S. government was considering lending 
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Iceland funds through a so-called PL-480 program to finance Icelandic import 
needs. Jónsson thanked Hoover for his statement and commented that he believed 
the main goals of his visit had been achieved (INA, 1956b). The two sides then 
decided that negotiations regarding the future of the defence force should take place 
the following November in Reykjavík. 
It was not only the promise of financial assistance and favourable loans that 
ensured the eventual retention of the defence agreement. Increased tension in the 
international security environment also had a role to play. A few weeks before 
negotiations were set to take place Israel invaded Egypt, sparking the Suez Crisis, 
while in Eastern Europe a revolt in Hungary was brutally crushed by the Soviet 
military. Unfolding of these events set the atmosphere for the negotiations in 
Reykjavík. On 24 November both sides agreed to suspend further talks on the 
removal of the defence force and issued a joint press statement that read:
…recent developments in world affairs and the continuing threat to the security of 
Iceland and the North Atlantic community call for the presence of defense forces in 
Iceland under the United States-Iceland Defense Agreement of May 5, 1951, and 
therefore that the discussions requested by the Government of Iceland concerning 
the revision of the agreement and the withdrawal of the defense force should be 
discontinued (U.S. Department of State, 1957c).
However, an added novelty emerged from the session which was the establishment 
of a joint U.S. Icelandic Defence Group as a consultation forum in matters relating 
to the defence force and intended to promote increased participation by Icelandic 
nationals in tasks performed by the Defence Force (U.S. Department of State, 
1957a, p. 100). The utility of the Defence Group proved to be short and uneventful 
as it convened only once during its lifetime and abolished in 1958 after a change of 
government (Thorsteinsson, 1992a, p. 576). 
The United States government would grant Iceland three separate loans, totalling 
nearly $12 million. The first loan agreement, intended to finance essential general 
imports into Iceland, amounting to $4 million, was signed on 28 December 1956, 
arranged through the International Cooperation Administration. $600,000 while 
the outstanding $3.4 million were drawn from the Special Presidential Fund, which 
the President had been authorised by Congress to use at his will to serve the security 
needs of the United States (U.S. Department of State, 1957d, p. 100). On the basis 
of the PL-480 Programme, the U.S. government entered into an Agricultural Surplus 
Commodity Agreement with Iceland on 11 April 1957, thus financing Icelandic 
purchase of U.S. agricultural products worth $2,785,000 (U.S. Department of State, 
1957b, p. 709). The final instalment of the promised loans was finalised on 10 May 
1957, worth $5 million, earmarked for the construction of Sog hydropower station 
(INA, 1957, p. 7). 
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While the wish to remove foreign troops from Iceland may have stemmed from 
national or pacifist origins and a belief that the world was in fact more peaceful 
than in 1951 it soon became apparent that the negotiations were to be used as a 
bargaining chip to secure favourable loans. The link between financial benefits 
and continued U.S. military presence in Iceland was acknowledged by the foreign 
diplomatic community in Reykjavík and spelled out in a report by the British 
ambassador Andrew Gilchrist to the British Foreign Office,
…one can perhaps sum up the prospects of retaining an effective base at Keflavik as a 
compound of three factors, the future course of international tension, the extent to 
which the Americans are willing to underwrite a policy of economic aid, and the skill 
with which they carry out that policy. In other words, if the Icelanders remain afraid of 
Russia and if the Americans make their presence unobtrusively an essential part of the 
Icelandic economy, the inevitable friction over the stationing of United States troops in 
Iceland is unlikely during the next few years to reach a point at which the troops will be 
asked to leave (FO-371/124888, 1956c).
A U.S. Security Council report written in the following month of May took stock 
of the preceding events and laid out future U.S. objectives in Iceland. The report 
began by asserting Icelandic importance for U.S. national security:
 
Iceland now provides the United States and NATO with (a) a key link in the Early 
Warning System for the defense of the United States and other NATO countries; 
(b) an important base for anti-submarine operations; (c) forward logistics support 
for Striking Fleet operations; (d) a significant air base for NATO requirements and 
(e) a key communication link between the United States, the United Kingdom and 
other NATO countries. Denial of these advantages to the United States and NATO 
would result in a grave weakening of the North Atlantic defense system, and the loss of 
Iceland to Soviet control would directly threaten the security of the United States (U.S. 
Department of State, 1992, pp. 499-500).
In light of Iceland’s importance, the most vital goal for the United States 
government was to maintain U.S. forces in Iceland, and reduce the economic and 
political influence of the Soviet Union in Iceland. An appropriate application of 
economic and political pressures would therefore be needed by U.S. authorities, 
in order to rid the government of communists as well as preventing Iceland from 
becoming too dependent on Soviet bloc markets (U.S. Department of State, 1992, 
pp. 503-504). To that end, economic assistance and loans for specific projects in 
Iceland were needed to further U.S. interests. 
 
50
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
3.4. The relationship as a leverage in gaining  
foreign policy objectives
The defence relationship proved successful for the government of Iceland in gaining 
economic assistance from the United States but it was also critical for Iceland to 
unilaterally extend its EEZ to 12 nautical miles in 1961, 50 nautical miles in 1973 
and in 1976 to its current 200 nautical miles. The extension was a major Icelandic 
foreign policy goal and the defence relationship with the United States and Iceland’s 
membership in NATO played a crucial role in achieving that. The following 
discussion outlines the connection between successful unilateral extensions of 
Iceland’s EEZ and Iceland’s defence relationship with the United States and 
membership in NATO. 
3.4.1. The first Cod War 1958-1961
Attempting to terminate the defence agreement was not the only trouble that the 
centre–left government of 1956-1958 was poised to stir up in NATO. It also had 
on its agenda the extension of Iceland’s territorial sea to 12 nautical miles giving 
Icelanders the exclusive right to fish within that limit. The decision to go ahead with 
the extension would affect other nations as the rich Icelandic fishing grounds were 
trawled by fellow NATO members such as the U.K., West Germany, Belgium and 
Norway. 
But extension would be complicated by the way the governmental parties 
favoured carrying it out. The preferred course for Progressives and Social Democrats 
was to avoid conflict with other nations and seek consultation and agreement within 
NATO (Hjálmarsson, 1985, p. 69). The People’s Alliance, by contrast, wished to 
hurry extension as much as possible. Failing to secure support for a national 12-mile 
territorial sea at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
in early 1958 spurred the government on. The only question at this point was 
not whether but when the Icelandic government would go ahead with unilateral 
extension.
During a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen in May 1958 the 
imminent extension brought Iceland to blows with other allies. As the meeting 
was about to begin, Foreign Minister Guðmundsson and his staff learned that the 
British representatives had spoken with NATO Secretary General P.H. Spaak and 
requested him to speak with the Icelandic Foreign Minister and encourage him to 
consult with other NATO members before going ahead with the 12 nautical miles 
extension (GÍG, 1958b). Spaak Informed Guðmundsson of the British approach 
and expressed his own concerns over a unilateral extension. Guðmundsson retorted 
that this was a pressing issue for his country and the latest decision within the 
Icelandic government had been to wait until after the conclusion of UNCLOS in 
Geneva. However, almost all other alliance nations had been against the Icelandic 
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position, therefore, consultation within NATO with those same nations would 
most likely be doomed from the beginning. Spaak implored Guðmundsson to allow 
for such talks at a NAC meeting in Paris within three weeks. Agreeing to such a 
meeting Guðmundsson also requested a special meeting to address Iceland’s fisheries 
extension during the Copenhagen session. 
At a NAC morning session prior to the one reserved for Icelandic fisheries 
extension British Foreign Secretary Lloyd rose up and requested to address the 
Council. Later in the afternoon, Lloyd declared, a special session would take place 
to discuss possible Icelandic actions regarding their territorial sea extension. Such 
unilateral actions could have serious consequences and colleagues in the NAC 
should voice their opposition and state their agreement with the British position. 
After Lloyd had finished the Foreign Ministers of Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Italy, Canada, West Germany and the United States, addressed the meeting and 
voiced their support for the British protest against the imminent Icelandic extension.
The Icelandic side regarded the British intervention as a sneak attack and 
countered that Iceland depended on its fisheries and it was common sense for Iceland 
to secure them for itself. The Icelandic government, Guðmundsson continued, had 
been working towards extension since a UN General Assembly in 1949. From 
a political perspective it was difficult for the government of Iceland to postpone 
extension any further and the decision to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical 
miles was in line with the majority view at the UNCLOS Geneva Conference 
and had even been proposed by the U.S. and Canadian delegates early on in the 
conference. Guðmundsson acknowledged that citizens of other NATO countries 
had interests at stake and that many alliance members would prefer Iceland not 
to go through with unilateral extension, at least not without negotiations. But 
preserving the fisheries was a question of life and death for Icelanders. Therefore, 
to negotiate for anything less than 12 nautical miles was out of the question (GÍG, 
1958b). Following Guðmundsson speech, Secretary General Spaak commented 
that obviously this was not a simple legal dispute but also an issue of political and 
economic importance. Iceland had already waited 10 years and it was no solution 
to them if other alliance members opposed demands considered just by Icelanders. 
Therefore, the issue had to be approached with understanding and attempts made to 
solve it (GÍG, 1958b). 
The Council decided to cancel the scheduled afternoon session and instead 
Secretary General Spaak held a short meeting in his office with Foreign Minister 
Guðmundsson and Foreign Secretary Lloyd. Spaak agreed with the Icelanders that 
they had two powerful arguments to back their claim: (1) ten years of working 
towards an extension, (2) and the importance of fisheries to their livelihood. The 
three agreed that a possible way forward would have to be discussed in NATO 
headquarters. Two NATO officials, under the authority of Deputy Secretary 
General Baron Adolph Bentincks, were tasked to work on proposals alongside an 
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Icelandic official (GÍG, 1958b). On Iceland’s behalf, Guðmundsson nominated 
Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Henrik Sveinsson Björnsson, as he had 
been present at the Copenhagen meeting and was well informed about what had 
taken place. 
For the next few days in NATO headquarters in Paris, Björnsson and NATO 
officials tried to find a compromise palatable to both Icelanders and other NATO 
members (GÍG, 1958a). In the course of their work, the idea surfaced that possibly 
the Icelandic government would be willing to allow foreign trawlers to fish within 
the 12 nautical miles for a limited number of years and in return other alliance 
members would recognise the new territorial sea limit. Björnsson presented the idea 
to Secretary General Spaak and the both agreed that recognition in exchange for 
limited fishing rights was the best course of action and would most likely be accepted 
by the other states (GÍG, 1958a, p. 22). What followed was a frantic exchange of 
telegrams between Björnsson in Paris and Guðmundsson in Reykjavík. However, 
the coalition government was starting to fray at the seams with the militant People’s 
Alliance firmly against granting temporary fishing rights in exchange for recognition 
while the pro-NATO Social Democrats and Progressives supported the compromise. 
Finally, on 19 May Björnsson received a telegram from Foreign Minister 
Guðmundsson informing him that the government of Iceland had decided to issue a 
directive on 23 May, claiming the extension of Icelandic territorial sea to 12 nautical 
miles. The directive would be effective from 1 September 1958. However, if other 
NATO member states consented to the directive before noon on 22 May, they 
would be allowed to fish between 6 and 12 nautical miles for the following three 
years (GÍG, 1958c, p. 40). 
On the morning of 20 May Björnsson delivered his Minister’s response to 
Secretary General Spaak who immediately called a NAC meeting. Björnsson began 
the meeting by recapping Foreign Minister Guðmundsson arguments during the 
Copenhagen Council meeting while a statement from the Icelandic government 
on the imminent extension was circulated in the Council. Following Björnsson’s 
statement the Secretary General addressed the Council and while underlining 
the seriousness of the issue he did not believe that a solution could be reached in 
two days. The Secretary General thanked the Icelandic government for consulting 
with fellow member states within NATO although he did not think the Icelandic 
proposal was acceptable in its present form but hoped for counter-proposals 
from other alliance members during the meeting (GÍG, 1958a, pp. 24-25). The 
British ambassador was the next to speak. The United Kingdom could not agree 
to a unilateral extension of Iceland’s territorial sea and it was disturbing to see the 
Council faced with an ultimatum on the issue. The British stance was supported by 
West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Greece. The only NATO 
member to throw its weight behind Iceland was Turkey which agreed that this 
was a question of life and death for the Icelandic nation and therefore justifiable 
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not to wait for another conference. To break the deadlock the Danish ambassador 
proposed a special conference tasked with solving the dispute and to address the 
territorial sea extension of the Danish controlled Faroese Islands. 
Next to speak was the U.S. ambassador. After stating his grave concerns about 
Iceland’s unilateral decision, he suggested a compromise that followed closely the 
Icelandic proposal. Iceland’s 12 nautical miles limit would be recognised but nations 
with historical fishing rights would be allowed to fish within a 6-12 nautical mile 
belt subject to maximum catch limitations. This compromise solution would later 
be followed by a special conference in line with the Danish proposal. The British 
ambassador welcomed the Danish and U.S. proposals and encouraged Iceland to 
participate in such a conference. At this point, the Secretary General commented 
that it had become clear that the Icelandic proposals was not acceptable to other 
alliance members and that counter-proposals presented by the United States and 
Denmark might be combined into one. He himself would like to add the third 
proposal (GÍG, 1958a, p. 26): a conference restricted to NATO members and 
limited to two months that would try to solve the dispute. If no solution could 
be found each country would be free to resort to whatever measure it believed 
necessary.
Later that evening, Spaak sent a telegram to the Icelandic Prime Minister Herman 
Jónasson. Although other alliance members were against unilateral extension on a 
juridical basis the Secretary General believed that they would be willing to negotiate 
on a common juridical position that would also meet the basic legitimate concerns of 
the Icelandic government. Continuing, Spaak stated that such a conference within 
NATO would provide a much quicker and surer means than a large international 
conference. He concluded:
…serious consequences would follow refusal of the proposal made this morning and 
would affect the whole Alliance [stop] unfortunate affects for Iceland would thus 
probably be produced at the time when OEEC partners show willingness to open 
up markets for Icelandic fish [para] Permit me to appeal to your feelings of Atlantic 
solidarity and to ask you to allow this last attempt conciliation by agreeing to continue 
negotiations which I am convinced will result in a solution favourable in Iceland (GÍG, 
1958d, p. 42).
In Reykjavík the coalition was on the verge of collapse over disagreement 
between the Social Democrats on one hand and the Socialists on the other hand 
( Jóhannesson, 2004, pp. 556-557). The People’s Alliance, led by Minister for 
Fisheries Lúðvík Jósefsson, was adamantly against continuing negotiations within 
NATO thus opposing the Social Democrats led by Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. 
Guðmundsson leaving the Progressives led by Prime Minister Herman Jónasson in 
the middle.
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As the word got out that the government was on the brink of collapse Secretary 
General Spaak set to work on a declaration acknowledging the willingness of the 
alliance to solve the dispute. The declaration was very much intended for Icelandic 
domestic use as Spaak’s intention was to aid the political parties in Iceland and 
especially the Social Democrats as they were committed to solving the fisheries 
dispute within NATO (FO-371/134965, 1958). Initially, Spaak’s idea was for the 
NAC to issue a joint declaration that would include all members of the alliance 
but as the government of Iceland was expected to collapse that same day and to be 
governed by a care-taker government the Secretary General suggested that Iceland 
should be excluded. Thus, making it a joint declaration by the remaining fourteen 
NATO members, Spaak’s eventual draft stated that,
Deeply conscious of the fundamental importance of the fishing industry for the 
Icelandic economy and anxious to assist their partner, <the fourteen nations> affirm 
their readiness to initiate negotiations without delay with Iceland on the following 
basis: (1) Iceland may exercise exclusive fishing rights within a six mile limit. (2) Iceland 
may similarly exercise exclusive fishing rights in a further zone of six miles over and 
beyond that mentioned above on the understanding that those nations whose vessels 
already fish within this area should continue to do so under conditions to be negotiated 
with the Icelandic Government (FO-371/134965, 1958).
The declaration gained the support of the British ambassador to NATO Sir Frank 
Roberts and his superiors at the Foreign Office but their political masters were not 
amused by their initiative. In London, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan furiously 
demanded to know what minister had authorised the Foreign Office to support this, 
since it conceded more or less everything to the Icelanders ( Jóhannesson, 2003, p. 
190). In Iceland the proposed declaration did not fare much better. On 24 May, 
the battered government had managed to pull itself from the brink of collapse 
and announced that a new regulation on a 12 nautical miles territorial sea would 
be issued on 30 June to take effect from 1 September. The interim period of two 
months would be used to muster international recognition and understanding for 
Iceland’s right and need for extending its fisheries limit ( Jóhannesson, 2004, p. 557). 
Tentative discussions continued throughout the summer within NATO but it was 
clear that neither side was willing to shift an inch – let alone budge a mile. Other 
NATO members, especially the U.K. and West Germany, were fixedly against a 12 
nautical miles fisheries limit (Ólafsson, 1999, pp. 269-275) while the Icelanders 
refused to recant their earlier decision. 
As September drew closer with no solution in sight, the imminent clash between 
two NATO members and possible damage to the alliance was causing concerns 
within the British government. As there seemed to be no solution in sight, the most 
pessimistic appraisal suggested that Iceland might actually be pushed out of NATO 
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(CAB/129/94, 1958). Already in mid-May, the British had weighed up the possible 
options for protecting their fleet of up to 130 deep-sea trawlers from harassment or 
arrest by the Icelandic Coast Guard. The most viable course of action, according to 
the Admiralty, would be:
Physical obstruction by a Task Unit of the Icelandic gunboats when attempting to 
effect arrest in the disputed waters. The presence of one of H.M. ships might deter 
the gunboat without having to resort to physical obstruction. It must be recognised, 
however, that in an extreme case this policy might result in the sinking of an Icelandic 
gunboat (CAB/129/93, 1958).
Ever since the Copenhagen meeting in early May the British delegation at NATO 
had found itself under increasing pressure from other alliance members as well as 
Secretary General Spaak himself. During a NAC meeting on 23 May Spaak scolded 
the British for being unnecessarily legalistic in their approach, since keeping Iceland 
in the alliance was the most essential objective for NATO and the Secretary General 
(FO-371/134965, 1958). Other NATO members shared Spaak’s concern for the 
fallout and Sir Frank Roberts found himself being grilled by other ambassadors as 
to whether, 
…the United Kingdom of all countries are indifferent to the dangers of throwing Iceland 
out of N.A.T.O and into the Soviet embrace, thus destroying at a moment when we are 
weakening our own naval contribution to the floating barrier the only land barrier to 
Soviet submarines entering the Atlantic (FO-371/134964, 1958).
On the first of September, as foreign trawlers sailed out of the 12 nautical miles 
zone, British warships entered in order to protect the remaining British trawlers. 
Until March 1960 British trawlers continued to fish within designated British fishing 
havens, under protection by the Royal Navy, while Icelandic Coast Guard vessels 
(ICGV) attempted to apprehend them. On some occasions these confrontations 
became violent when trawlers rammed the ICGV (Gudmundsson, 2006, pp. 100-
101). The British resorted to their preferred tactic of using their frigates to form a 
barrier between British trawlers and the ICGV. Luckily, such confrontations did not 
result in a shooting match or the sinking of any vessel.
The position of the U.S. government in the build-up to these events was one 
of caution. After the compromise proposed by the U.S. ambassador during the 
20 May NAC meeting failed the Eisenhower administration made efforts to 
prevent physical clashes between the British Fisheries Patrol and the ICGV 
(FO-371/134984, 1958) by encouraging the British government to refrain from 
protecting British trawlers caught within the old territorial sea zone of 6 nautical 
miles around Iceland while simultaneously encouraging the Icelandic government 
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not to arrest trawlers beyond a 4 nautical miles, limit, leaving a zone of 2 nautical 
miles as no man’s land.
The Eisenhower administration was painfully aware that Keflavík base might be 
put at risk if the dispute would get out of hand. Those concerns were not lost on 
British decision-makers as Prime Minister Macmillan noted in his diary on 20 May 
1958:
 
The Icelanders look like declaring the 12 mile limit unilaterally. If they try to arrest our 
trawlers, we shall have to take action to protect them. This will lead to trouble with 
Canada (who want to do the same thing) and with U.S.A., who are afraid that Iceland 
(which is very communist minded) will go out of NATO and the Americans may lose 
their base (Macmillan & Catterall, 2011, p. 118) 
Keen to exploit those fears the Icelandic government was quick to link the 
fisheries dispute together with Keflavík base. In an article published on 21 May 
1958, in Tíminn, a daily newspaper strongly affiliated with the Progressive Party, the 
question was asked whether British ship-owners had considered that in carrying out 
their duty the Icelandic Coast Guard had every right to demand assistance from the 
U.S. defence force and the Icelandic government could request every means available 
to the alliance to thwart aggression against Iceland. If not, the usefulness of the 
Atlantic Treaty would be called into doubt, thus opening up the question of whether 
Iceland should seek allies outside the Atlantic alliance (“Reynir nú á fyrsta skipti á 
það hvert hagræði Íslendingum er að því að að vera í Atlantshafsbandalaginu,” 1958). 
Coincidentally, the initials of the unknown author (HJ) were the same as those of 
the Progressive Party Prime Minister, Hermann Jónasson.
Foregoing subtleties, Prime Minister Jónasson decided to turn directly to the U.S. 
ambassador in Reykjavík, John J. Muccio. In a letter to the ambassador, Jónasson 
warned that public hostility towards the British might force the government to 
break off diplomatic relations and even to leave the alliance. Most Icelanders, he 
argued, thought it contradictory to belong to an alliance whose purpose was to 
ensure peace, democracy, and justice, while another alliance member used force 
against them (INA, 1958b). In his reply, Muccio remarked that his government 
was very concerned about the dispute and reminded the Prime Minister that 
the U.S. had before 1 September encouraged both sides to show modesty and 
constraint:
 
…disputes from time to time arise between nations which are members of NATO, as they 
do within families in spite of their joint membership. In cases of this kind the facilities 
available within NATO often provide the opportunities to work out disputes. We hope 
that this may be possible in the present case and strongly urge that your Government 
give this possibility its earnest considerations and encourage the organization to take 
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further positive action to assist in reaching a solution of Iceland´s present problem 
(INA, 1958a).
The Eisenhower administration was not going to be goaded into taking an active 
role on the Icelandic side but preferred to encourage the Icelandic government 
to use the alliance as a forum for solution. In reality, Jónasson’s sabre-rattling was 
merely that. There was no willingness among the government parties to leave NATO 
– except the People’s Alliance. The matter was not even brought up at Cabinet 
meetings (Guðmundsson, 1999, p. 77) during clashes between ICGV and British 
warships in the sea around Iceland. 
In early December 1958, the Icelandic government collapsed and was replaced 
with a minority government of Social Democrats, supported by the Independence 
Party. In October 1959 the Social Democrats and the Independence Party formed 
a government under the leadership of the Independence Party leader, Ólafur Thors. 
Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson retained his post as Foreign Minister and continued 
to seek an agreement with the British government. The coalition would survive for 
three terms or until elections in 1971. 
NATO’s active involvement in the dispute more or less ended in the autumn of 
1958. In January 1960, Secretary General Spaak and Norwegian Foreign Minister, 
Halvard Lange agreed to mediate a temporary agreement between Iceland and 
Britain, valid until after the second UNCLOS, to be held later that year. Although 
talks took off to a promising start it became apparent that no modus vivendi was to be 
reached and the discussions died down (D. Ólafsson, 1999, pp. 376-381). The final 
agreement was eventually wrangled out between Foreign Minister Guðmundsson 
and Foreign Secretary Lord Douglas-Home after a NATO meeting in December 
1960. From Douglas-Home’s memoirs:
Luckily the Icelandic Foreign Minister and I found ourselves together late one evening, 
following a session of the NATO Council. The building was locked up and everyone 
had apparently gone home, but we found an upper room with a bare wooden trestle 
table on which we sat and agreed that the quarrel must stop. We each undertook to see 
to it that it did. Negotiations followed and although there were some ticklish moments, 
the Foreign Minister, Mr. Gudmundsson, was as good as his word and all was quiet for 
another ten years (Home, 1978, p. 171).
The dispute was settled with a formal agreement in March 1961, whereby 
Britain acknowledged Iceland’s 12 nautical miles territorial sea. British trawlers 
were given a phasing-out period of three years. It was further negotiated that any 
future extensions by Iceland would have to be announced six months in advance. If 
disagreement should arise over an extension, then either state could refer the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Thorsteinsson, 1992a, pp. 630-631). 
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The final settlement did not differ much from the solution Spaak had suggested in 
May 1958. Which in Spaak’s own words showed “…the healing effects of time, which 
enable people to accept proposals they have fiercely opposed in the past” (Spaak & 
Fox, 1971, p. 280). Shortly after, Iceland negotiated a similar agreement with the 
Federal Republic of Germany as it also had a claim to historic fishing rights in the 
sea around Iceland. 
3.4.2. The Second Cod War 1972-1973
As Lord Home commented in his memoirs all was quiet for the next ten years. 
Following the 1971 Parliamentary elections in Iceland a coalition government 
emerged headed by the Progressive Party and included the People’s Alliance as well 
as a newly-formed splinter group, the Union of Liberal and Leftists. Apparently, the 
government of 1971 seemed intent on mimicking the foreign policy objectives of 
its 1956 predecessor (Rastick & Ísleifsson, 2004, p. 324). Regarding Iceland’s EEZ 
the government decided to extend it to 50 nautical miles although the territorial 
sea limit would remain at 12 nautical miles. As might also be expected of a left-
of centre government that included the People’s Alliance the future of the defence 
force was yet again on the agenda as it announced that it wished to revise the defence 
agreement with the intention to close Keflavík base. 
Shortly after gaining power the government moved ahead with its extension plans 
and announced on 31 August 1971 that a new 50 nautical miles EEZ extension 
would take effect in one years’ time. That is from 1 September 1972. Low key 
discussions followed between the Icelandic and British government but they proved 
unsuccessful. The Icelandic government was willing to allow foreign fishing within 
limited open areas, but not closer than 25 nautical miles to land. However, to the 
British side this was unacceptable as it would reduce up to 80% the total catch of 
British fishermen in Icelandic waters (Hart, 1976, p. 22). 
Losing its patience, the British government adhered to the 1961 agreement it had 
negotiated with Iceland and refereed the dispute to the ICJ. Thereby following the 
example of the West German government that had already done so. On 13 August 
1972 the ICJ ruled that British fishermen were indeed entitled to an annual catch 
limit of 170,000 tons and West German fishermen 19,000 tons, although the court 
did not rule on the actual legality of the EEZ extension (Hart, 1976, pp. 26-27). The 
Icelandic government argued that the treaty of 1961 no longer applied and therefore 
the ICJ had no jurisdiction in the matter. 
The Icelandic government ignored the ruling and decided to go ahead with 
unilateral extension. 1 September 1972 passed by and the captains of the ICGV 
began to apprehend foreign trawlers fishing within the new 50 nautical miles EEZ. 
The skippers of the British vessels tried to defend themselves by painting over the 
names of their ships and in some instances by attempting to ram the ICGV. The 
Coast Guard captains responded by using warp cutters to cut one or both of the 
59
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
trawl warps from fishing trawlers., thus rendering them unable to fish and forcing 
them to return back home. 
As autumn passed and winter set in British trawler skippers were increasingly 
demanding naval protection as the British government had done during the 1958-
1961 Cod War. Instead the British government opted for deploying civilian tugs 
to serve as a barrier between the trawlers and ICGV, preventing the latter from 
successful warp cutting. By March 1973 it began deploying Nimrod Surveillance 
Aircraft to keep track of ICGV in the sea around Iceland.
By spring the frequency of warp cuttings had increased and the ICGV began to 
fire upon the British trawlers (Welch, 2006, pp. 109-112). Mostly blank warning 
shots but in some instances also live rounds. By mid-May 1973 British trawler 
captains threatened the government in London to leave Icelandic waters if they were 
not provided with naval escorts. The hand of the British government was forced 
since departure of the trawler captains from the Icelandic waters had been a de facto 
recognition of the 50 nautical miles EEZ. Therefore, the government approved 
naval protection for the trawlers and on 19 May 1973 a fleet of 30 trawlers was 
escorted within the 50 nautical miles limit by British frigates. The decision by the 
government to send the navy caused great anger in Iceland. Even the conservative, 
pro-NATO newspaper Morgunblaðið described the decision as:
…a direct military attack on Icelandic jurisdiction […] and it is a grave 
misunderstanding by Mr Edward Heath and Sir Alec Douglas-Home to think 
that the Icelandic people will succumb to such blatant transgression and violence 
(“Stórveldið smáa,” 1973). 
while the pro-Progressive Party daily, Tíminn, commented that: 
…for a second time, the British have decided to use military force against Iceland […] 
thinking that the agreement from 1961 gives them the right to do so against an unarmed 
small nation” (“33 togarar í einum hnapp undir herskipavernd,” 1973). 
The pressure exerted by the British trawler captains at this particular moment 
may have been unfortunate since tentative negotiations were taking place although a 
settlement had not been reached. Both parties were moving closer to a compromise 
that would have allowed British trawlers to continue to fish within the 50 nautical 
miles zone with catch limitations (Hart, 1976, p. 38) But after the navy frigates 
entered the 50 nautical miles zone all such talks were broken off. 
Initially the Icelandic government intended to protest against British naval 
presence within the 50 nautical miles EEZ both at the United Nations Security 
Council and within the NAC. Eventually the government decided not to bring the 
case before the Security Council ( Jóhannesson, 2003, p. 94) as it feared the Council 
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would simply recommend Iceland to refer the issue back to the ICJ who’s ruling the 
government had already ignored once. 
10 days after the British frigates had arrived in Icelandic waters, Iceland’s 
ambassador to NATO, Tómas Tómasson, addressed the issue at a NAC meeting 
on 29 May 1973. The ambassador condemned British military intervention within 
the Icelandic EEZ and stated that further negotiations would not take place until 
the British government had withdrawn its naval vessels outside the 50 nautical 
miles zone (“Luns sáttasemjari?,”). Furthermore, Tómasson encouraged the NAC 
to intervene in order to prevent British naval vessels from shielding illegal fishing 
within Iceland´s EEZ, thus directly involving the council and its Secretary General, 
Joseph Luns, in the dispute. 
As the crisis escalated and tempers flared in late May 1973 President Richard 
Nixon and French President Georges Pompidou convened for a brief U.S.-French 
summit conference in Reykjavík. Iceland being selected as a convenient mid-point 
between France and North America. This was an opportunity for the Icelandic 
government to directly involve the U.S. government and link continued presence of 
U.S. troops in Iceland with U.S. support in getting the British out of the 50 nautical 
miles EEZ. On 31 May President Nixon made a courtesy call on Prime Minister 
Ólafur Jóhannesson to thank him for hosting the meeting with Pompidou. Nixon 
was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and National Security 
advisor Henry Kissinger while Jóhannesson was flanked by Foreign Minister Einar 
Ágústsson and President Kristján Eldjárn. After a brief exchange of pleasantries 
Jóhannesson started to chastise Nixon for being too neutral in the Icelandic fisheries 
dispute while the U.S. defence force in Keflavík had done nothing to evict the 
British invading force out of Icelandic waters (INA, 1973c). Consequently, the U.S. 
government should expect this inactivity on its part to affect future retention of the 
base in Keflavík. 
While unprepared for this barrage Nixon warned Jóhannesson against linking 
the fisheries dispute with any future defence agreement negotiations. Although 
the conflict worried him Nixon stated that the U.S. government could not be 
expected to take sides in a dispute between two nations friendly to the United 
States. However, it would negatively impact the alliance and Iceland if the 
Icelandic government was to adapt some form of isolationism by terminating the 
defence agreement or by leaving NATO. Secretary of State Rogers intervened and 
encouraged Jóhannesson to show caution and try to settle the dispute through 
negotiations with the British government (INA, 1973c). Although they had no 
objection to the NAC being used as a forum for informal discussions, Rogers 
warned against pressuring NATO into solving the dispute as that might undermine 
the cohesion of the alliance. In his memoirs Kissinger recalls his impression of that 
late-May meeting:
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Whatever the merit of its legal position, the little country meant to enforce it by the 
threat of closing the NATO airbase on its soil and if necessary by war with Britain. 
[…] The Icelandic ministers were uttering dire threats of escalating military action 
while Nixon and Rogers implored them to withhold the final sanction. I sat there in 
wonderment. Here was an island with a population of 200,000 threatening to go to 
war with a world power of 50 million over codfish, and here was a superpower that 
considered it necessary (a) to express a view and (b) to restrain not the stronger but 
the weaker. Nixon and Rogers made soothing noises while the Icelandic ministers 
implacably insisted on what in any previous period would have seemed suicide 
(Kissinger, 1982, pp. 172-173).
Just as in the previous Cod War the U.S. administration was unwilling to take 
sides. But an explicit linkage had been made between the fisheries dispute and 
possible closure of an important NATO base, thus increasing the pressure for a 
settlement favourable to Iceland. 
For more than two years, the government’s stated policy of gradually closing 
the base had seemed little more than political rhetoric designed to appease the 
fervently anti-NATO People’s Alliance. However, threatening to close the base at 
this particular juncture in time could prove to be a potent weapon. 
The significance of the Keflavík base on NATO’s Northern Flank had not gone 
unobserved by The Icelandic government. In late January 1973, Foreign Minister 
Einar Ágústsson had met with officials from the State Department as well as 
Department of Defence in Washington D.C. (INA, 1973e) to present at first-hand 
the base policy of the Icelandic government. During his stay Ágústsson was briefed 
on Soviet naval capabilities and the movements of the Soviet Northern fleet in the 
seas around Iceland. Ágústsson was handed a report entitled Iceland Defence Force 
Analysis that in brief assessed Soviet naval capabilities in the North Atlantic and 
what response might be expected from the United States and NATO in case the 
Soviet Union should occupy Iceland (INA, 1973a). According to the report, Soviet 
naval capabilities included a submarine fleet larger than that of the United States, 
Britain and France combined. The Keflavík base played a vital role in monitoring 
the activity of the Soviet Northern Fleet in the North Atlantic to which 70% of all 
Soviet nuclear submarines belonged. Although the base was home to only 3,400 
military personnel, they represented a fraction of the Icelandic Defence Force since 
most of it consisted of reserve units in the United States that could be airlifted to 
Iceland at a short notice. Terminating the defence agreement and closing Keflavík 
base would deprive the alliance of information on activity of the Soviet Northern 
Fleet and leave Iceland defenceless to the Soviets who could occupy Iceland in a 
single day. After initial occupation with a small force, Soviet reinforcements could 
be brought in within hours and could reach 100,000 within four days (INA, 1973a). 
Such a Soviet foothold in Iceland would threaten the security of the Atlantic sea 
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lines of communication between North America and Europe and thus endanger 
NATO itself. A Soviet-controlled Iceland would leave no other option available 
to the United States and NATO than to place Iceland under a naval blockade that 
would be followed by a full-scale invasion. 
The Nixon administration was of course concerned with the strategic value of the 
base but there were other short-term goals to be considered that State Department 
officials discussed with Ágústsson (INA, 1973d). The closure of Keflavík base would 
be interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a sign of division within the alliance that 
would undermine U.S. and NATO’s bargaining position in the upcoming Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries aimed at reducing the levels of conventional arms and armed forces in 
Europe. 
Meanwhile in the U.K. the adverse effect of the fisheries dispute on Iceland’s 
position in NATO was being discussed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
The British ambassador to Iceland, John Mckenzie, raised the possibility in a report 
to Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home of giving preferential treatment to 
Iceland in the fisheries dispute on condition that the base at Keflavík would be 
retained. Although the idea had its merits the ambassador came to the conclusion 
that the only government party completely in favour of closing the base was the 
People’s Alliance. Therefore, special concessions were hardly necessary as the 
government was more likely to collapse over the base issue than to terminate the 
defence agreement (FCO-41/826, 1971). Nonetheless, during a NATO Ministerial 
meeting in early December 1971 Sir Alec Douglas-Home informed Ágústsson of his 
concerns about the adverse effect on British security the removal of U.S. forces from 
Iceland would have. Ágústsson, a Progressive – hinting towards his own feelings – 
replied that:
…Icelanders needed educating in the strategic importance of their country” and “…
mentioned the timing of the Icelandic programme over the U.S. base, and said that it 
would be pretty slow (FCO-41/826, 1971).
Although the British government deemed it unlikely that the U.S. military would 
be kicked out of Iceland it had every reason to be mindful of the implications of 
such a move. In the summer of 1973, the Ministry of Defence commissioned a 
study from the Chiefs of Staff entitled The Importance to United Kingdom Defence 
Interests of NATO Military Facilities in Iceland. In short, the report concurred in 
all major points with the report handed over to Ágústsson in Washington D.C. In 
addition to pinpointing direct implications for British security and defence interests 
such as the loss of surveillance and reduced air defence capabilities over the British 
northern approaches the report also noted the importance of three NATO-funded 
Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) stations in Iceland that together with stations 
63
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
in Greenland and the Faroese Islands formed a part of LORAN A and LORAN C 
essential for communication and navigation of military and commercial ships and 
aircraft operating in the High North. The report pointed out that if Keflavík base 
closed the radars:
…would probably continue to operate. On the other hand the NATO-funded 
communications links terminating in Iceland would become redundant, and the loss 
of the proposed MATELO5 would mean that no alternative communication to United 
Kingdom aircraft from this country in the poor communication environment of the 
high northern latitudes would be available (Defe/5/196/6, 1973).
To the British side it was clear that retaining Keflavík base was essential both for 
the joint defence posture of NATO and British defence interests. 
By spring 1973 other NATO members – and non-NATO states – were becoming 
increasingly alarmed about the future of Keflavík base. The U.S. ambassador to 
Iceland, Frederick Irving, briefed his Danish and Norwegian colleagues on recent 
developments and the three of them decided to exert some light pressure on the 
Icelandic delegation at NATO through the Danish and Norwegian delegations at 
NATO (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973a). Meanwhile Soviet satellites in Eastern 
Europe seemed concerned that the closure of Keflavík base would throw the 
MBFR-talks off balance. The Romanian ambassador to Iceland, Ploestenau, called 
up Ambassador Irving and:
…spent his entire call telling me how important it was for the US to succeed in the 
MBFR and for the US not to make unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe. He said 
that his country’s position was that both Soviet and American troops should withdraw 
into their own countries but as long as Soviet troops are in other countries the American 
troops should also remain (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973). 
Although not a NATO member the Swedish government was also alarmed by 
the imminent weakening of NATO’s Northern Flank (US Embassy Stockholm, 
1974) and Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme made his concerns known to the 
Icelandic government (Secretary of State, 1973) during a brief visit to Iceland in 
May 1973. 
As the dispute escalated and NATO became more actively involved NATO 
Secretary General Joseph Luns decided in early June 1973 to act on his own and 
attempt to get negotiations back on track. Contacting the British government 
Luns gave– without any support from the Icelandic government – a personal 
5     MATELO (Maritime Air Telecomunictions Organisation Facility), a proposed on-line crypto 
communication link (Defe/5/196/6, 1973). 
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guarantee that the ICGV would cease harassment of British trawlers in exchange for 
withdrawal of British naval vessels outside of the 50 nautical miles limit (Luns, 1973 
and Ingimundarson, 2003, pp. 115-116). Although guided by the best of motives, 
Luns’s offer was stopped dead in its track as no assurance could be had from the 
Icelanders that ICGV would not attempt to apprehend British trawlers. 
On 25 June 1973, the Icelandic government followed through with its threat 
it had made to President Nixon a few weeks earlier and invoked article VII of the 
defence agreement thereby initiating the six-month revision period required before 
its termination. During its session on 5 July the NAC discussed the decision. The 
meeting began with Luns giving a brief account of his latest attempt to mediate. The 
British government, according to his proposal, would withdraw their navy from the 
50 nautical miles area as soon as the British trawlers had fished the 145,000 tons 
offered in the latest British proposal. He had submitted his idea to the British and 
Icelandic government and was encouraged to learn that the two Foreign Ministers 
had met privately in Helsinki. Regarding the invocation of Article VII, the council 
decided to direct the Military Committee to:
…prepare a report on Iceland´s strategic and military significance and submit the report 
in “due course”. MC report will provide the basis for the appraisal and recommendations 
which the Council will in turn submit to the two Governments (US Mission NATO, 
1973b). 
The wording “due course” was not free of political machinations. A week before 
that council meeting the Secretary General and the U.S. ambassador to NATO, 
Donald Rumsfeld, had met on several occasions to discuss privately an appropriate 
release date for the Military Committee report. Their concern was that if the 
report would be released too early it might be used as political fodder by those who 
wished to link the base issue with the fisheries dispute (US Mission NATO, 1973a). 
However, if delayed for too long, the Icelandic government would be given an excuse 
not to begin negotiations and simply let the six-month revision period run its course 
In Iceland ambassador Irving and Foreign Minister Ágústsson began informal 
discussions about the forthcoming negotiations. Although maintaining the official 
line that the ultimate objective of the Icelandic government was to close the base, in 
private Ágústsson conceded that the U.S. government and NATO were unlikely to 
accept removal of U.S. forces from Iceland. Therefore, he was willing to proceed on 
the following interim objectives:
(A) removal of as many IDF functions as possible from Iceland’s soil without impairing 
effectiveness of IDF; (B) reduction of military manpower by at least one-third from 
the present number of 3300 over a time period to be negotiated but not to exceed five 
years through removal of functions and by substitution of civilians which initially can 
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be combination of US and Icelandic civilians but eventually total Icelandization (US 
Embassy Reykjavik, 1973b). 
As not to draw all teeth out of the base bargaining ploy, Ágústsson emphasised 
that public opinion continued to sour towards NATO and the base because of 
the British invasion of Icelandic waters. Therefore, it would have extremely bad 
effects in the upcoming negotiations if British naval ships remained within the 50 
nautical miles EEZ. He himself, Ágústsson continued, and Prime Minister Ólafur 
Jóhannesson were of the same mind: that the base issue and fisheries dispute should 
be kept separate but they could not stand against public opinion. Ambassador 
Irving wryly pointed out that then it might be time for the pair of them to stop their 
anti-NATO and defence force statements in the media and try instead to calm the 
situation (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973b). Ágústsson replied that such was their 
intention and Irving would soon see evidence of it. Following this exchange the date 
for formal talks was set for late September. 
The Progressive Party was playing a dangerous balancing act. Publicly its leaders 
had linked the base retention with the fisheries dispute, implying that the base might 
be closed. But privately a clear divide existed between the governmental parties. Most 
of the Progressive Party saw a need for continued U.S. military presence in Iceland 
and wished for the base to remain, while the People’s Alliance happily exploited the 
fisheries dispute to turn public opinion against the base by referring to the British 
naval vessels as NATO warships (“Stærsti mótmælafundur á Íslandi,” 1973). For the 
Progressives the risk was that resentment towards the base and NATO would spiral 
out of control, handing the initiative over to the People’s Alliance.
The dispute remained in deadlock throughout the summer. During a June 
NATO Defence Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen the Norwegian and Danish 
Defence Ministers tried to nudge both sides towards talking by urging the British 
government to unconditionally withdraw their naval vessels outside the 50 nautical 
miles limit ( Jóhannesson, 2005, p. 98) but without success. The ICGV continued 
to harass British trawlers, cutting their fishing warps and attempting to board, while 
British frigates were deployed as a barrier between the antagonists. The result was 
repeated collisions of ICGV with British vessels. On 29 August the skirmishing 
eventually claimed the first and only casualty of the Cod Wars. Following a collision 
with HMS Apollo a sailor on board ICGV Ægir was accidentally electrocuted while 
carrying out temporary repairs on a damaged hull section. Tíminn, the Progressive 
Party newspaper, put the blame squarely on the Royal Navy (“Ofbeldisaðgerðir og 
yfirdrepuskapur,” 1973) and their violent and dangerous ramming tactics against 
ICGV. 
The sailor’s death marked a turning point in the fisheries dispute. In Brussels, 
the Icelandic ambassador to NATO informed Secretary General Luns that his 
government would soon recall him to Iceland as an act of protest over NATO’s 
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inability to halt British aggression. The Secretary General responded to the escalation 
by contacting Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and propose a British withdrawal 
outside of 50 nautical miles in exchange for the Icelanders’ willingness for bilateral 
talks. Not surprisingly, the British reply was negative (State Department, 1973) and 
on 11 September the government of Iceland issued an ultimatum: Iceland would 
break off diplomatic relations with the U.K. if British naval vessels would continue 
to ram Icelandic vessels. 
To hamper British efforts in monitoring the movement of ICGV the government 
of Iceland also instructed Icelandic air traffic controllers to stop communication 
with the British Nimrod maritime reconnaissance planes from 14 September (“Nú 
er það Breta að velja,” 1973) as they were used to gather intelligence about the 
movement of ICGV in the sea around Iceland (Welch, 2006, pp. 134-135). The 
surveillance flights were a particularly sensitive issue to many Icelanders as they were 
viewed as a use of NATO assets by one alliance member against another. Although 
threatening to cease communication with the jets seemed like a bold move it soon 
turned out that in reality it was not an option. Information on movements of the 
Nimrods was essential for air traffic safety and Icelandic air traffic controllers defied 
the Minister for Transportation, Björn Jónsson, and refused to enforce the ban 
(“Nimrod-þoturnar: Við metum þetta hverju sinni,” 1973) on the grounds that 
breaking communication would pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of airliners 
flying through the Icelandic air traffic control zone. 
While the fisheries dispute continued to simmer and boil the NAC had prepared 
its recommendation on the revision of defence agreement, required before the 
agreement could be abrogated. On 16 September Secretary General Luns arrived in 
Iceland into an emotionally charged atmosphere to present in person the Council’s 
advice. On the morning of 17 September Luns briefed the government, represented 
by four ministers from the three coalition parties. The assessment stated that the 
strategic importance of Keflavík base for surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the 
North Atlantic and its role in securing the Atlantic sea lanes of communication could 
not be done as effectively from any other NATO country (INA, 1973f ) and that the 
security of NATO, in particular its northern members Iceland and Norway, would 
be severely undermined if the base would be closed. After the Secretary General had 
finished it was time for the Icelanders to react. Prime Minister Jóhannesson opened 
by offering his gratitude for the presentation and affirming that his government 
would give it serious consideration. Jóhannesson, however, emphasized that the 
defence agreement was first and foremost a bilateral arrangement between the 
United States and Iceland (INA, 1973b). He himself and his government were most 
concerned with the security of Iceland and although the NAC took the view that 
closing the base would make Iceland defenceless and thus a tempting target for Soviet 
expansionism there were those that believed the base itself made Iceland a target for 
Soviet aggression. Jóhannesson finished his opening remarks by stating that:
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I have seldom heard military experts proposing reductions. It is a pity to have to admit 
our or at least my ignorance in military matters, so the report is half wasted on me, but 
I have some understanding of political matters (INA, 1973b).
Raising the stakes, Jóhannesson brought up the issue of NATO membership 
itself. The will of his government, he continued, had been to close the base but 
remain in NATO. Since late May the alliance had proved unable to get the British 
government to withdraw its navy outside the 50 nautical miles limit and this fact 
begged whether:
…If the fact is that NATO has no power in such cases […] we ask ourselves what have we 
to do in the alliance. We can go out in one year. Then the base issue solves itself (INA, 
1973b).
The Secretary General replied that it lay outside the power of NATO to intervene 
in political decision-making of its members but added that literally all NATO 
members were very worried about the British attitude. He himself would meet with 
British officials at London airport the morning after and he would convey Prime 
Minister Jóhannesson’s words (INA, 1973b). He then went on to list his own private 
attempts to use his influence to get the British to withdraw their navy and return to 
the negotiation table (INA, 1973b). In the end of May he had approached Foreign 
Secretary Sir Douglas-Home and Prime Minister Heath; 4 June he sent a letter to 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home; 1 July he had met with the British chief negotiator, Lady 
Tweedmuir, in London and also enlisted the help of Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral Cousins, to increase the pressure on the British 
government. 
The Icelandic insistence on entangling continued U.S. military presence in Iceland 
with the fisheries dispute was making the Secretary General gloomier by the minute. 
During an honorary dinner on the evening of the 17 September he confided in 
Ambassador Irving that “He was completely fed up with British intransigence which 
[…] will drive Iceland out of NATO and is making IDF [Iceland Defence Force] 
retention difficult if not impossible” (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973c). After inviting 
the British Ambassador, Mckenzie, to join them, Luns remarked that resentment 
towards NATO and the defence force, both within the Icelandic government and 
among the public, was greater than he had realized and that Iceland’s membership 
in NATO would be at risk unless the fisheries dispute was resolved quickly. He 
then implored Mckenzie to do his best in convincing his superiors in London of 
the damage the presence of the British Navy within the 50 nautical miles zone was 
causing the alliance. The possibility was real that in face of popular resentment 
towards NATO other coalition parties would placate the People’s Alliance and 
actually close the base. For NATO the loss of Keflavík base would be “unthinkable” 
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(US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973c). Therefore, he would have to increase his own 
personal efforts to solve the fisheries dispute. 
Despite the Secretary General’s impassioned arguments Ambassador Mckenzie 
was in disagreement. In fact, he had been advising his superiors at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office that the Icelandic government was bluffing and would never 
close the base no matter how much it tried to link base negotiations with the fisheries 
dispute. Disagreeing with Mckenzie, Irving pointed out that:
…although it is not logical to associate fisheries dispute with defense issues we 
nevertheless cannot overlook the fact that GOI [Government of Iceland] officials and 
the public are doing it. We would be deluding ourselves not to take notice of this in 
assessing IDF negotiation probabilities (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1973c).
In the following days, clashes continued in the Icelandic fishing grounds between 
ICGV and the British Navy. On 27 September, following two serious ramming 
incidents between ICGV Ægir, and HMS Lincoln, the Icelandic government 
announced that diplomatic relations with Britain would be severed if the navy 
would not be withdrawn before 3 October. 
Pressure within the NAC on the British government was rising. On 28 September 
the Secretary General called a private council meeting to discuss the crisis. The British 
ambassador, Sir Edward Peck, opened by reiterating the position of his government 
which was that the fisheries dispute was one of international legal disagreement – i.e. 
the right of British trawlers to fish outside the 12 nautical miles zone, in an area the 
British government regarded as international waters. Following his statement, the 
Belgian ambassador to NATO, André De Staercke, called for the U.K. to” abandon 
legalities. And encouraged the SYG [Secretary General] […] or the Council to take 
some form of action to intercede in this matter” (US Mission NATO, 1973c). In 
the end the Council decided that the Secretary General should send a letter to the 
government of Iceland and Britain and implore them to renew negotiations. 
The Secretary Generals intervention bore fruit and on 30 September in London 
he met with Prime Minister Heath and Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home to find 
some way out of the stalemate. His plan called for a meeting between the two 
Prime Ministers that would take place in parallel with withdrawal of British naval 
vessels from the 50 nautical miles mile limit while the ICGV would simultaneously 
stop harassing British trawlers within that zone (US Mission NATO, 1973d). The 
Secretary General’s plan worked and on 3 October the British government withdrew 
their frigates outside of the disputed area. On 16 October, the two governments 
reached an interim agreement valid for two years. Up to 140 British trawlers would 
be allowed to fish within the 50 nautical miles zone with a limit on total catch set at 
130,000 tons (Rastick & Ísleifsson, 2004, p. 373). With the fisheries dispute out of 
the way, negotiations about the future of the defence force could continue. However, 
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because of disagreement between the government parties on how to proceed the 
matter remained unsolved until after parliamentary elections in May 1974. 
Following the elections, a coalition consisting of the Independence Party 
and the Progressive Party was formed and the new right-of-centre government 
abandoned the policy of terminating the defence agreement. In private conversation 
Independence Party Prime Minister, Geir Hallgrímsson assured Ambassador Irving 
that his government had no intention of closing the Keflavík base (US Embassy 
Reykjavik, 1974) and on 22 October 1974 an agreement on the future retention of 
Keflavík base was reached between representatives of the two governments. 
As might be expected from the base negotiations in 1956 the 1974 agreement had 
a strong economic overture. Some 420 Defence Force personnel would be gradually 
replaced by Icelandic civilian workers whose training would be handled by the 
United States. In addition, the United States undertook to finance the construction 
of 500 apartments within the Keflavík base for defence force members currently 
residing in local communities. But the largest concessions regarded Keflavík airport. 
The United States promised to separate all military and civilian traffic within 
Iceland’s only international airport and support financially the construction of a 
new terminal building as well as upgrade airport infrastructure so that within 10 
years (INA, 1974) Keflavík airport would comply to category II standards of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
3.4.3. The Third Cod War 1975-1976
The new government in Iceland solved the base crisis but Hallgrímsson’s 
government would prove as difficult to the British government and NATO as the 
previous one. In the run-up for the national elections in 1974 further extension of 
the EEZ to 200 nautical miles had been endorsed by all political parties, however, 
the new government decided to wait until the conclusion of the 1975 UNCLOS 
as the expectation was that an international consensus on 200 nautical miles EEZ 
would be reached by the delegates ( Jónsson, 1982, pp. 157-160). As the convention 
proved a failure the Icelandic government declared, on 15 July 1975 that it would 
extend Iceland’s EEZ to 200 nautical miles to take effect from 15 October that 
same year. 
Exploratory talks between the British and Icelandic government began on 
September 11 in Reykjavík. The British delegation led by Assistant Secretary of 
State Roy Hattersley hoped that the previous fisheries agreement that ended the 
1972-1973 Cod War could be extended for further ten years. Their position was 
strengthened by an ICJ ruling in 1974 that Iceland’s previous unilateral extension 
beyond the 12 nautical miles had been unlawful ( Jónsson, 1981, p. 11). Choosing 
to ignore the ruling the Icelandic negotiators proposed instead a yearly catch of 
65,000 tons that would gradually be phased out in the coming years. The follow-up 
meeting took place in late October in London. This time the Icelandic offer had 
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lowered. Foreign Minister Ágústsson was not willing to offer the British more than 
a yearly catch of 50,000 tons while Hattersley could go no lower than 100,000 tons 
(Guðmundsson, 2007 p. 55) leaving an unbridgeable gap between the two sides. 
The government of Iceland followed through with its decision and extended 
Iceland’s EEZ to 200 nautical miles on15 October 1975, however, British fishermen 
would be allowed to trawl within the 200 nautical miles limit until 13 November, 
three days after the expiration of the 1973 agreement. In a last-ditch attempt to 
hammer out an agreement of some sorts the British and Icelandic negotiators met 
for the second time in Reykjavík on 16 November. Despite the effort the atmosphere 
was sullied from the start. The ICGV had cut the fishing warps off two British 
trawlers the day before and continued to harass British trawlers during the entire 
negotiation session. The Icelandic government returned to its previous first offer of 
65,000 tons which remained unacceptable to Hattersley and his companions. 
Following those failed November discussions, the British government placed a 
landing embargo on Icelandic fish in Britain and decided, yet again, to send the navy 
to protect its fishermen. The first frigates arrived in Icelandic waters on 25 November 
1975 and the same cat and mouse game that had characterised the previous Cod 
Wars resumed. The vessels of the Icelandic Coast Guard attempted to cut fishing 
warps of British trawlers while the British naval vessels tried to come between and 
often ramming ICGV in the process. 
After a month and a half of warp cuttings and collisions in the waters around 
Iceland the Icelandic ambassador to NATO, Tómas Tómasson, called for a 
special NAC meeting following a harsh collision between ICGV Thor and HMS 
Andromeda. Tómasson harshly criticised the British government for inconsistency 
in their actions. On one hand they expressed willingness for an amiable resolution, 
but on the other they sent British warships into Icelandic waters, resulting in several 
ramming with the much slower and smaller Icelandic vessels. Concluding, Tómasson 
declared that “If the British Navy continues to intervene in Icelandic waters, I 
cannot continue to sit at the same table with the UK representative” (Secretary of 
State, 1976) thereby threatening to withdraw Iceland’s representation to NATO. 
The British ambassador, Sir John Killick, replied that his government did not wish 
to debate the conflict in the NATO forum, “but was not in any way put out that the 
Government of Iceland called for a Council meeting” (Secretary of State, 1976). 
Furthermore, Killick countered with the traditional legalistic argument that British 
trawlers had every right according to international law to fish in Icelandic waters. 
However, the Icelandic manoeuvre to use NATO yet again as a forum to exert 
pressure on the British had worked. Following the Icelandic and British statements 
other ambassadors voiced their opinions, too. The Belgian ambassador, De Staercke, 
criticised the British government for disproportionate use of force and asked why it 
was not possible for them to withdraw the navy if that would help get negotiations 
back on track. Other ambassadors echoed the Belgian view and encouraged a 
71
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
British naval withdrawal as a first step in renewing negotiations (Secretary of State, 
1976). As the meeting concluded Secretary General Luns announced his plan to 
visit Reykjavík and London in an attempt to mediate the dispute as he had done so 
successfully three years before. 
Upon his arrival in Reykjavík on 14 January 1976 Prime Minister Hallgrímsson 
and Justice Minister Jóhannesson informed the Secretary General that there would 
be no deal with the British until they withdrew their navy unconditionally and 
without expecting any reciprocity from the Icelandic side. Furthermore, if the 
British would not comply then the government of Iceland would have no choice but 
to break diplomatic relations between the two states. Disappointed with Icelandic 
inflexibility the Secretary General replied that he had hoped to act as liaison between 
both sides, but he could not put himself in the position of “bearing an Icelandic 
ultimatum to London” (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976a). Whether the Secretary 
General’s talk softened Hallgrímsson’s position is not clear but not waiting until he 
had conferred with the British side Hallgrímsson announced on 16 January that his 
government was willing to begin negotiations if the British government withdrew 
its frigates and NIMROD jets outside the 200 nautical miles before 24 January. If 
not, the Icelandic government would break off diplomatic relations. The British 
government yielded, and on 24 January negotiations resumed in London. 
Unfortunately, the whole process would be torpedoed by an incident on 26 
January. A tacit understanding was in place that ICGV should leave the British 
trawlers alone during negotiations. Despite this, the captain of ICGV Týr cut the 
fishing warp of the trawler Boston Blenheim. As negotiations ran aground the British 
proposal was formally rejected and on 5 February the British government renewed 
naval protection of their trawling fleet. Soon rumours began to surface that the warp 
cutting had been carried out with the consent of Justice Minister Jóhannesson who 
was adamantly against any sort of deal with the British ( Jónsson, 1981, pp. 54-55). 
Why the Progressives might want to sabotage the negotiations could be explained by 
their fears that Hallgrímsson might agree to let the British continue fishing within 
the 200 nautical miles limit instead of driving them completely out of the new EEZ 
(Rastick & Ísleifsson, 2004, pp. 385-386). This rumour would later be quashed by 
the Captain of Týr, Guðmundur Kjærnested, who in an interview stated that it had 
been his own decision to cut the warps from Boston Blenheim (Guðmundsson, 2007, 
p. 111) and that orders to desist from harassing the British trawlers arrived only 
minutes after he reported his actions to his superiors 
There was a clear difference in style between the Progressive and Independence 
Party leaders on how to handle the crisis. As the conflict had reached a stalemate 
Justice Minister Jóhannesson paid a visit to U.S. ambassador Irving and after 
dispensing with some formal small talk, Jóhannesson attempted – yet again – to get 
the Americans involved on the Icelandic side:
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His real purpose turned out to be a warning that unless the USG voluntarily takes on 
an active and visible defence of Iceland against the British, the IDF will be in serious 
danger. He also wanted me to know that whereas in the leftist GOVT which he headed 
(1971-1974) he worked to save the base (comment: this is true), he will not do the 
same today unless the USG honors its “obligation” to Iceland. As alleged proof that 
USG is obliged to drive the British frigates out of the disputed waters he cited point E 
of the agreed minute of the 1974 MOU which reads as follows: “The two governments 
will study ways to further the cooperation between the Iceland Defence Force and the 
Icelandic Coast Guard, civil defense and civil aviation authorities.” After expressing my 
astonishment as to how he as an international lawyer of his standing and as the astute 
GOVT leader he claims to be could possibly believe this, […] there is nothing anyplace 
in the MOU which obligates the USG to become involved in Iceland´s fisheries dispute 
(US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976b).
What followed was an hour-long heated argument between the two men. 
Ambassador Irving warned Jóhannesson that the U.S. government did not give in to 
blackmail, and it seemed to him that “Iceland was trying to flex muscles it really did 
not have” (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976b). Continuing, Irving listed the possible 
consequences to Iceland if the base should be closed and the defence force forced to 
leave the country:
All construction at IDF would naturally stop, hitting Iceland the hardest at a time when 
Iceland expects unemployment to develop. I pointed out that Iceland gets excited when 
unemployment hits 200. If IDF closes, Iceland can expect to add at least ten times that 
number to its unemployment rolls. Iceland earns approximately $26 million a year 
in foreign exchange from IDF operations which just happens to be the amount of its 
reserves in good times and which this year has been of indescribable advantage it is a 
cushion Iceland denies it needs but is always glad to have. If IDF is forced to withdraw, 
Iceland´s security would be so endangered that its financial credibility with foreign 
lenders could be shakier than it is now. Icelandic Airlines currently enjoys an attractive 
concession from USG. There would be a serious question whether this concession 
should be continued. If withdrawn Iceland would be hard pressed to fill one 727 a 
week to New York instead of the present nine stretch DC-88. The foreign exchange 
loss would be felt. If Iceland broke relations with UK, left NATO and forced out the 
IDF, there was no reason to believe Iceland would be better off on the fishing grounds 
than now. In my opinion, most likely worse. Iceland´s largest customer of fish is U.S. 
if Americans became angry enough over Iceland´s action, we could conceivably look 
elsewhere for suppliers. If USSR offered to fill the gap and take Iceland´s fish, it will not 
be without disadvantages to Iceland (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976b). 
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Following the ambassador’s tirade Jóhannesson retracted his threat and 
conceded that it was not the policy of this government to close the base. He 
added, however, that national sentiment in Iceland was increasingly turning 
against NATO because of its inactivity over British actions and many thought 
that closing the base would hurt NATO and the United States more than Iceland. 
Before ending this meeting of frank exchanges, Jóhannesson inquired whether 
the 1974 MoU could be interpreted as allowing for U.S. sales of equipment, such 
as speedboats, helicopters and arms, at concessional rates to the Icelandic Coast 
Guard (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976b). Not giving an immediate answer, Irving 
offered to transmit the request to Washington D.C. for further study. Falling 
short of scaring the U.S. government into getting directly involved in the dispute 
Jóhannesson had settled for the next best thing. Whether his gambit was sincere 
or simply a ruse to keep the U.S. involved at some level can be debated. What is 
known is that nothing came out of this Icelandic bid, even though Jóhannesson 
would later tighten the screws by threatening to purchase patrol boats from the 
Soviet Union if the United States should remain non-responsive to his proposal 
( Jóhannesson, 2006, pp. 130-131). 
On 10 February, Irving met with the bewildered Prime Minister Hallgrímsson 
who unlike his cabinet counterpart did not show the same level of militancy against 
the defence force and NATO. Hallgrímsson acknowledged the seriousness of the 
situation and admitted that he and other NATO supporters within the government 
lacked any leeway to negotiate with the British and in effect had become hostages 
to the public mood. It would be political suicide for him or anyone else to give 
an assurance to the British government that ICGV would not continue their 
harassment if the frigates were to depart. Continuing, Hallgrímsson confided in 
Irving that he was quickly losing his parliamentary majority with defections even 
within his own party (US Embassy Reykjavik, 1976c). If nothing was to be done 
the Progressive Party would soon demand a break of diplomatic relations with 
Britain and possibly go as far as to demand a withdrawal from NATO. In that 
case the government would fall, as he and his fellow Independence Party members 
would never agree to Iceland pulling out of NATO. Just as in previous Cod Wars 
the U.S. government refused to take sides but it was not indifferent to the dispute. 
As before their position was that of caution and to act as an honest broker. U.S. 
officials encouraged the British to show restraint and keep in mind “…the strategic 
repercussions which the dispute could give rise to” (PREM-16/872, 1976a) as well 
as receiving briefings by Secretary General Luns on his initiatives to mediate the 
dispute (Luns, 1976). 
The conflict between Hallgrímsson and Jóhannesson was not lost on the British 
government or Secretary General Luns. During a meeting between Prime Minister 
Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan with the Secretary General on 
11 February 1976 (PREM-16/872, 1976d) Wilson thanked Luns for his efforts 
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although they had been doomed from the start as “Basically the problem was that 
there was no Icelandic Government and the Icelandic Prime Minister was terrified 
of his Minister of Justice.” 
Eventually on 19 February 1976 the Icelandic government followed through with 
its threat and broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. If the government had 
hoped that such a drastic action would entice a lull in British naval activity in the 
sea around Iceland they were mistaken. The British frigates continued to ward off 
ICGV which in turn seemed more determined than ever to cut as many trawler 
warps as possible. The result was an ever-increasing number of serious ramming 
that put both ICGV and British frigates out of service for days and even weeks as 
the damaged vessels had to return to harbour for repairs. Fortunately, there were 
no fatalities but the strain on manpower and ships was increasing, and affecting 
the British Navy more acutely than the Icelandic Coast Guard. Not only were the 
distances to friendly harbours and dockyards greater for the frigates, but the ICGV 
were sturdier and with thicker plating. Therefore, clashes would more often than not 
leave the frigates more badly damaged than the smaller gunboats. 
As March dragged on the ICGV were inflicting serious damages to the frigates. 
On 26 March  ICGV Baldur rammed HMS Galatea, leaving her with a hole two 
feet square. The following day Baldur made four successful attempts at ramming 
HMS Diomede causing extensive damage to the ship including a twelve-foot-long 
tear. Needless to say, the crippled frigates were withdrawn to Britain for extensive 
repairs. The skirmishes and the toll they took were beginning to affect other navy 
activities, including participation in NATO training exercises, that had to be 
abandoned because of the material and manpower tied up in the Icelandic fisheries 
patrol (Welch, 2006, p. 207). On the evening of 27 March orders were given to 
the frigate captains that they should avoid further action and damage. The utility 
of deploying naval vessels to counter warp cutting was proving to be futile. The 
British Ministry of Defence was faced with three options: (1) accept the reduction 
in naval protection which would mean increased interruption of fishing; (2) return 
to previous rules of engagement, that would mean further damage to naval vessels 
with the associated risk of casualties; or (3) counter ICGV ramming by some form 
of escalation of the rules of engagement under which the task force operated. In 
viewing the third option, the Minister of Defence concluded that:
In considering this last option, I have had in mind particularly the factors I stressed 
to the MISC 130 last week, viz the importance that Iceland remains a member of 
NATO and that Keflavik base continues to be available to the Alliance. The effect of 
what could all to easily be presented as aggressive action on the part of another NATO 
member against Iceland could frustrate these objectives, and the resulting loss would 
be compounded by the responsibility which our allies would attribute to the United 
Kingdom. I am therefore led to conclude that it would not be in our wider interests to 
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relax the constraints which the present Rules of Engagement place on the use of gunfire 
against this NATO ally (PREM-16/872, 1976b). 
Apparently, the level of naval protection could not be maintained, nor was it 
possible to simply open fire on the ICGV to end their harassment of British trawlers 
once and for all. In early May the frigates returned to previous rules of engagement 
and began to intercept ICGV with renewed fervour (Welch, 2006, p. 245) which 
resulted in nine collisions in less than three hours, crippling HMS Mermaid and 
HMS Falmouth. 
Applying brute military force against ICGV had been deemed an unpalatable 
option by the British decision-makers, but on the ground, threats or requests to use 
military force were actually made on at least three occasions. Following Baldur’s 
ramming of the HMS Diomede, her captain threatened the captain of Baldur that 
if he did not desist the Diomede would use her guns against him (Welch, 2006, p. 
217). Fortunately, the warning was heeded and the Captain of Diomede was not 
forced to follow through on his threat. The second instance occurred in the course of 
the clashes that put HMS Mermaid and HMS Falmouth out of service. During the 
skirmishing, the captain of HMS Mermaid requested permission from his superiors 
for the frigates to use their guns and mortars against the ICGV as the Coast Guard 
seemed determined to damage the frigates. Needless to say, his request was denied. 
The third occasion took place, on 12 May, while the ICGV Ægir was giving chase 
to the trawler Primella caught fishing within 50 nautical miles. The captain of 
the Primella repeatedly ignored orders to stop and as a result the captain of Ægir 
decided to fire at the trawler, first using blank warning shots followed by a live shot 
narrowly missing the trawler’s stern. The captain of the Primella sent out a distress 
call to the British task force and as a Nimrod surveillance jet arrived to the scene the 
captain of Ægir was threatening to fire a live round into Primella’s hull. The crew 
of the Nimrod relayed the message to Ægir that British units had been allowed to 
return fire. The Captain of Ægir responded by threatening the Primella a number of 
times, with each threat being reciprocated with a warning from the Nimrod (Welch, 
2006, pp. 240-249). What the captain of Ægir did not know was that the Nimrod 
jet was unarmed but the ploy worked and Ægir gave up on its attempt to apprehend 
the trawler 
The severing of diplomatic relations between Iceland and Britain marked the 
end of Secretary General Luns direct involvement in the dispute, but heralded 
the introduction of Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund as a would-be 
mediator. As the crisis continued to spiral out of control the Norwegian government 
grew increasingly concerned about the effect it might have on Keflavík base 
(US Embassy Oslo, 1976b). A few days after the rupture of diplomatic relations 
Frydenlund suggested to the NAC a temporary compensation scheme for the British 
trawlers fishing off the Icelandic coast. With the trawlers gone, the frigates could 
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be withdrawn thereby fulfilling the Icelandic requisite for renewed negotiations. 
Although Frydenlund was quoted by a U.S. embassy official in Oslo as stating that 
“Norway is prepared to pay the whole bill on this one” (US Embassy Oslo, 1976a) 
the plan envisioned participation by other selected NATO members, such as West 
Germany, Belgium, Holland, Canada and Denmark (US Embassy Oslo, 1976a). 
The idea was left to linger for a few days before being finally killed off. The Ford 
administration was not willing to go along as the Icelandic government might 
interpreted U.S. involvement as providing assistance to the British side. There were 
also reservations as to whether Congress would approve such a use of U.S. funding 
( Jóhannesson, 2005, pp. 120-121). There was also resentment among other NATO 
members who feared that using NATO in such a way would create a precedent for 
other member states in the future. 
While the compensation scheme fell through, another possible solution presented 
itself. During an informal meeting between Tómas Árnason, a prominent member 
of the Progressive Party, and the Norwegian ambassador in Reykjavík, Olav Lydvo, 
Árnason proposed a possible way forward: the two sides should negotiate for the total 
number of British trawlers within the 200 nautical miles zone instead of focusing on 
a total allowable catch. Árnason, whose initiative was a private one ( Jóhannesson, 
2005, pp. 122-123), went further and suggested that the government might settle for 
roughly 15 British trawlers within the zone for a limited time period. Frydenlund set 
to work on the proposed solution and for the next month he was in contact with both 
the Icelandic and British government, tentatively probing a solution based on a total 
number of trawlers which would be palatable to both parties. By the end of March his 
work had resulted in a basis for an agreement (PREM-16/872, 1976c) although there 
was still haggling over the absolute number of trawlers. By this stage it was clear that 
the British government had settled on a policy of honourable defeat. As spelled out in 
a report from Foreign Secretary Callaghan to Prime Minister Wilson:
We are in no doubt about the penalties of a prolonged dispute with Iceland. The longer 
we fish without an agreement the more difficult our position will be. The move towards 
200 mile fisheries limit is likely to gather pace. Anxiety within NATO about the effects 
of this dispute between member countries is increasing. And the Royal Navy will have 
genuine difficulty in protecting our trawlers under the present rule of engagement if 
the Icelandic coastguard resume the ramming tactics which have led recently to severe 
collisions in one week (PREM-16/872, 1976c).
For the next two months, informal negotiations continued and on 21 May 1976 
an agreement was reached that brought an end the third Cod War. On 30 May the 
British government withdrew their naval force outside the 200 nautical miles zone 
and a formal agreement that met all Icelandic demands was signed on 1 June in Oslo. 
Up to 24 British trawlers would be allowed to fish within the 200 nautical miles 
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zone for the following six months after which no British ship could fish within the 
area without permission from the Icelandic authorities. 
The conclusion of the last Cod War marked a complete capitulation on behalf 
of the British side. But they had been fighting a losing battle and the British 
government knew it. Not only did they have to take into consideration the effect 
the dispute had on cohesion within NATO and the retention of Keflavík base, but 
other NATO members such as Canada, Norway and the United States had by this 
point already declared that by 1977 they would extend their EEZ to 200 nautical 
miles. For Iceland, the extension of its EEZ to 200 nautical miles marked the end 
of an on-going struggle over the right of Icelanders to exclusive fishing in the waters 
around their country.
 
3.5. Conclusion
For most of its history Iceland remained at the periphery of Europe unaffected 
by European conflicts. Iceland’s greatest guarantee lay in its remoteness and the 
disinterest of European powers in its affairs. A part of the Kingdom of Denmark 
from 1380 until 1918, Iceland’s distance from the Danish heartland translated into 
Danish inability to provide Iceland with adequate defences. Most notable instances 
took the form of the Ottoman plunderers of the early-17th century and the seizure 
of power by the British adventurer Samuel Phelps for a brief period in the summer 
of 1809. 
With technological advances of the 20th century, Iceland’s strategic importance 
grew and Iceland’s remoteness ceased to keep the country separate from European 
conflicts. Not being able to rely on Danish protection, Iceland found itself squarely 
within the British sphere of influence during the First World War. Ironically, it can 
be argued that British dominance in the North Atlantic and British insistence upon 
the Icelandic Home Rule government to acquiesce to its demands, i.e. inspection of 
Icelandic cargo bound for Denmark in British harbours and communicating with 
the outside world via telegram in either English of French, gave Iceland certain self-
confidence and belief that Iceland could thrive without Denmark. After all, Iceland 
was able to conduct trade agreements with the allies during the war without any 
Danish interference. 
With the outbreak of the Second World War and Nazi occupation of Denmark, 
the British invaded and occupied Iceland in May 1940. As before, when the bond 
between Iceland and Denmark frayed Iceland prospered. The 1941 U.S.-Icelandic 
Defence Agreement further solidified Iceland’s post-war position as a fully 
independent nation. 
However, the post-war security environment was fraught with dangers, especially 
for small states. From the end of the war, Icelandic decision makers took consecutive 
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steps to safeguard and guarantee the independence of Iceland. The 1941 Defence 
Agreement was only valid until the end of the war but the government of Iceland 
decided to allow the U.S. to continue to operate and use Keflavík airport for military 
purposes and entered a formal alliance by joining NATO in 1949 and signing a 
bilateral defence agreement with the United States in 1951. Thus, by joining an 
alliance and bandwagoning with one of the most powerful actors in the international 
system the theoretical school of Neorealism goes a long way in explaining the 
behaviour of a small newly independent state too weak in an insecure international 
system to provide itself with military defences. 
For Icelandic decision makers NATO membership was a by-product of the 
defence relationship with the U.S. During exploratory talks in Washington D.C. in 
March 1949 it was made abundantly clear to the Icelandic delegation that a bilateral 
military alliance was not on the table and any U.S. or British defence guarantees 
would only be offered to Iceland through the North Atlantic Treaty framework. 
From the mid-1950s and onwards the nature of the defence relationship with 
the U.S. and Iceland’s NATO membership began to evolve and taken on a stronger 
political and economic dimension. The threat of dissolving the 1951 Defence 
Agreement was used by the Icelandic government to exert favourable loans from the 
United States and the same threat used to exert pressure on the British government 
during the Cod Wars of the 1950s and the 1970s. 
Equally, NATO and its institutional framework was used to exert pressure on 
the British by providing Iceland with a platform to make its case that a unilateral 
extension of its economic exclusion zone was in essence not an international legal 
dispute, as argued by the British government, but a political dispute whereby 
Iceland’s economic livelihood, and by extension sovereignty and independence, was 
at stake. Through those means Iceland triumphed and Britain was forced to give 
way when Iceland expanded its economic exclusion zone to 12 nautical miles in 
1958; 50 nautical miles in 1973; and finally, 200 nautical miles in 1975. For Iceland, 
the alliance became a source of economic aid and political leverage. States must 
guarantee their survival but for Iceland that involved economic survival as well as 
territorial integrity and formal sovereignty. 
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4. The defence function of Keflvík base
On 15 March 2006 a phone call from U.S Assistant Secretary of State to Iceland’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs brought an end to 55 years of unbroken U.S. military 
presence in Iceland. Before the end of September the last four remaining F-15 
fighter jets were removed and with them went the last vestige of U.S. military power 
in Iceland. Of course, Keflavík base was a Cold War offspring and it could be argued 
that its closure was inevitable. During its existence the base personnel monitored 
Soviet activity in the skies and the sea around Iceland and in times of conflict it would 
have served as a bastion in NATO’s Northern Flank against the Soviet Northern 
Fleet in the North Atlantic and a bridgehead in the defence of Iceland. However, the 
base also played several latent roles beneficial for successive Icelandic governments. 
Therefore, Foreign Minister’s Haarde mid-March phone call had wider implications 
than saying farewell to a redundant military force in a strategically insignificant 
region of the world. 
When the first U.S. soldiers arrived in 1951, they were returning to a decade-old 
military airport constructed by the U.S. that also served as Iceland’s only international 
airport. While the 1951 Defence Agreement designated the U.S. defence force as 
responsible for all aviation services at the airport (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
1951) responsibility for civil aviation was in the hands of the Icelandic authorities 
which gained free use of base equipment for the Icelandic aviation agency. Thus, 
Iceland’s only international airport was serviced and maintained to a great extent 
by U.S. military authorities and did not function without the involvement of U.S. 
military personnel.
By the mid-1970s efforts were undertaken to separate civilian and military traffic 
within Keflavík airport. The U.S. government contributed funds for the construction 
of a new civilian terminal and new ramps, taxiways and roads within the airport area 
(INA, 1979), in line with the 1974 MoU that solidified continued U.S. military 
presence in Iceland. In the mid-1980s the Reagan administration embarked on 
extensive upgrades of base facilities and equipment to counter growing Soviet naval 
power in the North Atlantic (Gunnarsson, 1985, pp. 3-4). Those projects included 
the construction of a harbour and oil depot, hardened fighter hangars, complete 
renewal of an obsolete radar system, a new command centre and an increase in the 
number of fighter jets from 12 to 18 in conjunction with the phasing out of the older 
F4E Phantom in favour of the new F-15 Eagle fighter jet.
Apart from reaping benefits from having the United States government fund 
services and major works within Keflavík airport the existence of a small American 
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township on Reykjanes peninsula benefitted the Icelandic economy. The need for 
local labour in construction and services at the base in the 1950s pumped U.S. 
dollars into the Icelandic economy, eliminating unemployment while causing 
manpower shortages in other sectors of the economy (Fjármálatíðindi, 1956). In 
the 1960s the services and labour needed at the base provided a steady stream of 
revenue and valuable foreign currency (Fjármálatíðindi, 1960) and by the 1970s 
the base had become a permanent feature in the Icelandic economy: the third 
largest single buyer of electricity from the national electric grid while employing 
1.4% of the available labour force in Iceland. (Sigurpálsson, 1976). This trend 
continued into the late 1980s when revenues generated by the U.S. military in 
Iceland constituted 2.5% of Iceland’s Gross National Product (Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2006).
Throughout the decades the U.S. military also provided an important – although 
unintended – role as a provider of Search and Rescue. Stationed alongside the fighter 
jets was a Rescue Squadron (56th RQS) of five HH-60G Pavehawk helicopters 
supported by a HC-130 Hercules refuelling airplane (Eydal, 2006, p. 50) and upon 
request by the Icelandic Coast Guard would fly non-military Search and Rescue 
missions (Senior official Icelandic Coast Guard, 2014). Deployed to provide 
combat Search and Rescue to the base the squadron had an impressive rescue record 
of non-base personnel. From 1971 to 2005 the squadron flew over 400 missions 
and rescued over 300 individuals from over 20 nationalities (Iceland Defence Force, 
2006). The squadron’s activity declined as domestic Search and Rescue capabilities 
were built up within the Icelandic Coast Guard but it is important not to undervalue 
its importance as it continued to provide Coast Guard with added backup in case 
it was ever needed right up until they were removed from Iceland in 2006 (Senior 
official Icelandic Coast Guard, 2014). 
4.1. Iceland Air Defence System (IADS)
At the time of the U.S. departure from Iceland the Iceland Air Defence System 
(IADS) was the backbone of U.S. NATO air surveillance in the North Atlantic. 
The components of IADS include both NATO equipment and NATO facilities. 
IADS is divided into three sub-systems: (1) radar system, (2) communication 
system and a (3) telecommunication system. The radar system consists of primary as 
well as secondary radar system. The radar and communication sites are four and are 
situated in each quadrant of Iceland: Miðnesheiði (H-1A), Gunnólfsvíkurfjall (H-
2), Stokknes (H-3) and Bolafjall (H-4). Optical fibre cables connect these sites to a 
Command and Reporting Centre (CRC) and a Iceland Software Support Facility 
(ISSF) situated within the former Keflavík base area (United States Navy Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, p. A-1). 
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The communication component of IADS connects the system with command 
and control centres in other NATO countries; while the telecommunication system 
makes it possible for the staff at the CRC to communicate through secure UHF and 
VHF channels as well as Tactical Digital Information Links (TADIL) with military 
ships and aeroplanes (Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, pp. 76-77). These three 
systems gather information from radars and other air defence systems and military 
aeroplanes and ships. The data collected by the systems is transmitted to the CRC in 
Keflavík where they are combined into a Recognised Air and Sea Picture (RASP), a 
real-time-picture of movement of all military aeroplanes and vessels within a given 
area. The CRC in Keflavík shares the RASP with other NATO command centres in 
Europe, which in turn share their RASP with the Keflavík CRC (Icelandic Defence 
Agency, 2010, pp. 80-82), thus creating knowledge of all military air and sea traffic 
within the area covered by NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS). 
Furthermore, the CRC in Keflavík shares digital primary radar data on air 
traffic with Icelandic civilian air traffic controllers. Without this, civilian air traffic 
controllers would only be able to see aeroplanes that send automatic signals to 
secondary radar. Other traffic, i.e. non-allied military flights, would remain unseen 
(Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, p. 85) causing possible danger to civilian air traffic. 
Following the U.S. departure in 2006 the Keflavík CRC was integrated into 
European NATO Combined Air Operations Centres (CAOCS) in the NATO 
defence structure. Initially, in September 2006 to CAOC-3 in Reitan, Norway 
and later to CAOC-9 in High Wycombe in the English Midlands. Work began 
to integrate IADS into NATINADS in August 2007 and the Keflavík CRC was 
reassigned to CAOC-F in Finderup, Denmark (Icelandic Defence Agency, 74). 
Following the deactivation of CAOC-F in 2013, the Keflavík CRC was yet again 
reassigned and this time to CAOC Uedem-U in Uedem, Germany (Commander of 
Keflavík Air Base, 2014). 
One of the major functions of Keflavík base during the Cold War was to monitor 
Soviet activity around Iceland. Before the end of the Cold War Soviet military 
flights into the North Atlantic were commonplace. Between 1962 and 1973 fighter 
jets from the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron based at Keflavík base intercepted 
over one thousand Soviet aircraft (INA, 1974). In the 1980s the number of Soviet 
military flights continued to rise with an average of 126 planes intercepted each 
year ( Jónsson, 1990, p. 74). In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russian military flights within the Icelandic Military Air Identification 
Zone (MADIZ) declined sharply and petered out in 1991. At the turn of the 
century, Russian military planes consisting of Cold War era Tupolev-95 were again 
spotted within the Icelandic MADIZ. A single flight of two planes was reported 
in 1999 (“Birnir á flugi,” 1999) and again in 2003 (“Tvær rússneskar vélar inn á 
loftvarnarsvæðið,” 2003). With the closure of Keflavík base and the departure of 
U.S. military personnel from Iceland regular Russian military flights into the North 
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Atlantic resumed and continued with regular intervals during the time period 
2006-2013.
Figure 1 Russian military flights and aircrafts within the Icelandic MADIZ 2006-2013 
(Icelandic Coast Guard, 2014).
Figure 1 shows the total number of Russian military planes, and flights, within 
the Icelandic MADIZ, renamed NATO Air Policing Area following the closure of 
Keflavík base. Ten of these flights have been circular flights around Iceland with a 
minimum distance of 35 nautical miles from land (Icelandic Coast Guard, 2014). 
The frequency of these flights is still far below what it was during the Cold War 
era, but their presence in the skies around Iceland is in stark contrast to the 1990s 
and early 2000s and shows renewed flexing of Russian military power in the North 
Atlantic. The flights mimic those flown by the Soviet nuclear strategic force during 
the Cold War:
We have simply opened old Soviet military manuals from the Cold War and seen 
that they haven’t changed a thing. They have been practicing cruise missile attacks on 
targets on land. They have clearly been exercising cruise missile attacks on NATO HQ, 
SHAPE, and targets in Germany, Norway, and Iceland, as well as flying down to the 
U.S. eastern seaboard. They have also been exercising anti-submarine warfare. It’s the 
whole package. They fly past Iceland and head south towards Europe (Senior official 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The reappearance of Russian military flights is not simply a Cold War echo 
repackaged in a veil of Russian national interests there is also some risk involved 
for civilian air traffic crossing the Atlantic. The Russian military authorities do 
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not inform Icelandic air traffic control services of their flight plans; neither do 
the Russian bombers send signals to secondary radars used by Icelandic air traffic 
controllers or answer to radio communication (Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, p. 
84). The risk of a mid-air collision between a passenger plane crossing the Atlantic 
and a Russian bomber are low but there have been instances when civilian air traffic 
has had to be redirected because of nearby Russian bomber flights:
The Russians came in 2008, when the French were here [Air Policing mission] and they 
flew up and across traffic. There were number of instances which we would register as 
incidents, because they [Russian bombers] were that close to the middle of air traffic. 
We forwarded the information [to Icelandic civil aviation authorities]. There has been 
more than one incident. Especially in the south-east corner [of Iceland] and Icelandic 
civil aviation authorities have directed traffic above and to the side of the area (Technical 
crew chief IADS, 2014). 
In these instances, it is the role of the CRC in Keflavík to identify and track the 
planes and relay information about their flights to the CAOC in Uedem. It is then 
up to air defence controllers in that particular CAOC to decide from where to 
scramble fighters to intercept the bombers (Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, pp. 83-
84). If the Russians fly close to Norway on their way to Iceland, Norwegian fighters 
are scrambled from their bases in Norway. 
The linkage between the CRC in Keflavík and CAOC Uedem, Germany is 
integrated. NATO units deployed in Iceland for NATO air policing missions 
include air defence controllers who direct the fighter planes from Keflavík CRC. 
Of course, NATO air policing is carried out at the request of and on the behalf 
of the Icelandic government but tactical control is in the hands of foreign military 
personnel that operate within a joint NATO command structure and work 
according to NATO rules and procedures. In the event that fighters from Keflavík 
need to intercept military flights within the so-called Icelandic NATO Air Policing 
Area an authorization needs to be given by CAOC Uedem (Commander Keflavík 
Air Base, 2014). NATO members have tasked SACEUR to conduct air policing on 
their behalf, and this is executed by the NATO chain of command following strict 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) in consultation with the nation in whose air space an 
incident potentially occurs.
The first steps towards mounting NATO air policing missions takes place at 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), during NATO Force 
Generation Conference held in the first week of November each year (Icelandic 
Defence Agency, 2010, p. 87). During the event individual NATO member 
announce participation in NATO missions and their contribution. Among those 
missions advertised is Air Surveillance and Interception Capability to meet Iceland’s 
Peacetime Preparedness Needs (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2014). The missions 
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are the responsibility of and conducted on behalf of NATO although individual 
member states send personnel and equipment to conduct air policing in Iceland. 
NATO standard AJP4.5, titled: Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support, 
describes the six phases that must be completed before NATO military forces can 
arrive in Iceland to participate in air policing:
1. A Memorandum of Understanding is negotiated within SHAPE, outlining 
the overarching principles for provision of Host Nation Support between 
NATO Strategic Commands the Sending Nations and the Host Nations;
2. Within SHAPE a Host Nation Support Request is drafted, summarising 
the need for Host Nation Support and outlines the scope of the desired 
arrangement. The Host Nation is then expected to respond to the Host Nation 
Support Request before moving on to discussions with the designated NATO 
Commander on needed Host Nation Support Arrangements;
3. Combined Joint Statement of Requirements is then sent from SHAPE to the 
host nation outlining the required support needed by the sending nation. It 
covers facilities, transportation, security, telecommunication etc.; 
4. A Joint Implementation Arrangement between the Host and Sending Nation 
is developed. A bilateral agreement between the Host Nation and individual 
Sending Nations, obligating the signatories to provide the financial and other 
resources detailed within the agreement;
5. Statement of Requirement is then developed. Its purpose is to take the 
planning process from the generic to the specific: identifying what forces 
need to be supported, it shall include all Host Nation Support needed by the 
Sending Nation forces;
6. The Statement of Requirement is then annexed to a Joint Implementation 
Arrangement which outlines in detail the procedures and concepts 
underpinning available Host Nation Support. The Joint Implementation 
Arrangement includes a list of all nations participating in the military activity 
(NATO Standardization. Office, 2013, pp. 3-1 - 3-8 and Commander Keflavík 
Air Base, 2014).
Although the procedure laid out in NATO standard AJP-4.5 is the standard 
method of preparing for Air Policing missions in reality only three of these steps 
are taken when preparing for Air Policing missions in Iceland (Icelandic Defence 
Agency, 2010, pp. 88-89): (1) The Office of Defence at the Icelandic Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and Commander Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters 
Brunssum ( JFC Brunssum) sign a memorandum of understanding concerning 
the provision of Host Nation Support to the visiting NATO countries air forces, 
(2) The Defence Department and JFC Brunssum sign a Technical Agreement on 
Host Nation Support and implementation of Air Policing and (3) the Icelandic 
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authorities and each Sending Nation develop a Joint Implementation Arrangement 
which is based on the existing Technical Agreement. 
Table 1 Contributing nations in NATO Air Policing in Iceland 2008-2013 (Icelandic Coast 
Guard, 2013).
NATO Air Policing Missions in Iceland 2008-2013
2008 France France U.S.
2009 Denmark Norway U.S.
2010 Denmark Germany U.S.
2011 Canada Norway U.S.
2012 Germany U.S. Portugal
2013 Canada Italy U.S.
In the spring of 2008, the first NATO Air Policing Mission took place in Iceland. 
The Sending Nation was France which deployed four Mirage 2000 fighters from the 
French Air Force. Followed by a U.S. Air Policing mission in September that same 
year. 
Between 2008 and 2013 three periodic deployments took place a year, each 
lasting five to six weeks. The U.S. has filled one slot a year while Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany and Norway have filled two slots each with Portugal and Italy 
covering the remaining two slots. Before the departure of U.S. forces from Keflavík 
Iceland enjoyed a year round air defence provided by the F-15 fighters stationed 
at the base and three periodic deployments a year is a far cry from permanent 
stationing of fighters in Iceland. The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
are also provided with regular NATO Air Policing missions; however, their coverage 
is continuous and there are voices within the Icelandic public administration that 
have argued for increased coverage:
We had a clear claim to ask for full coverage like the Baltic states, perhaps it was a 
mistake not to do so, and end somewhere in between. This current arrangement is not 
acceptable as there can be up to six months between deployments. […] The arrangement 
is four slots [deployments a year] but we have never used the fourth slot. There have 
only been three missions a year since we didn’t think we could support four slots after 
the banking crisis [autumn 2008]. A tradition has formed around three missions a year, 
and we haven’t requested any increase. But this is not an acceptable arrangement as we 
do not have adequate air defences (Senior official Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013).
This view from within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs draws attention to the 
problem of costs a dilemma accentuated by Iceland’s smallness, although, the brunt 
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of the costs associated with each air policing slot is the responsibility of the Sending 
Nation. The average cost to the Icelandic government for each air policing mission 
is roughly €77,000 (Senior official Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013) that is mostly 
imbursement for local transportation, increased security measures at Keflavík 
airport as well as payments to the national airport and air navigation service provider 
ISAVIA for ground services, 
4.2. NATO facilities in Iceland
Through the decades a number of defence projects were funded in Iceland. While the 
initiative was in the hands of the U.S. authorities, the projects were carried out with 
consent from their Icelandic counterparts (Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, p. 66), 
and their funding was either in the hands of the U.S. government, NATO or both. 
The facilities and equipment in question differ in size and shape. From harbour and 
airport facilities to radar communication sites and fibre optic cables. Until 2007 the 
United States had represented Iceland within the NATO Infrastructure Committee, 
today known as the NATO Security Investment Programme, but in light of changed 
circumstances the government of Iceland took over that role and began to contribute 
to the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP), a requisite for Host Nations 
to receive NATO common funding for defence infrastructure. 
During the hand over process in 2006, base and airport facilities were categorized 
into two separate groups according to their source of funding: U.S. owned and 
those in NATO inventory. The two sides reached an agreement for handover of 
U.S. facilities; and both governments decided to jointly recommend to NATO that 
Iceland would assume Host Nation responsibility for all NATO funded facilities in 
Iceland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006, p. 13). As an interim arrangement the 
U.S. government continued its User Nation role for NATO infrastructure, pending a 
decision by NATO on the final disposition of these facilities. However, following U.S. 
notification to NATO military authorities that the United States no longer required 
the use of these facilities that interim arrangement could not exceed twelve months. 
In the summer of 2008, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a definitive 
record of all NATO facilities in Iceland (Government Gazette, 2008). In short, these 
facilities were divided into three categories: (1) various facilities located within the 
Keflavík airport area, (2) IADS facilities and equipment and (3) Helguvík harbour 
facilities and oil depots that supply Keflavík airport with jet fuel through a 5.5 km long 
pipeline. Of course, Keflavík airport has always served as a dual military and civilian 
airport, while IADS and Helguvík harbour were a part of an extensive investment 
program in the 1980s carried out by the U.S. military but financed by NSIP.
Defence investment in Iceland funded with U.S. taxpayer’s money or NATO funds 
has been substantial. In 2007 NATO valued its own contribution at €550 million. 
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Of which €300 million had gone towards civil work projects with the remaining 
€250 million earmarked for IADS (NATO Security Investment Programme, 2007). 
However, the total value of IADS was set at €385 million (Icelandic Coast Guard, 
2006), the discrepancy of €135 million accounts for direct U.S. investment towards 
IADS. 
The previously mentioned list (Government Gazette, 2008) of NATO 
infrastructure covers 187 facilities of which 46 were in a deletion process from the 
NATO inventory at the time of its publication. Of the remaining 141 facilities, a 
number of those within Helguvík harbour and Keflavík airport have been leased 
out to third parties. In turn, the leaseholders are responsible for maintaining the 
facilities but NATO retains a first user right. 
There are a number of buildings owned by NATO within our area. They are either used 
by us, unused or leased out to ISAVIA. We [Icelandic authorities] have also leased out 
the NATO oil depot in Helguvík harbour, which is a substantive facility. We saw right 
from the start that we would never be able to maintain Helguvík. The defence force 
had already leased out the harbour facilities to Reykjanes municipality and we simply 
continued with that arrangement. The oil depot was later leased out to Olíudreifing, and 
the income is used to finance supervision of the contract: making sure that Olíudreifing 
performs required maintenance (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2013).
Ownership of works funded by NSIP is not fully defined. Indeed, installations 
financed under common NATO infrastructure are the responsibility of the relevant 
Host Nation but NATO “…has the right to use works that have been accepted into 
the NATO Inventory and the right to reimbursement of the residual value of NATO 
Security Investment Programme funded works that are deleted from the inventory” 
(NATO Office of Resources, 2011, pp. 256-257). However, costs incurred from 
maintaining and scrapping NATO facilities taken off the NATO inventory list 
have exceeded any residual value owed to NATO (Icelandic Permanent Delegation 
at NATO, 2014). Therefore, during the time period covered by this thesis the 
government of Iceland has not had to reimburse NATO for any infrastructure NSIP 
has funded in Iceland.
4.3. National Security Authority Iceland
Membership of a military alliance calls for a collective framework for security 
standards and procedures that ensure a common degree of protection for classified 
information. Therefore, the third set of tasks that the Icelandic authorities fully 
assumed after the U.S. departure was the implementation of NATO security 
standards and procedures to guard classified information. The North Atlantic 
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Council security policy document C-M(2002)49 obligates NATO member states 
to establish a National Security Authority (Icelandic Defence Agency, 2010, pp. 47-
48) whose responsibilities are as follows: 
1. Preserve the security of NATO classified information in national organizations; 
2. Carry out regular inspections of security arrangements intended for protection 
of NATO classified information in all national organizations; 
3. Perform security checks on individuals before they are granted security 
clearance;
4. Ensure that national security plans are in place to prevent NATO classified 
information from falling into unauthorised or hostile hands; and
5. Grant the establishment or disestablishment of central national registries.
Classified information includes information or material determined to require 
protection against unauthorized disclosure that has been so designated by security 
classification. Classified information does not only include written information 
and/or data gathered from NATO data systems but also buildings and equipment. 
Each member state National Security Authority competence is regularly 
monitored by the NATO Office of Security6 through regular inspections (Icelandic 
Defence Agency, pp. 48-52). These inspections focus on: (1) Personnel Security, 
reliability of individuals with access to classified information; (2) Physical Security, 
physical protection in place at facilities containing information requiring protection; 
(3) Security of Information, overall defensive measures intended to identify and 
prevent loss of classified information and (4) Industrial Security, application of 
defensive measures to prevent the loss of classified information that has been 
devolved to private sector actors for contractual reasons, for example in connection 
with construction work on a classified facility. Further, the NATO Office of Security 
investigates, in cooperation with the National Security Authority, instances of lost 
or compromised NATO classified information. 
4.4. Implementation of defence tasks prior to 2006
In accordance to the 1951 Defence Agreement the U.S. government was responsible 
for the defence of Iceland on behalf of NATO. Therefore, the U.S. maintained assets 
and personnel in the country to provide Iceland with defences. In addition, the U.S. 
served as a Host and User Nation for all NATO facilities in Iceland, and shared 
6     “The NATO Office of Security is a distinct body responsible for coordinating, monitoring and 
implementing NATO’s security policy, for overall security within NATO and for the NATO Headquarters 
Security Service” (NATO Encyclopedia, 2016, p. 295).
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some of the responsibilities of a domestic National Security Authority with the 
Icelandic authorities. 
Of course, the U.S. government did not perform these tasks in a vacuum. NATO 
facilities existed throughout the country and important components of IADS were 
outside the Keflavík base area. Therefore, an Icelandic quasi-governmental agency, 
the Radar Agency (Ratsjárstofnun), was involved at the operational level. The role 
and function of the Radar Agency is crucial to understanding the implementation of 
Icelandic defence organizational processes prior to 2006. Consequently, the focus of 
interest in the following discussion is very much slanted towards this agency.
The Radar Agency traced its origins to a decision by the U.S. government in 
the early 1980s to scrap the previous Icelandic air defence system that dated with 
modifications from the early 1950s ( Jónsson, 1990, pp. 70-71). Previously, all 
technical aspects of air surveillance as well as air policing around Iceland had been 
in the hands of the U.S. defence force but by the 1980s the government of Iceland 
decided that it should be more involved in implementing the national defence of 
Iceland. In June 1985, a Radar Committee (Ratsjárnefnd) was established within 
the Office of Defence at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Radar Committee was 
tasked with making a study of how the Icelandic authorities could collaborate with 
the defence force in operating and maintaining the new radar stations (Radar Agency, 
1994, pp. 6-7) although the U.S government would pay for its daily operation and 
maintenance, in accordance to the 1951 Defence Agreement.
In May 1987 the Radar Agency became active as a sub-structure within the 
Office of Defence at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the same time the first 
group of Icelandic radar technicians were being trained in Iceland and the United 
States (Radar Agency, 1994, p. 7). In April 1989 the Radar Agency took over the 
operation of telecommunication and radar equipment on the radar stations in 
Stokksnes (H-3) and Miðnesheiði (H-1A) and those on Mt. Bolafjall (H-4) and Mt. 
Gunnólfsvíkurfjall (H-2) when becoming operational in January 1992. 
By 1994 the Radar Agency employed 62 people at its radar stations and main office 
in Reykjavík. So far so good; there was just one problem. The Icelandic Parliament 
never created a legal framework for the agency nor did any government minister 
define its role and function. In February 1988, Foreign Minister Steingrímur 
Hermannsson briefed Parliament about imminent legislation for the Radar Agency 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1988, p. 46), but no bill was put before the 1987-
1988 Parliament. As Parliament reconvened the following autumn a new left of 
centre government had taken over and nothing was heard of the proposed bill. In a 
1988 review by the Icelandic National Audit Office Parliament was encouraged to 
establish a legal framework for the Radar Agency since:
The activity of the Radar Agency has increased, and it is apparent that it will continue 
to do so when two new radar stations will be made operational. It is the view of the 
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inspectors of the State Auditor that such an extensive government activity shall be 
regulated (Icelandic National Audit Office, 1989, p. 11). 
Instead of operating within an Icelandic legislative framework the tasks and 
procedures of the Radar Agency were defined in an annual renewable contractual 
agreement, Performance Work Statement, between the Radar Agency and the U.S. 
Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic, headquartered in the United 
States at Norfolk, Virginia. 
Discussions regarding the yearly Performance Work Statement took place 
between the Radar Agency and the U.S. Navy with a representative from the U.S. 
Air Force (Böðvarsson, 2014b) as the Radar Agency was funded by the U.S. Air 
Force in Langley Virginia. Despite the lack of an Icelandic legal framework both 
governments of the United States and Iceland regarded the agency as a government 
entity (United States Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. A-1) 
as disputes between the Radar Agency and the U.S. government were a bilateral 
matter between the government of Iceland and the government of the United States: 
All differences between the Radar Agency and the US relating to the interpretation of 
application of this contract shall be settled by negotiations between the Radar Agency 
and the US without recourse to judicial forums. Contractual differences which cannot 
be settled by direct negotiations between the US contracting Officer and the Radar 
Agency shall be referred to the Icelandic-United States Defence Council. Disputes not 
resolved by the Defence Council shall be resolved in negotiations between the United 
States Department of State and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland. The Radar 
Agency and the US shall exert their best efforts to resolve disputes at the lowest possible 
level (United States Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. A-7). 
Why the government did not go through with legislation in 1988 or any subsequent 
government for that matter is hard to say. Until the final days of Keflavík base the 
Radar Agency was included in the Icelandic government budget (Parliament, 2006, 
pp. 430, 433), namely, in its B section, which deals with state owned enterprises 
expected to rely partly or fully on sales of goods or services. 
What the Radar Agency was, or was not, did cause some confusion within 
Icelandic public administration. In August 1998 the Ministry of Finance saw fit to 
inform the director for defence at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that since the 
Radar Agency was defined in the government budget as a state entity its vehicles 
would from now on be defined as state owned. Furthermore, the director was 
reminded that state purchase of vehicles was prohibited without prior consent 
from the Ministry of Finance (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1998). According to 
the former director of the Radar Agency, nothing came of this bid by the Ministry 
of Finance to claim ownership over Radar Agency property (Böðvarsson, 2014a). 
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Radar Agency vehicles continued to be imported without any tariffs or import 
charges on the basis of the defence agreement and later resold through the defence 
force surplus sale in Reykjavík, as any other defence force civilian surplus equipment. 
The ambiguity was brought to an end two years later when Parliament passed a law 
regulating the implementation of certain aspects of the 1951 Defence Agreement 
(Parliament, 2000). Although the first piece of Icelandic legislation to mention the 
Radar Agency the law did only go so far as to state that “Furthermore, the activities 
of the Radar Agency shall be exempt from taxes and charges in the same way [as the 
defence force].” 
While functioning outside of an Icelandic legal framework its work was rigidly 
regulated and monitored by the U.S. Air Force. The Performance Work Statement 
defined Radar Agency responsibilities as to:
1. …furnish all supervision, management, administration, transportation, 
logistics support, training and office equipment needed to maintain the 
Iceland Air Defence System (IADS) hardware and software and operate and 
maintain communication-electronic (C-E) equipment at the radar sites...
2. …[be] responsible for furnishing personnel required with the necessary skills 
and qualification to operate, maintain and repair the facilities, equipment, and 
software as described herein…
3. …provide for the management, maintenance, security and logistic support of 
the power production equipment, roads and other unpaved areas, facilities, 
real property, real property installed equipment and grounds as specified 
herein for each radar site.
4. …provide all organizational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance 
support for the IADS, to include sustaining engineering for the Control and 
Reporting Center (CRC) (AN/FYQ-137), Iceland Software & Support 
Facility (ISSF) (AN/FSM-67), and the Remote Radar Head (RRH) 
communication suite (AN/FRY-1(V)1&2), external links and connections…. 
[and] provide all organizational and intermediate level and maintenance and 
support for the AN/FSP-117 radar.
5. [be]…responsible for security of the hardware and software resources under 
their direct control. Access to the CRC and ISSF facilities will be limited to 
essential personnel as determined by the Commander, 932 ACS [Air Control 
Squadron].
6. [make] all Radar Agency or subcontractor technical documentation available 
for US Government review upon request... 
7. …comply with the technical requirements of the US Government 
representative, ACC Program Management Squadron… (United States Navy 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. C-1, C-2).
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The Radar Agency was thus responsible for the day to day system maintenance 
and support services to IADS and radar sites outside Keflavík base. Furthermore, 
as paragraph e) states the Radar Agency was responsible for information security 
and industrial security of the hardware and software under its direct control. While 
physical security of the CRC and ISSF was in the hands of base military authorities’ 
physical security of the radar sites outside the base were in the hands of the Radar 
Agency, 
Responsibility for personnel security was a bit more complicated. Within 
Keflavík base a component of the defence force, the 932 ACS, reserved the right 
to determine what essential personnel were allowed access to the CRC and ISSF 
but it remained the responsibility of the Radar Agency to provide its staff with 
NATO security clearances (Former senior official Radar Agency, 2013). Requests 
for vetting and issuing of security clearances went from the Radar Agency to the 
Office of Defence at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which forwarded the request 
for processing to the National Commissioner of Police responsible for vetting and 
providing Icelandic government employees with NATO security clearances.
Other aspects of the day to day workings of the Radar Agency showed the same 
levels of symbiotic cooperation. The internal quality assurance system (paragraphs 
f ) and g)) was monitored to ensure that the quality of services, workmanship 
and material complied with U.S. standards by U.S. government representatives. 
Meanwhile, the financial records of the Radar Agency were reviewed annually by 
separate auditors from the Icelandic government and the U.S. government (United 
States Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. A-6, A-9).
The Performance Work Statement was also a two-way agreement, and on its 
behalf the U.S. government committed itself to:
1. …determine the employment of all C-E hardware and software and reserves 
all operational decisions relative to data affecting systems operations, or 
data derived from systems at the CRC, ISSF and radar sites, and retains full 
responsibility for the initiation of any action resulting from such decisions…
2. US Government exercises will be programmed to provide minimum 
interference with Radar Agency O&M responsibilities, however, facility 
access for US Government personnel to the radar sites will be required during 
these periods.
3. The US Government is responsible for CRC and ISSF facility maintenance 
and emergency generator operations and maintenance (United States Navy 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. C-2). 
Under heading 1 the U.S. government took responsibility for the system hardware 
and software as well as its data usage. Furthermore, paragraph c) obliged the U.S. 
government to maintain the CRC and ISSF facilities – the nerve centres of the IADS 
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system. Indeed, it was also the responsibility of the U.S. government to provide the 
Radar Agency with all material, i.e. spare parts, hardware, software etc., and the use 
of the U.S. government supply system to maintain the IADS system (United States 
Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2005, pp. C-9). 
4.5. Conclusion
From 1951 the U.S. military was responsible for providing Iceland with military 
defences on the basis that Iceland did not have its own military capabilities. From 
a Neorealist perspective, Iceland successfully bandwagoned with a larger power but 
that cooperation cut far into Icelandic sovereignty, after all, The U.S. military funded 
and was responsible for the day to day function of Iceland’s international airport 
and financed important infrastructure projects within Keflavík airport in the 1970s 
and the 1980s. In addition, the helicopter rescue squadron stationed at Keflavík 
base to service U.S. military personnel flew regular non-military rescue mission 
at the request of the Icelandic Coast Guard until the base closed in 2006 and the 
Coast Guard, to an extent, became dependant on seeking assistance from the rescue 
squadron in case of long-range flights.
It was not until the early 1980s that an Icelandic government entity became 
involved in the day to day operations of the defence force by providing technical 
service to IADS. However, despite the position of the U.S. and the Icelandic 
government that the Radar Agency was an Icelandic government agency it was 
funded by the U.S. Air Force and its work regulated by a yearly performance work 
agreement between the Radar Agency and the U.S. Air Force. 
The 2006 base closure changed all that. The functions underpinning the 
implementation of an active defence policy were handed over to the government 
of Iceland: taking over the operation of IADS, responsibility for defence facilities, 
safeguarding those facilities and to set up a NATO air policing scheme to compensate 
for the departed U.S. forces. Although the 1951 Defence Agreement is still in effect 
the closure of Keflavík base was a fundamental change for the government of Iceland 
which was now fully responsible for the implementation of the national defence of 
Iceland.
As a result, the institutional ties with NATO were strengthened. The government 
of Iceland was now responsible for maintaining and operating NATO infrastructure 
in Iceland which in turn required that Iceland began to contribute financially to NSIP 
and participate in relevant committee work to ensure funding from the programme. 
The most important NATO defence infrastructure in Iceland, the IADS system, was 
now the responsibility of the government of Iceland which had to set up linkages 
with relevant NATO agencies in Europe and regular Air Policing missions. Today 
Air Policing and air defence in Iceland is fully integrated with NATO command 
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centres in Europe and tactical command is in the hands of personnel under a NATO 
chain of command in Keflavík and Uedem in Germany. From the perspective of 
Institutionalism, the importance of NATO as the second pillar in Iceland’s security 
policy has strengthened as a counterbalance to the weakening of the first pillar, i.e. 
the defence relationship with the U.S. following the removal of U.S. forces from 
Iceland. 
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5. The closure of Keflavík base
5.1. The impact of the defence issue on domestic politics
Before delving into the eventual base negotiations that resulted in the 2006 closure 
of Keflavík base it is necessary to briefly outline the nature of the Icelandic political 
party system and what positions the dominating parties have had towards U.S. 
defence cooperation and Icelandic membership in NATO. 
The Icelandic 19th and early 20th century political party system was largely shaped 
by Iceland’s relationship with Denmark and the move towards self-determination 
and eventual sovereignty (Harðarson, 2002, p. 107). With the 1918 Union Act 
Iceland became set on a trajectory that would lead to full independence. In the 
late 1910s the political party system began to tilt towards traditional class politics 
centring on economic and social issues. During a 15-year period the four major 
parties were formed that would dominate the Icelandic political scene throughout 
the 20th century. In 1916, the Social Democratic Party (Alþýðuflokkur) and the 
agrarian Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkur) were established. Followed In 
1929 by the creation of the conservative Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkur), 
and the Communist Party (Kommúnistaflokkur Íslands) in 1930. The Communist 
Party evolved into the United Socialist Party In 1938 (Sameiningarflokkur 
alþýðu-Sósíalistaflokkurinn), which in turn transformed into the People’s Alliance 
(Alþýðubandalagið) in 1956.
The Social Democratic Party, unlike its sister parties in other Nordic countries, 
was never able to gain a dominating position in the Icelandic political landscape. As 
a political outgrowth of the Icelandic labour movement it represented traditional 
working-class interests. After initial success in the 1920s and 1930s, its electoral 
support stagnated below the 20 percentiles and the party was never able to propel 
to the forefront of Icelandic politics. A major realignment on the left wing of the 
spectrum took place in 1999 with the merger of four left of centre parties into 
the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin). The intent was to consolidate 
the left into a single block to counter the Independence Party that has historically 
represented a united right of centre front. 
With the merger of the People’s Alliance and the Social Democratic Party into 
the Social Democratic Alliance, a splinter group from the People’s Alliance formed 
the Left Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin grænt framboð). Overshadowed by 
the Social Democratic Alliance the Left Green Movement gained initially 9% of 
the electoral votes rising to 14.3% in the 2007 Parliamentary elections. Two years 
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later, following the 2008 financial crisis, the Left Green Movement carried through 
its biggest Parliamentary electoral victory by winning 21.7% of the electoral votes.
The agrarian Progressive Party has traditionally been the second largest party in 
Parliament. Malapportionment in the Icelandic electoral system has benefited rural 
constituencies in Iceland translating into disproportionate electoral Progressive 
Party gains (Harðarson, 2002, pp. 150-151). In the post-war decades the Progressive 
Party could rely on 20-30% of the electoral votes but its electoral base has gradually 
eroded through urbanisation as people migrated from the rural constituencies to 
urban areas. To compensate for its dwindling rural electoral base the Progressive Party 
has branched out to urban voters (Kristjánsson, 1994, pp. 154-155). Historically, 
this has translated into a necessity for the Progressive Party leadership to be able to 
form coalition governments with parties either to the left or right on the political 
spectrum 
Compared to the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party, the 
conservative Independence Party was a relative late comer on the political scene. The 
Independence Party has combined conservative and liberal elements (Harðarson, 
2002, p. 108) while drawing on working class support. The centre right wing of the 
political spectrum has been united within the Independence Party thus securing the 
party 30%-40% of the electoral votes. 
Despite the dominance of the four-party structure a peculiarity of the political 
system has been the continuous emergence of a single issue fifth party. Usually 
inhabiting the political system only for a brief period (Kristinsson, 2007, pp. 
108-109), such parties usually championed a popular single issue with a broad 
appeal to the electorate. However, after their initial success, the established 
parties would often adopt their policies, thus depriving them of their uniqueness. 
For instance, such was the fate of the nationalistic and anti-communist National 
Preservation Party (Þjóðvarnarflokkurinn). After moderate success in the 1953 
Parliamentary elections by capitalising almost solely on opposition to the Keflavík 
base the National Preservation Party garnered 6% of the vote and two members of 
Parliament. (Nuechterlein, 1961, p. 122). However, as the Social Democratic Party 
and the Progressive Party adopted an anti-base position prior to the 1956 election 
the National Preservation Party lost its electoral support and its representation in 
Parliament. 
Since the establishment of the Icelandic republic in 1944, the defence relationship 
with the United State and later membership of NATO has had a decisive influence on 
the Icelandic domestic political scene. As the victors of the war began to drift apart it 
became apparent to the leaders of Iceland’s three major political parties – excluding 
the communists – that Iceland needed western defence guarantees to compensate 
for its vulnerabilities. In the winter of 1948-1949 the coalition government, led 
by the Social Democratic Party watched from afar attempts by Norway, Denmark 
and Sweden to form a Scandinavian defence alliance. Although the Icelandic 
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government followed developments with interest, its usefulness to Iceland appeared 
doubtful since within such a security arrangement Iceland would always remain 
at the periphery. Eventually a fundamental difference about what role the United 
States should have vis-à-vis a Nordic defence alliance turned the discussions barren. 
In the winter of 1948-1949 it was not surprising that the Icelandic government 
proved receptive to U.S. overtures on Icelandic participation in a U.S. led defence 
alliance. Tentative discussions about this future military alliance took place between 
Ambassador Butrick and Foreign Minister Benediktsson but the decision to join 
had to be agreed upon by all members of the ruling coalition government. Therefore, 
the Icelandic delegation that convened with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and 
his staff at the State Department in Washington D.C. in March 1949 consisted of 
influential political figures from each of the three coalition parties: Foreign Minister 
Bjarni Benediktsson, Independence Party; Minister for Commerce Emil Jónsson, 
Social Democratic Party; and Minister for Education Eysteinn Jónsson, Progressive 
Party. The three parties represented a unified front during the negotiations, but it 
is necessary to separate Icelandic NATO membership from the more politically 
explosive issue of U.S. military presence in Iceland that would cause internal division 
within the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party. 
The division was already apparent during the 1946 Parliament vote on the 
Keflavík Agreement that gave the United States the right to continue to use 
Keflavík airport for military transit flights. Opposing the agreement at the time 
was the leader of the Progressive Party, Hermann Jónasson, who argued for a 
complete Icelandic take-over of Keflavík airport. However, he was countered by a 
large faction within his own party in favour of the agreement. Hermann Jónasson’s 
reluctance for closer defence ties with the United States remained in 1949 as he 
abstained in the Parliamentary vote on NATO membership, supported by a small 
group within his own parliamentary group. Equally, the Social Democratic Party 
was not fully united in1946 and 1949. While a majority of six Social Democratic 
parliamentarians voted in favour of the Keflavík Agreement two were in opposition 
while one abstained. A pattern that repeated itself three years later when the Social 
Democrats voted on whether to join NATO with two of its parliamentarians 
voting against membership.
The internal division within the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic 
Party can be explained by two fundamental reasons. As a recently independent 
nation Icelanders were sensitive to losing its newly gained independence to a foreign 
power and for many the Keflavík Agreement, and later, NATO accession were first 
steps towards greater dependency on the United States and erosion of Icelandic 
national identity. The second objection was closely related to the first one. After 
being drawn into the armed Western camp Iceland would not be able to avoid 
becoming a target in any future struggles between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. An anathema to those who wished for Iceland to remain out of harm’s way 
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and adopt the same neutral status it had held after becoming a sovereign state in 
1918.
Despite internal division among the Progressive’s and the Social Democrats 
the break-out of the Korean War in 1951 proved to be the external catalyst that 
formed a consensus within the three major parties for the necessity to station U.S. 
military forces in Iceland (Ingimundarson, 1996, p. 223). The day before Parliament 
adjourned for the summer, 5 May 1951, Foreign Minister Benediktsson signed 
the defence agreement and introduced as a government bill when Parliament re-
assembled in the autumn and passed with unanimous support by the Independence 
Party, the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party. While the three parties 
discussed and debated the defence agreement the socialists were intentionally left 
out in the dark. 
Although the three parties had presented a united front in accepting U.S. forces 
in Iceland the decision was a crisis response. As the shock-waves that rippled from 
the Korean War receded opposition within the Progressive Party and the Social 
Democratic Party towards the defence agreement became more vocal. Following the 
1953 elections the Independence Party and a weakened Progressive Party renewed 
their coalition government, but opposition to the defence agreement was emerging 
as a dominating issue on the political landscape.
In the run-up to the 1956 Parliament elections the Progressive Party moved to 
disengage itself from the Independence Party towards positioning itself as their 
main political rival (Kristjánsson, 1994, p. 154). The vision of the Progressive Party 
Chairman Hermann Jónasson harmonised well with the agenda of a new radical 
leadership within the Social Democratic Party. Therefore, the road was paved for the 
1956 government of Progressive Party, the Social Democratic Party and the socialist 
People’s Alliance whose foreign policy goal was to revoke the defence agreement 
and to extend unilaterally Iceland’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in 1958. 
However, after the coalition collapsed the defence agreement receded into the 
background as a political issue following twelve years of Independence Party and 
Social Democratic Party coalition rule.
The issue of the defence agreement had not faded into political obscurity. 
Following the 1971 Parliament elections a coalition government was formed 
by the Progressive Party, People’s Alliance and a splinter group from the People’s 
Alliance, the Union of Liberals and Leftists (Samtök frjálslyndra og vinstrimanna). 
The binding glue between the 1971-1974 coalition government was revision of the 
defence agreement and extension of Iceland’s EEZ to 50 nautical miles. However, 
the parties disagreed on how far the revision should go. True to their 1956 position, 
The People’s Alliance argued for its termination and an Icelandic resignation 
from NATO. Union of Liberals and Leftists championed terminating the defence 
agreement but for Iceland to remain within NATO. Meanwhile, the Progressive 
Party was divided in its position. Within the party a new generation of young 
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Progressives, more radical than its predecessors, was coming to prominence, and 
this faction championed the departure of the U.S. defence force while supporting 
continued Icelandic membership in NATO (Ingimundarson, 2002, p. 123). 
However, the coalition was unable to conclude the revision and after its collapse 
in 1974 the issue of whether foreign forces should be stationed in Iceland or not 
receded from the political arena.
In the late 1970s and onward the presence of U.S. military forces in Iceland 
became more accepted by the Icelandic electorate than in previous decades. By the 
early 1980s a survey on the attitude of Icelanders towards the Keflavík base revealed 
that 54% of those polled approved of continued U.S. military presence in Iceland 
while 30% disapproved with 16% remaining indifferent (Harðarson, 1985, p. 18). 
Indeed, the lack of interest among leaders of political parties traditionally opposed 
to the defence agreement, to exploit the issue for political gains is reflected in the 
fact that neither one of two left of centre governments (1978-1979 and 1989-1991) 
made a termination or revision of the defence agreement a policy issue. 
While the defence cooperation with the U.S. and the presence of a U.S. 
military base in Keflavík could be debated on ideological grounds there were also 
material factors to consider as a driving force behind political party position to 
the defence force. As previously noted, in chapter four, the base itself gradually 
became a permanent fixture of the Icelandic domestic economy and the four main 
political parties had to be mindful of that fact. The base was an important source 
of employment for the communities in the Reykjanes region and large economic 
gains were to be had by private and public business interests. Reduced U.S. military 
presence at the base could translate into fewer votes at the ballot box for three of 
the four main parties. For the Independence Party as the party of business interests, 
the Progressive Party as the representative of rural constituencies and the Social 
Democrats as representatives of labour interests in Reykjanes region. 
Apart from direct voter support there was also the issue of clientelism, whereby, 
the two major political parties, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party 
benefitted directly from economic activity of the defence force. Iceland Prime 
Contractors (ÍAV) is an example of such entanglement. ÍAV was formed in 1954 on 
the initiative of the Icelandic state and given monopoly over all construction work at 
Keflavík base. 50% of the company was owned by Sameinaðir Verktakar hf, which in 
turn was owned by influential members of the Independence Party. 25% was owned 
by Reginn hf which was a daughter company of Federation of Icelandic Cooperative 
Societies which in turn had close ties with the leadership of the Progressive Party 
and 25% owned by the Icelandic state (Árnason, 1991, pp. 258-259). In 1996 the 
government of Iceland decided to abolish the ÍAV monopoly and the company was 
given an adjustment period until 2003. The state would eventually sell all of its shares 
in ÍAV during a government privatization process completed in 2003.
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5.2. The formation of an Icelandic base policy
The end of the Cold War heralded cutbacks and downsizing at the base as its strategic 
importance and that of Iceland, dwindled fast. With the Soviet menace out of the 
picture the United States government became increasingly concerned with cutting 
military expenditures. This altered reality was not lost on the Icelandic government 
and coming to terms with the immediate scaling down of U.S. forces at Keflaík base 
became a task for the 1991-1995 Independence Party/Social Democratic Party 
coalition government. While not announcing any revision of Iceland’s defence policy 
in its government manifesto (Office of the Prime Minister, 1991) the two parties did 
agree that Icelandic security interests would be best served by maintaining the U.S.-
Icelandic defence relationship and through continued Icelandic NATO membership. 
But with mounting U.S. pressure it became clear that the government would have 
to devise a future strategy to counter U.S. reluctance to maintain Keflavík base in its 
current form. In March 1993 that strategy saw the light of day in a report published 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Iceland’s defence policy. Commissioned and 
published by the Social Democratic held Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the report 
rejected Icelandic burden sharing at Keflavík base (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
1993, pp. 46-47) and identified cost reduction as the Independence Party/Social 
Democratic Party coalition negotiation goal vis-à-vis the United States. The authors 
of the report set about gauging the views of the United States and the Icelandic 
government about the future of Keflavík base. Both sides agreed that savings could 
be made, but there was a clear difference of opinion (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
1993, pp. 46-47). Already the United States had adopted the position that the way 
forward was a cost sharing scheme. An understandable position given that 40% of 
air traffic going through Keflavík airport was civilian.
Tentative discussions soon began that resulted in a 1994 MoU between the two 
sides. The MoU can be interpreted as a statement by the coalition partners about 
what tasks the Icelandic side viewed as essential and what reductions at Keflavík 
base they were willing to accept (Bjarnason, 2011, p. 305). In essence, the negotiated 
MoU (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994) met the stated policy goal of the 
Independence Party/Social Democratic Party coalition by identifying those base 
functions to be continued and what could be made redundant. Without incurring 
additional costs on their Icelandic host, the defence force would remain with the 
Icelandic government laying down red lines that made it possible to declare that 
the defence agreement remained valid as long as the United States retained those 
capabilities spelled out in the MoU.
The 1994 MoU reiterated the soundness of the 1951 Defence Agreement 
although the number of fighter jets would be reduced to four. U.S. intentions to 
reduce costs had been made clear but any broader concerns about its closure 
appeared to have been quenched. The pro-government Icelandic daily Morgunblaðið 
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proclaimed “Equity in decision making acknowledged” (“Jafnræði í ákvarðanatöku 
viðurkennt,” 1994), while the base own weekly journal, White Falcon, announced in 
more sombre tones that “U.S./Iceland talks render decision. U.S. forces to remain, 
with some changes” (“U.S./Iceland talks render decisions,” 1994). In April 1996 the 
two governments renewed the MoU for further five years, by which time the two 
governments would have to reconvene again. 
Following elections in the spring of 1995, the Independence Party and the 
Progressive Party formed their first of five consecutive coalitions creating the longest 
serving political partnership in Icelandic political history. Attributing to this long 
streak was a strong leadership within the Independence Party led by Davíð Oddsson 
and the Progressive Party led by Halldór Ásgrímsson. 
Davíð Oddsson first made his marks in Icelandic politics when at the age of 
34 he led the Independence Party to victory in the 1982 Reykjavík municipal 
elections becoming mayor of Iceland’s capital, a post he would hold for nine years. 
In 1991, then vice-chairman of the Independence Party, Oddsson ran against 
and narrowly defeated the sitting chairman, Þorsteinn Pálsson in a leadership bid 
during the Independence Party National Conference. Less than two months later, 
despite not holding a seat in Parliament, Oddsson led his party to victory in the 
1991 parliamentary elections that led to a coalition government with the Social 
Democratic Party. The Independence Party/Social Democratic Party coalition 
would only survive one term but Oddsson would go on to hold the position of Prime 
Minister continuously from 30 April 1991 until 15 September 2004 becoming the 
longest serving Prime Minister in Icelandic political history. 
The circumstances surrounding Halldór Ásgrímsson’s ascension to power 
were less dramatic. A seasoned parliamentarian, Ásgrímsson was first elected to 
Parliament in 1974, and served as Minister of Fisheries 1983-1991 and Minister of 
Justice and Ecclesial Affairs 1988-1989 in previous Progressive Party led coalition 
governments. Elected party vice-chairman in 1980, Ásgrímsson became the natural 
successor at the 1994 Progressive Party national conference with 97% of the cast 
votes (“Halldór fékk 97% atkvæða,” 1994) when the outgoing Progressive Party 
chairman, Steingrímur Hermannsson, retired from politics.  
In the 1995 Independence Party/Progressive Party coalition Oddsson retained 
the premiership and Ásgrímsson became Minister for Foreign Affairs, positions 
they would both hold until autumn 2004 when they swapped posts. In matters 
of defence the 1995 government stayed the same course already plotted by the 
Independence Party/Social Democratic Party coalition. It made no changes to 
previous government policy to the U.S.-Icelandic defence relationship (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1995) and in negotiating for a second MoU with the U.S. on further 
cost reduction at Keflavík base in 1996 Foreign Minister Ásgrímsson did not deviate 
from the fundamentals of the 1994 MoU negotiated by the Social Democratic held 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
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In matters of defence the Independence Party tended to be the more dominating 
partner in the coalition. The 1993 Independence Party National Congress 
manifesto was perfectly aligned with the government position. The manifesto 
identified the 1951 Defence Agreement as the core pillar of Iceland’s defence 
policy and mirrored (Independence Party, 1993, pp. 7-8) key components of the 
yet to be negotiated 1994 MoU by defining Icelandic defence interests in terms of 
maintaining air defences and surveillance capabilities at the base as well as the 56th 
Rescue Squadron.
The Independence Party had always been a strong supporter of the U.S.-Icelandic 
defence relationship and Oddsson remained a key player at every round of defence 
negotiation, first as Prime Minister from 1991-2004 and then as Foreign Minister 
from 2004-2005. When the first news story broke in 1993 that Keflavík base might 
undergo extensive downsizing (“Mikill niðurskurður er fyrirhugaður í Keflavík,” 
1993) Oddsson met in early August with Vice-President Al Gore in Washington 
D.C. (“Varnarstöð aðeins breytt í nánu samráði við Ísland,” 1993) and secured 
assurances that no changes would be made at Keflavík base without a prior consent 
from the Icelandic government. However, that meeting took place less than two 
years after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and the future of the former 
communist states of Central- and Eastern Europe remained uncertain. Therefore, 
it made sense for the United States to make moderate reductions at the base and 
accommodate the needs of its Icelandic negotiating counterpart. 
Following the 1999 Parliamentary elections the Independence Party and The 
Progressive Party retained their parliamentary majority and formed their second 
coalition government. With 36 out of 63 Members of Parliament the coalition 
retained a strong majority (“Alþingiskosningar 1999 úrslit,” 1999). Davíð Oddsson 
retained his premiership and Halldór Ásgrímsson continued as Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. In matters of security and defence the renewed coalition did not present 
any forthcoming changes (Office of the Prime Minister, 1999) and the two parties 
retained the position that the U.S.-Icelandic defence relationship should continue 
to be the core of Iceland’s defence policy. Although the 1999-2003 Independence 
Party/Progressive Party coalition wished to maintain the status quo events abroad 
made such a position harder to attain.
5.3. U.S. position towards Keflavík base
Downsizing at Keflavík base was clearly in line with a general United States policy 
to exploit the post-Cold War peace dividend. From 1989 to 1996 a score of U.S. 
bases in Europe were shut down while at the same time the number of United States 
troops stationed in Europe was cut from 325,000 to 100,000 (Douglas, 2008, p. 82). 
Keflavík base had survived the first rounds of U.S. base realignment but whether it 
would survive the coming rounds was questionable.
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On 18 January 2001, George Walker Bush was sworn into office as the 43rd 
President of the United States and few days later he appointed Donald Rumsfeld as 
Secretary of Defence with a mandate to begin a comprehensive review of the U.S. 
armed forces. It soon became obvious to Rumsfeld that further troop reductions 
abroad were needed:
The way our forces were stationed overseas was so outdated. It was if they had been 
frozen in time for the decades since Berlin and Tokyo fell in 1945, the armistice halted 
the Korean War in 1953, and the Cold War ended in 1991. Of the quarter million 
troops deployed abroad in 2001, more than one hundred thousand were in Europe, 
the vast majority in Germany to fend off an invasion by a Soviet Union that no longer 
existed (Rumsfeld, 2011, p. 301).
With 532 U.S. military facilities spread throughout 16 European countries7 and 
funding for U.S. forces deployed in Europe rising between 1999 and 2001 from 
$10.9 billion to $11.8 billion Europe was identified as a theatre for further cost 
savings (Rumsfeld papers, 2001b) with Keflavík base singled out as a showcase of 
an antiquated defence posture. In late March 2001 Rumsfeld had his mind made up. 
Via e-mail, Rumsfeld informed Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, that 
he was considering removing U.S. capabilities currently in Iceland as they had no 
other particular purpose than “…providing search and rescue for Iceland” (Rumsfeld 
papers, 2001a). The Department of State was not in agreement and on 11 July 
Rumsfeld complained to Secretary of State Colin Powell that:
DoD [Department of Defense] has been trying for several years to reduce our presence 
[In Iceland]. However, we get resistance from Iceland, and then we get that resistance 
reflected back from the State Department (Rumsfeld papers, 2001c). 
In his reply, Powell emphasised that the Department of State and Department of 
Defence shared the same objectives regarding Iceland. that in Powell’s mind were:
[1] to maximise the impact of our military presence in Iceland while [3] seeking to 
reduce that presence, [2] to obtain relief on U.S. – funded costs associated with 
purely commercial use of the Keflavik field and to [4] preserve access to the base while 
continuing our mutually beneficial relationship with this NATO ally (Rumsfeld papers, 
2001d).
7     Those 16 countries included non-aligned Austria – home to one U.S. Air Force installation. The 
remaining 15 countries were all NATO members. Most of these facilities, 326, located in Germany 
(Rumsfeld-papers, 2001b).
104
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
Powell, furthermore, suggested that it might be more effective to separate talks 
about force composition, i.e. fighters, Search and Rescue, and support personnel, 
from actual renegotiation of the base agreement.
Clearly, the two departments differed in their policy. Indeed, the Department 
of State was mindful of the political consequences if Rumsfeld had his way. Four 
months prior to Powell’s exchange with Rumsfeld, the U.S. ambassador to Iceland, 
Barbara J. Griffiths, advised Powell against removing the four remaining fighters 
from Iceland as that would be crossing a “red line” that the Icelandic government 
had drawn (Rumsfeld papers, 2001d). The resulting backlash, in her view, would 
lead the Icelanders to stop future cost-sharing talks dead in their tracks. Trying to 
get his view across, Powell attached Ambassador Griffiths’ report to his reply to 
Rumsfeld with a note reading “PS – Don, see our Ambassador’s letter (attached.) 
Lays out the case. Let’s chat after you’ve read” (Rumsfeld papers, 2001d). 
The ambassador’s assessment that removing the fighters from Iceland would 
be unacceptable to the government of Iceland was accurate. Already the Icelandic 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs had made it a formal Icelandic position that Iceland 
should be provided with minimum defence capabilities in land, sea and air. Any force 
changes at the base would have to be negotiated between the two governments, in 
accordance to the 1951 Defence Agreement (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1999, p. 
9). What minimum defence capabilities entailed was open to interpretation but with 
only four remaining fighters at the base the Icelandic government had in effect made 
its position clear: no further force reductions of U.S. military presence at the base.
In early August 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Icelandic Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Halldór Ásgrímsson, met in Washington D.C. Among the issues 
touched upon was the upcoming renegotiation of the 1996 MoU. Regardless of the 
tug of war taking place behind the scenes between the two departments of Defence 
and State Powell gave no hint of further force reductions, and Ásgrímsson reiterated 
his government’s position that current force levels provided Iceland with minimum 
defence capabilities (“Powell kynnti engar áherslubreytingar,” 2001). But before the 
two sides had time to reconvene the United States was hit by the 11 September 
terrorist attacks. Now the Bush administration was faced with a radically altered 
security environment. The implications for the future of Keflavík base were twofold: 
in the short term, all negotiations between the United States and the Icelandic 
government were postponed indefinitely (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2002, p. 26). 
In the long run the incentive to pull forces and equipment out of Iceland was bound 
to gather pace.
As 2002 wound on the Bush administration became further engaged in the “war 
on terror” (Wolfe, 2008), but Keflavík base had not disappeared altogether from 
Rumsfeld’s sight. In early December 2002 Rumsfeld fired off a memo to his Under 
Secretary of Defence for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, in which Rumsfeld argued in favour 
of removing the fighters from Iceland in light of U.S. commitments in Afghanistan 
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and possible future involvement in Iraq “If we can’t make a good argument for it 
now”, Rumsfeld wrote, “there is no time we can make a good argument” (Rumsfeld 
papers, 2002). Concluding, Rumsfeld suggested they send someone over from the 
Department of Defence to Iceland, since the Icelanders would not be able to meet 
in Washington D.C. until January 2003. The Department of Defence managed to 
squeeze in a late December meeting with Icelandic officials in Washington D.C. to 
notify them of U.S. intentions to remove the last remaining fighters the following 
spring. The announcement was not taken kindly by Prime Minister Oddsson who 
countered by telling the U.S. ambassador in Reykjavík, James Gadsden, that the 
removal of the fighters without a prior consent from the Icelandic government was 
tantamount to abrogation of the 1951 Defence Agreement (Ingimundarson, 2006, 
p. 47). 
But this was not the first time the Prime Minister had hinted that the defence 
agreement would be at risk if the base would be closed. Publicly, he had done so in a 
2001 newspaper interview (“Varnarstöð vegna hagsmuna beggja þjóðanna,” 2001), 
while privately, he made this point clear to President Bush during the 2002 NATO 
Prague summit (Rumsfeld papers, 2003a). After all, he could argue that it was 
not up to the Bush administration to decide the fate of Keflavík base. In 1951 the 
Truman administration had agreed that the Icelandic government should approve 
the number of military personnel stationed in Iceland (United States Department of 
State, 1951). Admittedly, this was designed at the time to prevent the United States 
from having a free hand in determining the upward-size of Keflavík base but for 
Iceland the argument stood: the defence agreement dictated that force composition 
and troop levels in Iceland were subject to approval of the Icelandic government.
Eventually on 2 May 2003, Ambassador Gadsden notified the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Minister that the F-15’s would be removed that coming month 
(Ingimundarson, 2006, p. 48). Although the Icelandic government should not have 
been surprised, the announcement came as a shock (Independence Party, former 
member of cabinet, 2014b), perhaps more so because it arrived eight days before 
scheduled parliamentary elections in Iceland. 
Still digesting that fateful announcement, Foreign Minister Ásgrímsson contacted 
NATO Secretary General George Robertson (Ingimundarson, 2006 and Bjarnason, 
2008) who until now had been unaware of Rumsfeld’s decision. As luck would have it, 
Robertson was in Washington D.C. when he received the call. Later that day during 
a meeting at the White House with President Bush with Powell and Rumsfeld, in 
attendance. Robertson brought up the base issue in Iceland at which point it became 
apparent that the President had not been informed about the decision to remove the 
fighters. After being briefed President Bush handed it over to his National Security 
Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, without deciding on the matter. Eventually, the removal 
of the fighters was postponed until later that August by which time the decision was 
withdrawn. Robertson’s intervention thus frustrated Rumsfeld’s efforts and bought 
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the Icelandic government some time. For the Icelanders, the question was how to 
proceed. In a newspaper interview with Morgunblaðið, the Prime Minister attributed 
to National Security Advisor Rice a warning that although the fighters would stay 
for the time being; there was no guarantee that they would remain indefinitely in 
Iceland (“Fyrirmælin ekki lengur í gildi um að þoturnar fari,” 2003). 
When the blow came in spring 2003 that the U.S. government intended to remove 
its last four remaining fighter jets from Iceland, the leadership of the Independence 
Party/Progressive Party coalition had accumulated experience in fending off base 
reductions against three U.S. administrations. The U.S. decision had the potential 
of becoming a key election issue during Parliamentary elections in spring 2003. 
However, the government remained silent (“Allt eða ekkert,” 2003) and no leaks 
were made to the media. Although losing four seats in parliament, the Independence 
Party/Progressive Party coalition retained its parliamentary majority and the third 
consecutive coalition headed by Oddsson and Ásgrímsson was formed. 
If the Icelandic government wished to retain the base the only way ahead was 
some sort of cost sharing scheme as proposed by the United States. After all, the 
Department of Defence was paying $225 million for Keflavík base each year. With 
as much as half of that cost ($121 million) going towards civilian air traffic support 
such as facility maintenance and radar operations, which to Rumsfeld was “too 
much and had to be fixed” (Rumsfeld papers, 2003b). 
In due course, the Icelandic government accepted the inevitable. On 6 July 2004, 
the Prime Minister and President Bush met at the White House to discuss the future 
of Keflavík base. The result was that the President proposed that certain functions at 
Keflavík airport should be taken over by the Icelandic authorities to which the Prime 
Minister reacted favourably, as long as those costs were associated with civilian and 
domestic roles (“Íslendingar taka aukinn þátt í kostnaði,” 2004). Additionally, the 
two leaders decided that future negotiations would be carried out between the State 
Department and the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Following the elections, the coalition was able to give its full attention to warding 
off the imminent removal of the four remaining fighters from Keflavík base. For 
Oddsson the bottom line remained the same. Removing the fighters constituted a 
breach of the defence agreement that would prompt his government to call for a 
revision of the defence agreement that might lead to its termination, a message that 
he gave to Assistant Secretary of State, Elisabeth Jones, when she arrived in Iceland 
to initiate defence talks negotiations (Ingimundarson, 2008, p. 40). 
To his domestic audience, and of course the diplomatic community in Iceland, 
Oddsson reiterated the key issue at hand in an interview with the local newspaper 
Dagblaðið Vísir. According to Oddsson the Icelandic government was of the view 
that the decision to remove the fighters had not been made at the highest level but 
instead by individuals in Washington D.C. that lacked a clear grasp of the nature of 
the relationship between Iceland and the United States (“Allt eða ekkert,” 2003). 
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Oddsson further argued that the defence agreement was based on continued 
capabilities in Iceland that benefitted the defence interests of both Iceland and the 
United States. If the United States unilaterally removed the bulk of what constituted 
the essence of the agreement (i.e. the fighters) then it was clear to him that the 
defence agreement was null and void. 
In the autumn of 2004, a cabinet reshuffle took place as Oddsson and Ásgrímsson 
traded places; Oddsson consigned the premiership to Ásgrímsson and instead took 
up the post of Foreign Minister. A position he would hold until his retirement from 
politics in late September 2005. When Davíð Oddsson left the political stage, he 
handed the political reins of the Independence Party and the position of Foreign 
Minister over to the vice chairman of the Independence Party, Geir Hilmar Haarde. 
Three years younger than Oddsson Haarde was a different political breed. While 
Oddsson had moved quickly into politics after graduating from the University 
of Iceland with a degree in law Haarde had studied extensively abroad and built 
up a career as an economist before entering politics. Born to an Icelandic mother 
and a Norwegian father Haarde attended the same junior college as Oddsson 
(Menntaskólinn í Reykjavík) and graduated in 1971 – a year after Oddsson. After 
graduation, Haarde studied in the U.S., graduating with a bachelor degree in 
economics from Brandeis University in 1973, a master’s degree in international 
relations from John Hopkins University in 1975 and a master’s degree in economics 
from University of Minnesota in 1977.  
Haarde took a seat in Parliament following the 1987 elections and diligently 
worked his way to a leadership position within the party serving from 1999 until 
2005 as the vice-chairman until he was handed the reins during a peaceful transfer 
of power, unlike Oddsson who in 1991, as vice chairman, seized power by running 
against and defeating the sitting chairman. In 1998 Haarde took up the position 
of Minister of Finance, a post he would hold until moving into the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs in 2005. 
5.4. Base negotiations 2005-2006
Almost a full year passed before negotiations about the future of Keflavík base began. 
With Rumsfeld still at the helm at the Department of Defence, following Bush’s re-
election in November 2004, the year long hiatus had not materially benefitted the 
Icelanders. If anything, Rumsfeld’s position had toughened. On 14 December 2004 
he wrote to incoming Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:
 
Condi, I’m ready to go and start the process on Iceland, along the lines of the memo I 
gave you. I need a yes or no. It is $281 million/year, and we just had our budget reduced 
by $10 billion (Rumsfeld papers, 2004).
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As the Department of Defence was being hounded by budget cuts, and feeling the 
mounting strain in Afghanistan and Iraq, Keflavík base looked increasingly out of 
place and out of time. In due course, the two sides convened at the State Department 
in Washington in early July 2005. If the Icelanders expected the negotiation to focus 
on sharing costs associated with the civilian component of Keflavík airport, they 
were sadly mistaken. After acknowledging the Icelandic government’s willingness to 
shoulder increased financial burdens the U.S. negotiators put forth their demands. 
From their point of view the government of Iceland should: 
1. Take over operational elements of Keflavík airport relevant to civilian use and 
bear sole responsibility for most of them; 
2. Pay the salaries of Icelanders employed by the defence force; 
3. Assume responsibility for the quasi-governmental Radar Agency, funded by 
the U.S. Air Force but manned and operated by Icelanders; and
4. Provide Search and Rescue services for the F-15 fighters at Keflavík base 
(UTN, 2005a)
To make their case, the Americans pointed out that complete Icelandic assumption 
of certain airport functions would be simpler than developing a complicated cost 
sharing formula between the two governments. After all, these functions were 
necessary conditions for Keflavík airport to function as an international airport and 
already carried out by Icelanders. Paying the salaries of Icelanders directly employed 
by the defence force was a different matter but the U.S. negotiators emphasised that 
this was not just a question of money “we are looking for a recognition that you as 
a sovereign nation bear responsibility for your own defenses and we are looking for 
Iceland to assume such responsibility” (UTN, 2005a). Moving on to Search and 
Rescue the U.S. side had already deemed the 56th RQS a low-density, high-demand asset 
needed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, the Icelandic Coast Guard would have to 
shoulder Search and Rescue responsibility for Keflavík base military personnel.
This was more than the Icelandic side had expected. The Icelanders reiterated that 
they were only willing to discuss cost sharing in view of the increase in civilian traffic 
at Keflavík airport. After all, the airport served military flights from NATO member 
states and during times of war the U.S. military would be granted full usage of the 
airport. Paying the U.S. government for retaining the defence force in Iceland was 
out of the question and rejected by the Icelandic Foreign Minister. The Icelandic 
negotiators further added that Icelandic participation in paying for costs associated 
with Keflavík base had not been brought up during the Prime Minister’s meeting 
with President Bush in 2004 (UTN, 2005a), and constituted a clear breach of the 
1951 Defence Agreement. While willing to look into providing Search and Rescue 
the Icelanders pointed out that such a large financial commitment would need a 
political mandate before it could be discussed any further.
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Holding their ground, the U.S side retorted that no one was asking the Icelandic 
government to pay for the F-15’s or the presence of the U.S. military in Iceland. It was 
not unreasonable to expect Iceland to participate in its own national defence. After 
all, the U.S. military was not a band of mercenaries and while the U.S. government 
stood by its commitment to defend Iceland “This does not absolve Iceland as a 
sovereign country from assuming responsibility for its own defences” (UTN, 
2005a). The Icelanders held firmly to their position, and countered by arguing that 
convincing the Icelandic public of the need to pay the United States government 
to defend Iceland would be a hard sell given the domestic political division the 
base had caused in Iceland throughout the years. Shortly after this exchange, the 
session was set to carry on the next morning and adjourned for the day. The brief 
meeting that followed on the morning of 7 July did nothing more than consolidate 
the lines already drawn up between the two sides. Still, no one could have expected 
a settlement right at the beginning. The U.S. negotiators emphasised that since both 
sides had made their positions clear a basis for finding common ground had been laid. 
Meanwhile the Icelanders expressed disappointment over the U.S. position which 
they viewed as unfair and inconsistent with Prime Minister Oddsson’s previous talks 
with President Bush. Iceland, they declared, would be willing to pay its fair share of 
running Keflavík airport, but paying the salaries of defence force employees was a, 
“show-stopper” (UTN, 2005a). As this first base negotiation meeting came to an 
end, the two sides scheduled their next meeting for the coming September. 
It was clear that there was still a wide chasm to cross when negotiations resumed 
in Reykjavík on 8 September that year. Still, the Icelanders had a counter offer 
to present to the U.S. delegation. The Icelandic government was unwilling to 
shoulder sole responsibility for Keflavík airport, but it was willing to offer financial 
participation in most airport functions previously suggested by the U.S. negotiators. 
Cost distribution would be determined by a joint U.S.-Icelandic committee and 
Icelandic participation would be introduced through staged implementation. After 
all, the Icelanders argued, Keflavík airport was a dual-purpose civilian/military 
airport; thus the U.S. government could not be absolved of its cost entirely. Vexed 
by this, the U.S. delegates asked why the Icelandic government was not willing to 
assume full responsibility for the civilian aspect of Keflavík airport just as other 
governments did all over the world. 
Apparently, the negotiators had already hit the first stumbling block, and it would 
not be the last. After a short break the negotiation teams reconvened. Refusing to 
abandon the principle of burden sharing, the U.S. side suggested that the Icelandic 
proposal would be more palatable to decision makers in Washington D.C., and a 
possible way to move things forward, if its method was applied to other defence force 
costs: salaries of local defence force employees and base utilities, as well as defence 
force radar sites (UTN, 2005b). But the Icelanders were adamant and refused, as 
before, to discuss these proposals. 
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The next topic on the agenda was the Icelandic takeover of Search and Rescue 
which by now was meeting some opposition. The Icelanders argued that providing 
Search and Rescue was a part of defence force operational costs: without U.S. rescue 
helicopters operating the fighter jets would be impossible. Therefore, providing the 
U.S. with such a service was in fact subsidising the work of the defence force and ran 
counter to the Icelandic policy of not paying for U.S. military presence in Iceland. 
The Icelandic delegation had arrived at the scene with an offer to move cost sharing 
negotiations forward but as they could not budge on costs associated with defence 
force functions and Search and Rescue it seemed the two sides were just as far away 
from reaching an agreement as before.
The third meeting took place in Washington D.C. in October, and turned out to 
be shorter than the previous two. While reiterating their position that burden sharing 
at Keflavík airport was not enough the U.S. negotiators put forth concrete proposals 
on how costs could be shared. The suggestion was to apply the same formula used by 
the Japanese and South Korean governments regarding U.S. military bases on their 
soil (Senior member of the U.S negotiation team, 2015). A senior member of the 
U.S. team recalls the event in these words:
But when I gave that to Ambassador Jónsson he basically said, ‘look, I have been 
instructed. I can only deal on the basis of our proposal, and you have to take your 
proposal back.’ And I said, ‘Well I can’t do that... I can’t do that for a variety of reasons.’ 
One of which was that I was under a fair amount of pressure from my own government to 
actually get some more from the Icelandic government which the Icelandic government 
proposal would have not (Senior member of the U.S. negotiation team, 2015).
The Icelandic side could not address the U.S. offer and further negotiations were 
broken off. Whether breaking off discussions was a smart move or not can be debated 
but as a negotiation tactic it gave the U.S. a free hand to go ahead with its plans for 
Keflavík base, be that a matter of downsizing or closure. Or as one senior Icelandic 
government official associated with the negotiations phrased it:
People were so naïve. They [U.S. government] used this. Now they could say that 
they had offered something, although it was the same proposal which we had tried to 
negotiate ourselves away from. In other words, they had not given our proposal any 
consideration, but they had hosted the meeting and the Icelanders had walked out. That 
was the narrative, and everything went up in the air. (Senior official Icelandic Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, 2013b). 
To the Icelandic government, that October meeting confirmed an unbridgeable 
gap between the two sides. Later in November, when a journalist from Morgunblaðið 
asked about developments in the defence negotiations Prime Minister Ásgrímsson 
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regretted the slow progress made while declaring that the U.S. government would 
have to say if it was not willing to provide Iceland with defences or did not think 
they were needed. Continuing, Ásgrímsson added that his government would never 
force or ask U.S. forces to stay in Iceland if they did not want to (“Yrðum að treysta 
betur sambandið við Evrópu,” 2005). As the negotiations had come to a standstill, 
the Prime Minister was irrevocably being drawn towards recognizing the possibility 
that U.S intentions were in fact to close the base.
No further advance was made until an exchange of letters between Foreign 
Minister Haarde and Secretary of State Rice broke the deadlock with a new round 
of negotiations scheduled in the coming months. On 2 February 2006, Foreign 
Minister Haarde and Secretary of State Rice convened in Washington D.C. The 
meeting was amiable enough. Secretary of State Rice began by discussing the long 
and close friendship between the United States and Iceland before delving into 
the changing security and defence threats states faced following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
Concurring with the opening statement of the Secretary of State, Foreign 
Minister Haarde replied that there still was need for visible defences in Iceland and 
emphasised the importance of reaching a permanent solution in the spirit of the 
1951 Defence Agreement and the North Atlantic Treaty (UTN, 2006a). Pressing 
for continued U.S. military presence in Iceland, the Foreign Minister argued four 
main points: (1) the vacuum created by uncertainty was in itself a threat; (2) The 
core values underpinning U.S.-Icelandic relations still remained; (3) the modern 
security environment was fraught with uncertainty; (4) and what directions assertive 
nationalistic Russia would head towards in the future remained to be seen. However, 
to meet the United States government mid-stream, the Foreign Minister continued, 
the Icelandic government was willing to take over Keflavík airport and provide the 
defence force with full Search and Rescue coverage.
The Icelanders had gone a long way to meet U.S. demands. But despite that the 
Secretary of State sidestepped the issue of retaining U.S. forces in Iceland and gave no 
clear answers. Instead, Rice discussed the need to modernise the defence relationship 
with appropriate capabilities, and the importance of not holding on “to defense 
capabilities that may not be necessary” (UTN, 2006a). Continuing, the Secretary 
of State added that at this stage the immediate step was to review the burden sharing 
proposal presented by the Foreign Minister, which seemed like a good start and a way 
forward for the upcoming negotiations focusing on modernising Iceland’s defences. 
The morning after, negotiations continued at the State Department between 
officials from the two sides with Foreign Minister Haarde and Secretary of State 
Rice absent from the proceedings (UTN 2006d). The Icelanders opened by stating 
that their presence in Washington D.C. was an earnest attempt to end the intolerable 
uncertainty in the defence relationship between the two countries, and to reach a 
consensus on the outlines of a new agreement by putting concrete proposals on the 
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table. Unlike the September proposal that assumed an undetermined percentage 
share over a period of eight years the Icelandic government was now offering a 
complete takeover of Keflavík airport as well as full Search and Rescue coverage for 
Keflavík base. The Icelanders, however, maintained that the Icelandic government 
would not pay the United States for the defence of the country. That point of view, 
they continued, had been stated countless times in previous negotiations, and it was 
needless to go over it once again.
Replying favourably to these offers, the U.S. side went deeper into the Search and 
Rescue part of the proposals. What interested the U.S. negotiators was “performance 
and capabilities” but how the Icelandic government went about it was a secondary 
issue since they were “not in sales business, only in capabilities business” (UTN, 
2006d). However, the Americans did offer assistance to their Icelandic counterparts 
in purchasing or leasing U.S. helicopters if the Icelandic government choose to do so.
Next topic for discussion was the bilateral security and defence consultation 
between the two countries. The Icelanders argued that holding regular bilateral 
political/military talks would be beneficial for both, to which The U.S. negotiators 
agreed. After all, such consultation would be useful for evaluating U.S.-Icelandic 
security cooperation at any given time. Actually, a joint U.S.-Icelandic defence 
committee was already in place but its role was limited to matters involving the 
defence force. Therefore, a new high-level forum would be useful to discuss security 
threats and what ways to tackle them. A case in point, the Americans continued, 
might be container security at harbours, seeing how the secure transport of goods 
was a growing concern for Iceland. Another area of cooperation might be in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (UTN, 2006d). According to the U.S. delegates, Iceland had 
consistently performed well in NATO missions since it began sending Icelandic 
doctors and nurses to Bosnia in the mid-1990s. The third field singled out for 
consideration was increased cooperation between the Icelandic Cost Guard and the 
U.S. Coast Guard, through mutual visits, training and joint operations.
After reviewing these possible topics for a U.S.-Icelandic defence forum to discuss 
the meeting was adjourned until later that day. When the two sides reconvened in 
the afternoon the U.S. delegates distributed a list of buildings within the base area 
that would be handed over after the airport transfer was completed. The intention 
was for the list to serve as a conceptual framework for the work ahead. According 
to U.S. calculations, that list comprised about 30% of base facilities and 20% of the 
workforce employed by the defence force, in addition to facilities Iceland had already 
offered to take over. After a brief break, during which the Icelandic representatives 
conferred with their Foreign Minister, they informed their counterparts that the 
Icelandic government had agreed to continue negotiations on the agreed basis. The 
U.S. team replied that they would inform their supervisors in the State Department 
and, hopefully, they could soon tell the Icelanders whether the result was acceptable 
or not.
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It appeared that negotiations were back on track. In Morgunblaðið, both Robert 
G. Loftis, the head of the U.S. negotiation team, and Ragnheiður Árnadóttir, 
assistant to Foreign Minister Haarde, went on record saying that talks had been 
beneficial and cost sharing discussions were moving along favourably (“Viðræðurnar 
sagðar vera árangursríkar,” 2006). But less than a month and a half later, without 
any forewarning, Foreign Minister Haarde received that fateful phone call from 
Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Burns informing him that in fact the last 
fighters would be removed from Iceland. Although Icelandic decision makers 
suspected that the U.S. government intended to withdraw the fighters the method 
still came as a surprise:
I had the feeling that this had become very difficult, but of course I didn’t know that 
they would do it in such a brutal way. To just pick up the phone. Of course, they had 
already reached a decision within their own system, which goes through some processes. 
At one point someone says: hey Nick Burns! This phone call is yours (Independence 
Party, former member of cabinet, 2014a).
The following day, Foreign Minister Haarde made a 10 minute verbal report 
to Parliament (Parliament, 2006a), during which he gave a chronological account 
of the negotiations, ending with the latest February meeting in Washington D.C 
and expressing his disappointment over the U.S. decision, he continued that his 
government had been under the impression that negotiations had been ongoing and 
mowing forward. 
In the immediate aftermath uncertainty lingered about what fate awaited Keflavík 
base. In his report to Parliament, Haarde spoke of vast reductions of defence force 
functions and in an interview with Morgunblaðið, he stressed that it was now up to 
the United States and the Icelandic government to come up with a solution that 
provided Iceland with minimum defences, since “…a defence agreement without 
defences has very little value.” (“Varnarsamningur án varna ekki mikils virði,” 2006) 
A similar note was struck by media pundits who speculated that a small token force 
would remain, and that Keflavík base would possibly continue to exist in a dormant 
state (“Getur markað upphaf endaloka varnarsamstarfsins,” 2006 and “Hótun um 
uppsögn varnarsamningsins virðist orðin tóm,” 2006). 
Indeed, U.S. diplomats, and U.S. military personnel at the base did not seem to 
have a clear picture of what would happen after 30 September 2006. The head of 
the U.S. negotiation team, Ambassador Loftis, went on record with Morgunblaðið 
saying that U.S. military presence would be diminutive, but just how small he was not 
willing to speculate (“Lítið vit í að hafa orrustuþotur á Íslandi,” 2006). Meanwhile 
the base commander, Captain Mark Laughton, announced to his staff of 1,240 
military personnel and 100 Department of Defence civilian employees that the 
drawdown of Keflavík base would lead to “no significant military presence in Iceland 
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after 30 September” (“NASKEF leadership announces plans for base downsizing,” 
2006). Clearly, the base would go through far reaching alterations, but the phrase 
“no significant military presence” implied that some U.S. military personnel might 
remain. 
Whether a small token force would stay remained unclear but it was clear 
that the government of Iceland had to come up with a plan. Five days after the 
announcement, during a town meeting with the locals at Keflavík, Prime Minister 
Ásgrímsson announced that his government would focus on three key issues: 
(1) reach an agreement with the United States government about future defence 
of Iceland; (2) assume responsibility for Keflavík airport; and (3) respond to the 
imminent mass lay-offs among the locals employed at the base (“Segir að vantraust 
hafi skapast milli þjóðanna,” 2006). However, Ásgrímsson warned that reaching 
an understanding with the U.S. government might prove a bumpy road. Preceding 
events had eroded Icelandic trust towards the United States and it remained to be 
seen whether that trust could be rebuilt. Continuing, he added that it might be 
necessary to revoke the defence agreement, or at least revise it, in which case NATO 
would have to be consulted. Still, he expected some U.S. military presence within 
the old base area although that depended on the outcome of discussions between 
the two governments.
But why was there confusion over what, if any, U.S. military presence would remain 
after 30 September? For this there were two reasons. At the time of negotiations, 
command of Keflavík base was in the midst of being transferred from the U.S. Navy 
to the U.S. Air Force (Senior member of the U.S. negotiation team, 2015) and for 
Icelanders working at the base this was visible on a daily basis as the Air Force has 
already started to take over certain key buildings from the Navy (Former senior 
official within the Radar Agency, 2013). Therefore, despite the tense negotiations 
throughout 2005 the U.S. negotiators had not been working towards closing down 
the base as such (Senior member of the U.S. negotiation team, 2015). Secondly, 
the abrupt break of the Icelandic negotiation team during the previous October 
meeting had been a turning-point but not because it gave the U.S. State Department 
an excuse to end talks. Rather, it gave Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld the excuse he 
needed to eliminate funding to Keflavík base altogether:
They walked out and unfortunately when they walked out the word got out to 
Secretary Rumsfeld that told the controllers, the guys that control the budget, to zero 
out the account at the end of the fiscal year. In other words, at the end of the fiscal 
year which would have been September 30 2006 the military would no longer be 
allowed to spend any money on keeping Keflavík open, which is essentially to shut it 
down. [….]... once you have that order that you are no longer allowed to spend money, 
it is a criminal offence so they had no choice. But the people I talked to were not 
happy about that. That was a unilateral decision on part of Rumsfeld; he didn’t check 
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with the White House he just did it. [….] We [State Department] actually didn’t find 
out about the decision until several days later (Senior member of the U.S. negotiation 
team, 2015).
Icelandic decision makers had suspected Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld as the 
key protagonist behind the decision but the view on the Icelandic side had been 
that President Bush had simply chosen Rumsfeld’s view as the most preferred option 
(Progressive Party, former member of cabinet, 2014, and Independence Party, 
former member of cabinet, 2014b). The events that followed that failed October 
meeting echoed Rumsfeld’s previous attempt to remove the fighters; however, this 
time around Rumsfeld did not face effective opposition from the State Department.
Any hope that the U.S. government would maintain some military presence in 
Iceland after 30 September was soon dashed. Two weeks after the announcement, 
the two sides met in Reykjavík.8 In the context of those talks U.S. Under Secretary 
of State, Nicholas Burns, published an open letter in Morgunblaðið (“Öflugra 
varnarsamstarf á 21. öldinni,” 2006) discussing past and present security and 
defence cooperation between Iceland and the United States. In brief, Burns argued 
that the non-existence of a credible military threat in the North Atlantic and the 
growing preponderance of new security threats which static military forces are 
not the ideal tool for addressing such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, were at the heart of President Bush’s decision to end permanent 
stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland. However, the U.S. government intended to 
honour the 1951 Defence Agreement by providing Iceland with mobile forces 
situated in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Since the U.S. government had reiterated its commitment to the defence 
agreement the logical next step was to open up a dialogue about how the United 
States government envisioned an adequate defence posture for Iceland. In early April 
Foreign Minister Haarde informed Parliament (Parliament, 2006b) about ongoing 
discussions between the two sides on a new defence plan for Iceland that the United 
States European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart was working on. Clearly, 
revoking the defence agreement, although sometimes flaunted as a bargaining chip, 
had never been a real option for Icelandic decision makers:
No, it was not an option. Perhaps someone said at one point, “OK if they’re gone we 
can just tear up these papers”, but it was never serious. It [the Defence Agreement] was 
always the bottom line. Instead of calling for physical presence in Iceland, as the 1951 
agreement did, it is not necessary to read it [the defence agreement] or interpret it that 
 
8     The Ministry for Foreign Affairs minutes from meetings held on 31 March, and 26-27 April 2006 are 
not accessible since they contain information on the U.S. defence planning for Iceland.
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way, instead we emphasised the commitment. We thought that in light of events and 
the changed security environment that this was acceptable (Independence Party, former 
member of cabinet, 2014a). 
Eventually, a defence plan was worked out, palatable to both sides, and a new 
framework for security and defence cooperation was agreed upon. The 1951 Defence 
Agreement continued to serve as the basis for defence cooperation between the two 
states, but with amendments made to its annexes and technical schedules (Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, 2006) to reflect the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iceland 
and the return of land and facilities to the Icelandic government.
In early October 2006, a few days after the formal handover of Keflavík base, the 
Prime Minister informed Parliament (Parliament, 2006c) that a final settlement 
had been reached between the two governments. A settlement which was given 
flesh in four separate agreements: three of which concerned practical issues such 
as the handing over of land, infrastructure and equipment, while the fourth dealt 
directly with the future security and defence relationship with the United States. 
The preamble to the 2006 Security and Defence Cooperative Agreement (Office of 
the Prime Minister, 2006a) reiterated the validity of the 1951 Defence Agreement 
before setting out the future defence relationship between the two countries. The 
Icelandic government accepted EUCOM’s plan to ensure Iceland’s future defence’s 
with mobile forces. Additionally, the two sides committed themselves to regular 
consultation and information sharing. Not only within the context of military 
security, but also regarding non-military security threats such as terrorism, law 
enforcement, border control and safety at sea. 
In Parliament the opposition criticised the government for handling the 
negotiation process poorly. Particularly for insisting on holding on to the four 
remaining fighter jets without offering any alternatives (Parliament, 2006c). This 
stubbornness, the opposition claimed, left Iceland with no clear defence policy goals 
beyond maintaining as much of the status quo as possible. 
Indeed, putting so much emphasis on keeping the four remaining F-15’s may 
have seemed archaic and exasperating to U.S. negotiators and decision makers. But 
there was more to it than that. In one form or another the remaining base functions 
at Keflavík base existed to support the fighter jets. Without them the rationale 
to maintain the base disappeared and with it the certainty that the United States 
government would respond quickly to any military or terrorist threat facing Iceland 
since such threats would put U.S. citizens and a U.S. military base also at risk. With 
the defence force gone this assurance of immediate response had disappeared.
Consequently, it is not surprising that in their final report to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs the Icelandic negotiation team emphasised the need to make up for 
this vacuum through alternative methods:
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Therefore, the Icelandic authorities must make necessary arrangements to increase the 
likelihood of a swift and effective U.S. response against threats made towards Iceland. 
Such arrangements pertain to communication lines between U.S. and Icelandic 
authorities during a crisis, but also, and not least, by establishing as close ties and 
cooperation as possible with the U.S. military and other U.S. security institutions such 
as law enforcement and Coast Guard (UTN, 2006c).
On the other side of the Atlantic Rumsfeld congratulated himself on ending 
U.S. military presence in Iceland despite opposition from the State Department 
(Rumsfeld papers, 2006). However, dissenters within the Department of State 
contended that his victory was a hollow one:
This was not something that we [State Department] took very lightly. There were a 
couple of things at play at the same time. There was the U.S.-Iceland relationship over 
all, but there was also the perception that Iceland had been a very valuable partner in 
the North Atlantic Council, Iceland had been deploying... you know it doesn’t have 
a military but it had people who were working in Iraq and Afghanistan, we were 
just integrating the Baltics, small countries there who were worried about NATO’s 
commitment. So, it is not just how you deal with Iceland, it is how you deal with a small 
ally within a larger alliance, and the perception that when people are no longer useful 
you kind of throw them aside, and what that does to the rest of the alliance. So, for the 
State Department and a lot of the career people at the Pentagon, this was a shock and 
[…] unfortunately given Rumsfeld’s power, there wasn’t a lot we could do to the change 
the decision […] so the question was then how do you go about fixing a problem that 
you created, and maintaining the alliance and making sure that Iceland understood that 
[…] our commitment to the defence of Iceland still was very strong (Senior member of 
the U.S. negotiation team, 2015).
The sense of being sidestepped and disregarded by the U.S. government was 
shared by Iceland’s own decision makers:
It may well be that long-term fatigue among individuals such as Rumsfeld had some 
effect. He was rumoured to have gotten the impression of Icelanders during the Cod 
Wars that Icelanders were demanding, inflexible and greedy. So, he was not viewed as 
friendly towards Icelanders. Then there is the question whether we could have tried 
to influence the negotiation process through connections in the U.S. Congress or 
Senate. We had friends there… or as good friends as is possible to talk about in this 
business. Looking back and thinking about how this evolved, it is possible to say that we 
[government of Iceland] should have approached this differently. We could have said: 
OK, you can take the fighters but are you willing to leave behind a small force to work 
with us on technical issues regarding IADS and also to show that you respect the old 
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agreement from 1951 with some physical presence, a small force that would also serve 
as deterrence (Independence Party, former member of cabinet, 2014a).
What stung Icelandic decision makers was that the U.S. government had decided 
to pull its military out unilaterally despite a defence relationship that stretched more 
than 60 years – going back to the defence agreement of 1941 – and the fact that 
the 1951 Defence Agreement is after all a bilateral agreement that called for joint 
decision making regarding overall troop levels at the base. As feared by members of 
the Department of State, directly involved in the negotiations, this action eroded 
trust and confidence in the integrity of the United States among Icelandic decision 
makers: 
I always had great trust in my dealings with the U.S., but through all this I lost that trust. 
[….] This is all water under the bridge and U.S. military presence in Iceland is not a 
goal in itself. What matters is that the security of Iceland is guaranteed through NATO 
membership and the bilateral defence agreement. We have to be able to rely on the 
defence agreement, and the Americans have tried to reassure us, but I have my doubts 
(Progressive Party, former member of cabinet, 2014).
Whether Icelandic decision makers could have done something differently to 
maintain the status quo at Keflavík base seems improbable, but the chain of events 
was not wholly predetermined. The Icelandic government had viewed the base 
itself as a guarantee that the United States would respond swiftly to any future 
aggression or threat against Iceland. As a result, instead of focusing on the main 
goal of maintaining some U.S military presence in Iceland, even if only in token 
form, the main bone of contention for Iceland had become the fighter jets. This in 
turn had opened the way for the Pentagon with Rumsfeld at the helm to present 
the government of Iceland with a fait accompli by shutting down what he saw as a 
redundant Cold War relic in a strategically insignificant part of the world.
The coalition government of the Independence Party and Progressive Party was 
extremely resilient and one of the longest serving coalition in Icelandic political history. 
Prime Minister Oddsson was a central figure during the different phases of defence 
negotiations but his government was a coalition of two parties and the Progressive 
Party leadership stood firmly by the hard-line position pushed by Oddsson:
We within this government often had different opinions that we discussed among 
ourselves without making them public. [….] We had different viewpoints but in such 
an important matter the end result was to reach a consensus that everyone could agree 
with and follow that policy through-and-through. [….] We agreed that they [U.S. 
defence force] were going to stay and that we were not going to give way (Progressive 
Party, former member of cabinet, 2014).
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The perception of the leadership of the two parties was that despite U.S. cut backs 
at Keflavík base their end-game was not to close the base and end U.S. military 
presence in Iceland but to coerce the government of Iceland to share the costs 
associated with the airport and the base itself. However, in the autumn of 2005 the 
defence negotiations were in a gridlock and it would take Oddsson’s retirement from 
politics to bring about a change of policy. On 27 September 2005 Haarde succeeded 
Oddsson as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and elected chairman of the Independence 
Party a few weeks later. After taking office as Foreign Minister, he altered his 
predecessor’s policy and sought to restart the stalled defence negotiations by offering 
his U.S. counterparts some relaxations from previous Icelandic offers (Independence 
Party, former member of cabinet, 2014a). The result was the 2006 February meeting 
in Washington D.C. between Foreign Minister Haarde and Secretary of State Rice 
during which Haarde stepped back from the previous red line drawn by Oddssson 
and offered Icelandic assumption of responsibility for Keflavík airport and provide 
the defence force with Search and Rescue services thus freeing up the much needed 
56th Rescue Squadron.
The change of policy after Haarde took over the chairmanship of the 
Independence Party should not be so surprising. Within the coalition there 
had been voices that argued that instead of fighting the U.S. negotiators on costs 
associated with the civilian side of Keflavík airport a wiser course of action was to 
be more accommodating, since the ultimate goal was of course to reach an amiable 
agreement with the Americans that would secure future presence of U.S. military 
forces in Iceland (Independence Party, former member of cabinet, 2014a and 
(Independence Party, former member of cabinet, 2014b). Oddsson’s retirement had 
created a leeway for moderates within the party that wished to meet the Americans 
half-way and find some accommodation that both sides could accept. 
A Similar reversal of policy took place with the possible revoking of the 1951 
Defence Agreement. Oddsson’s enthusiasm about terminating the agreement if the 
last remaining fighters were removed from Keflavík base was not shared by Haarde 
and Ásgrímsson as they did not follow through with Oddson’s threat. Instead, they 
saw through an arrangement with the U.S. whereby the 1951 Defence Agreement 
was interpreted in such a way that the U.S. would continue to provide Iceland with 
military defences albeit with moveable forces stationed outside of Iceland. Whether 
Oddsson would have gone through with his threat if he had remained as Foreign 
Minister and leader of the Independence Party is impossible to ascertain. But seeing 
how quickly the hard-line policy was reverted after Haarde took over the reins at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs implies that Oddsson would have met fierce opposition 
within his own party as well as from his coalition partner.
Oddsson’s brinkmanship in making the defence agreement dependent on the 
presence of few fighter jets was understandable. Oddsson rational was that the 
fighters were the linchpin of the base itself (Senior government official, 2015). 
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Without them there was no need for various support staff at Keflavík base and one 
by one various layers of base services and staff would peel away until the base would 
become an empty shell. 
But there were also domestic political factors to be considered. In the Icelandic 
political landscape, the Independence Party had always been the most steadfast 
supporter of U.S. military presence in Iceland. It served U.S. defence interests to 
have a base in Iceland but the Independence Party had championed the defence 
agreement and the base as necessary for Icelandic defence needs since 1951. For 
the Independence Party leadership, to abandon its policy of a visible U.S. military 
presence in Iceland was tantamount to acknowledging the argument of those who 
opposed the defence agreement throughout the Cold War period on the grounds 
that American forces were only in Iceland to protect U.S. interests, and had little to 
do with the security needs of Icelanders. Convincing Parliament to allocate funds for 
Keflavík airport and burden sharing as a requisite for maintaining the defence force 
in Iceland would also be a tough sell for the coalition government. For Oddsson and 
his team this was regarded as unworkable:
Let’s say that we had gone home with this offer. Then we would have had to ask 
Parliament for the money, let’s say 10 billlion ISK for the year 2005. If Parliament had 
asked whether that would keep them in Iceland or if we would come back in a few 
years to ask for more money, we could not give them any assurances, this was a hopeless 
situation (Senior government official, 2015).
Clearly, the thought was that Parliament would never accept considerable 
financial expenditures for airport maintenance; paying the salaries of Icelandic 
defence force employees and assume financial responsibility for the Radar Agency 
without having a guarantee that the United States would keep the base open. In the 
end, Rumsfeld’s intervention terminated any possible future settlement of retaining 
Keflavík base, regardless of whether Oddsson’s hard negotiation tactic or Haarde’s 
softer approach prevailed.
5.5. Conclusion
Iceland’s defence agreement with the U.S. and membership of NATO was a 
contended issue in domestic politics until the late 1970s. Especially during the three 
Cod Wars with the parties to the left of centre on the political spectrum calling 
for the termination of the defence agreement and two coalition governments that 
included the Progressive Party calling publicly for the termination of the defence 
agreement in 1956 and 1971. However, by the late 1970s and onwards the presence 
of U.S. military forces in Iceland and the defence agreement receded into the 
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background as a political issue and was not an issue for discussion of any left of centre 
coalition government formed in the late 1970s or throughout the 1980s. Following 
the end of the Cold War In the early 1990s a government coalition consisting of the 
Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party responded to possible reduced 
U.S. military presence at Keflavík base by forming a policy of cost reductions but no 
cost sharing at Keflavík base. While the U.S. was trying to move beyond its Cold War 
presence in Iceland the government of Iceland had not been able to move further 
and consider alternative arrangements from what had existed since 1951.
This position was maintained by the Independence Party/Progressive Party 
coalition formed in 1995 which held through every national election until 2007. 
Headed by Prime Minister Davíð Oddsson both coalitions drew a red line in the 
sand vis-à-vis U.S. negotiators which was that four fighter jets and the helicopter 
rescue squadron would remain at the base. Even though the policy became 
increasingly tenacious there was no reversal until after a change of leadership within 
the Independence Party in the autumn of 2005 when Davíð Oddsson retired from 
politics. 
During their tenure in government, both the Social Democratic Party and the 
Progressive Party presented a united front with the Independence Party during 
successive negotiation rounds about the future of Keflavík base. Of course, 
government coalitions have to present a united front and speak with one voice 
when engaged in international negotiations and the Progressive Party and the 
Independence Party were united from start to finish in their defence negotiations 
with the United States. 
From a Neorealist point of view the defence negotiations present a quandary. 
The rational approach for Icelandic decision makers would be to take stock of the 
security environment facing Iceland and formulate an appropriate defence policy 
that would assess the continued need for U.S. military forces in Iceland and then set 
out negotiation goals based on that assessment. Instead from 1991 until late 2005 
the main emphasis was to draw out the winding down of the base and then to fight 
tooth and nail against Icelandic burden sharing. 
It was only during the February 2006 meeting between Foreign Minister Haarde 
and Secretary of State Rice that the negotiations were framed within the appropriate 
strategic context of why continued U.S. military presence in Iceland served Icelandic 
defence interests as argued by Haarde: the departure of the defence force would 
create a power vacuum which in itself was a threat and it remained entirely uncertain 
what route a nationalistic Russia would take in the near future. With the closure of 
the base a reality the government of Iceland settled for reinterpreting the defence 
agreement in such a way that it remained valid but interpreted in such a way that 
permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland was not required. 
From an Institutionalist perspective the involvement of NATO throughout the 
negotiation process was minimal. Although 1951 Defence Agreement stated that 
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the U.S. provided Iceland with defences on behalf of NATO the NAC was not 
involved in any stages of the negotiation process that from the beginning to the end 
was a bilateral issue between the U.S and Iceland. Although not using NATO as a 
forum of mediation NATO Secretary General George Robertson did have a minor 
role to play in the spring of 2003 when he spoke to President Bush on behalf of 
Foreign Minister Ásgrímsson and persuaded Bush to postpone for the time being 
the removal of the last fighter jets from Keflavík. 
Moving beyond Neorealist and Institutional thinking the perspectives of Political 
Economy and Social Constructivism may help us better understand the route that 
the defence negotiations took. The intransigent behaviour of consecutive cabinets 
headed by Davíð Oddsson to refuse to consider cost sharing at Keflavík base and to 
maintain as much of the status quo as possible was a manifestation of the functional 
role Keflavík base played in Iceland on a daily basis and had done for decades. The 
defence force was among the largest individual employer in Iceland, bought goods 
and services from Icelandic businesses, ran Keflavík international airport and 
provided Search and Rescue in Iceland. Any winding down of base functions was 
bound to impact the U.S. economic impact in Iceland and incur additional costs on 
the Icelandic government. 
Maintaining as much of the status quo was important for economic reasons but 
there were also political considerations at play. For decades the Independence Party 
had positioned itself as the strongest supporter of defence cooperation with the U.S. 
and the party that could be best trusted with responsible handling of defence issues, 
including successful negotiations with the U.S. on the defence relationship between 
the two states. Failing to live up to that expectation could cost the party votes 
from its traditional supporters. Therefore, remaining tough on keeping the four 
remaining fighter jets at Keflavík was also intended to appeal to the electoral base 
of the Independence Party. With considerable electoral losses in the 2003 national 
elections any leakage of the decision by the U.S. to remove the last remaining fighters 
from Keflavík in the spring of 2003 could have cost the Independence Party/
Progressive Party coalition three members of Parliament which would have brought 
down the coalition. 
Moving from Political Economic considerations to Social Constructive 
perspectives it is hard to overlook the pivotal role played by Davíd Oddsson. Prime 
Minister from 1991 until 2004 and then Foreign Minister from 2004 until 2005, 
Oddsson had a ruthless approach in politics. In 1991, as vice-chairman of the 
Independence Party he ran against and defeated the sitting chairman, Þorsteinn 
Pálsson, a man one year older than Oddsson who had been elected chairman in 1983 
and already served as Prime Minister from 1987 to 1988 during a brief coalition of 
the Independence Party, Progressive Party and the Social Democrats. His unyielding 
approach was evident throughout the negotiation process: threatening to terminate 
the defence agreement if the last fighter planes were to be removed from the base 
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and focusing throughout on costs and how to minimise Icelandic financial burden 
in any negotiated agreement.
It is only when Oddsson left the stage to Haarde in the autumn of 2005 and 
following the February 2006 meeting between Haarde and Secretary of State Rice 
that the Icelandic side moved away from its fixation on costs. With an educational 
background in the United States worthy of any State Department career diplomat 
Haarde was able to articulate to Rice why a continued U.S. military presence in Iceland 
was important for Icelandic security interests, placing the discussions in their correct 
strategic context while accepting upfront the most pressing U.S. demand: complete 
Icelandic takeover of Keflavík airport. However, the breakthrough came too late in 
the process as Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld had already made his fateful 
decision in late 2005 to shut down Keflavík base regardless of any counterproposals 
by the Icelandic side.
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6. Government policy following the closure  
of Keflavík base
6.1. Keflavík airport and base facilities
With the status of the defence agreement out of the way the next hurdle was the 
successful transfer of responsibility for Keflavík airport and base facilities to 
the Icelandic authorities. To tackle the work ahead, the two sides formed a joint 
Transition Working Group. The Icelandic delegation was led by the Office of 
Defence at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. team by senior officials 
from Keflavík base and staff members of the U.S. embassy in Reykjavík. According 
to the Icelanders the transition group had two goals: 
The key short-term objective is to establish what needs to be done to ensure the 
uninterrupted operability of the international airport and how those steps need to be 
taken, noting that the GOI [Government of Iceland] had already agreed to take over 
airport-ops related functions. In the long term he said that it was critical that the GOI 
be informed of the end state of the transition at the base and what future requirements 
there may be to keep the Agreed Areas or part thereof functional for US/Iceland and 
NATO in accordance with the defense agreement (UTN, 2006d).
As a dual military/civilian airport operated by a foreign government taking over 
Keflavík airport posed a number of challenges. To ensure a seamless transition the 
base authorities supplied the Icelandic side with a complete list of all equipment 
needed for operating the airport: (1) airport workforce; (2) computers; (3) 
databases and electrical equipment; and (4) necessary fire trucks and snowploughs. 
This listing was reciprocated with a formal request by the Icelanders for transfer of 
relevant assets (UTN, 2006d). The larger equipment, fire trucks etc. were leased 
through a Foreign Military Sales Program for a period of five years, and a procedure 
known as Foreign Excess Personal Property was used to transfer all other items to 
into ownership of the Icelandic authorities. 
The transfer of airport facilities posed its own set of unique problems. As 
previously recounted, base facilities had been financed either directly with U.S. 
funding or NATO funds. Accordingly, airport facilities were either U.S. owned or 
defined as NATO Infrastructure. The Icelandic position regarding U.S. facilities was 
that they should be handed over free of charge (UTN, 2006d) in accordance with 
the general annex of the 1951 Defence Agreement: 
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All other property [i.e. real estate] provided by the United States and located in 
Iceland under this agreement shall remain the property of the United States until the 
termination of this Agreement, whereupon, except as provided in paragraph 4 below, 
it shall become the property of Iceland without compensation (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 1951).
Deciding on the future of NATO facilities was a trickier affair. The Host Nation role 
for NATO facilities in Iceland had always been shouldered by the U.S. government 
and as such the United States had represented Iceland within NATO. However, that 
division of labour was about to change. In early April the U.S. side had asked their 
Icelandic counterparts whether the government of Iceland would consider taking 
over Host Nation responsibility for NATO facilities in Iceland. However, the only 
reply had been that currently there was no Icelandic government policy in place 
whether to participate in NSIP or whether to assume Host Nation responsibility for 
Icelandic NATO facilities (UTN, 2006d). The ambiguity was not one sided. The 
U.S. representatives were also unable to say whether the United States intended to 
retain its Host Nation role for any NATO facilities in Iceland or not. Eventually, in 
late May, the U.S. side informed its Icelandic counterpart of its decision: 
The U.S. intention is to declare all NATO owned facilities and equipment in Iceland 
as excess and no longer needed by U.S. forces […] with the drawdown of U.S. forces in 
Iceland there is no longer an operational requirement for these things (UTN, 2006d). 
While the U.S. side was arguing that the Icelandic government should take over 
Host Nation support for NATO facilities in one batch the Icelandic delegates 
emphasised that their primary interest was only to take over those NATO facilities 
essential to operate Keflavík airport. As discussions continued, it became apparent 
that tweezing out those facilities needed for running the airport and transferring 
them separately would complicate the handover process (UTN, 2006d). In Brussels 
the U.S. Permanent Representation at NATO had been working with the NATO 
Infrastructure Committee on the transfer and from their vantage point it would 
be easier for the Infrastructure Committee to process a single request than many 
smaller parcels. 
By early September, EUCOM recommended that 63 out of the 145 NATO 
facilities in Iceland should be handed over to the Icelandic authorities. The U.S. 
government had already decided that it had no need for the remaining 82 listed 
NATO facilities but was obliged to secure and maintain them for 12 months after 
which a decision had to be reached by the NATO Infrastructure Committee on 
their future use. 
As the winding down of U.S. forces in Iceland continued the pressure on the 
Icelandic authorities increased. The Defence Office at the Ministry for Foreign 
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Affairs established a task force to handle the practical issues of transition, since 
a seamless transition of utility services: electricity, water and sewage had to be 
secured, in addition to the equipment and facilities needed to operate the airport. 
Eventually, over 560 former base facilities were handed over (UTN, 2006d) which 
in turn presented problems of its own. The Icelandic handover task force had 
to operate within a narrow time limit as its task had to be completed before the 
departure of the defence force. Associated with the transfer process was a former 
senior official within the Radar Agency who described the process in the following 
way:
What people didn’t realise is that this was not a question of being told to sit and write 
down a list over what needs to be done. This is not action; this is re-action, a reflex. The 
Americans are leaving and we have to get our arms around what they are leaving behind. 
In reality, you find yourself in a defensive position and you are discovering all kind of 
things. For example, what about the airport fire brigade? They can take whatever trucks 
they like when they leave. How are we going to ensure that the airport meets ICAO 
standards regarding fire safety? [....] There was also an issue with the telephone system. 
A part of its hardware was a piece of U.S. owned equipment which was so essential that 
without it the airport could not function, and of course the Americans could take it 
with them. [….] Another thing was the handing over of facilities. Suddenly there were 
hundred keys to hundred different apartments thrown at your desk in a day and there 
were three of us. What were we supposed to do? You were grateful if you could ask to 
what apartment a particular key went. There was this kind of nonsense, this was chaotic 
(Former senior official, Radar Agency, 2013).
Eventually, the dust settled and on 30 September 2006 a formal handover 
ceremony of Keflavík base took place. As plans for the transition ceremony were 
underway the government of Iceland decided to divide the former base and airport 
area into three sectors (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006, p. 12). Sector A included 
the international airport at Keflavík, its terminals, hangars and runways. Sector B 
would be the newly designated Security Zone covering the defence and security 
facilities which included the CRC, ISSF and a number of other buildings. The 
largest zone: sector C, included 386 facilities used and lived in by defence force 
military personnel and their families. 
All property within sector C was quickly handed over to a newly established 
development company whose purpose was to expedite their transition from military 
to civilian use. However, an unfortunate event in late October that year revealed 
the need for clear rules of administrative responsibility within the former base area 
(The Icelandic National Audit office, 2008, pp. 19-23). During unusual autumn 
frosts, water pipelines burst in 13 abandoned apartment buildings and seven other 
facilities, causing extensive water damage to 106 apartments. This incident, less than 
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a month after the transition, brought the point home that some future arrangement 
was needed for Keflavík base area. 
Before the transfer was complete the two sides had to come to an agreement 
on three issues: (1) transfer of responsibility of base infrastructure and equipment 
to the Icelandic authorities; (2) environmental clean-up of the area coming into 
Icelandic possession; and (3) the future of IADS. The first session took place on 7 
July in Reykjavík followed by a session in early August in Washington and a final one 
in mid-September in Reykjavík. 
Transfer of responsibility. Transferring essential airport equipment to the Icelandic 
authorities was a straightforward matter. The U.S. side was not willing to give the 
equipment free of charge, but they were willing to lease it to the Icelanders for a 
nominal sum of a few thousand dollars. But transferring base infrastructure was a 
trickier affair. In the beginning, the U.S. side claimed that the replacement value of 
the base was $2.5 billion, however, the United States government was willing to let 
it go for $150 million. An offer presented by the U.S. negotiators as “…a magnificent 
opportunity to take over magnificent facilities” (UTN, 2006e). The offer was 
rejected by the Icelanders who countered that they were only interested in facilities 
essential for running the international airport, and those needed for receiving U.S. 
and NATO military forces in the future. However, the Icelanders had a counter-
offer to make: they might be willing to take over all base facilities if the residual 
value of those not needed would be deducted from the price of facilities that the 
government of Iceland truly wanted. Both sides remained at loggerheads and were 
obliged to seek a compromise through other means.
Environmental clean-up. In due course, the two sides delved into the environmental 
condition at the base. The Icelandic negotiators maintained that article VIII of the 
general annex to the defence agreement9 obliged the United States government to 
clear the agreed areas of waste material, which implied that the U.S. government 
should pay for closing garbage dumps and cleaning up contaminated soil at Keflavík 
base at a total cost according to Icelandic estimates of $47 million (UTN, 2006e). 
Not buying into the Icelandic argument, the U.S. negotiators argued that the concept 
of environmental clean-up had been unknown in 1951 and countered that that 
particular article only applied if the defence agreement was revoked (UTN, 2006e). 
To bolster its claim the U.S. government had hired an environmental consulting firm 
to carry out a survey within the base area. 
According to the study, the most prevalent contagion was groundwater pollution, 
but this was a well-known issue that had already been settled with an agreement 
between the two governments in 1989. With regard to other contamination, out 
of 60 pre-defined zones 14 needed further investigation, however, only two had 
9  “…waste material, will to the extent practicable, be removed destroyed or otherwise disposed of upon 
the surrender of the agreed areas” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1951).
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been used by the U.S. military. The remaining 12 had been used by contractors and 
domestic airport authorities under Icelandic supervision. Apparently, the situation 
was particularly bad in a so-called contractor area that the U.S. military had had no 
control over. Adamant that they were not obliged to carry out any kind of clean-up, 
the U.S. negotiators argued that it was particularly unfair to hold them responsible 
for pollution caused by Icelandic contracting firms. However, if the Icelandic 
government would choose to carry out environmental clean-up that cost might be 
considered a part of a residual payment for U.S. base facilities. 
The U.S. side had decided to mesh environmental clean-up settlements with 
financial reimbursements for base facilities. The Icelanders acceded somewhat to that 
point of view, and agreed to clean up the contractor area and old training grounds 
known to contain unexploded munitions from past military exercises. Eventually, a 
compromise was reached. The Icelandic government was given ownership of all 541 
U.S.-owned base facilities free of charge. In return the United States government was 
absolved of any obligations for future environmental clean-up (Office of the Prime 
Minister, 2006b) and the two governments agreed to further consultation on best 
ways to respond if an environmental hazard detrimental to people’s health should 
become known within the next four years. 
The future of the Iceland Air Defence System. When seeking agreement on IADS 
it was clear that the two sides had different goals in mind. The Icelandic position 
was that IADS played a pivotal role in the security of Iceland. After all, it was the 
responsibility of any sovereign state to be aware of what was taking place within 
its territory in land, sea and air. Additionally, the system had strong implications 
for civilian air safety. IADS radar signals were forwarded to the Icelandic aviation 
authorities and used to monitor flights and navigate civilian air traffic around 
Iceland. Because of its significance, a continued U.S. participation in IADS would 
constitute a visible U.S. contribution to the defence of Iceland. Therefore, the 
Icelandic negotiators made their U.S. counterparts an offer: Iceland would fund the 
operational costs of IADS while the U.S. payed for maintenance, required spare parts 
and future upgrades (UTN, 2006c). The argument was that because of economics 
of scale the United States would be able to fund maintenance at much lower costs 
than the Icelandic government. If accepted, the offer would have made the U.S. and 
Iceland partners in Host Nation Status for IADS under NATO definitions with 
Iceland paying up to 75% of the costs. There was, however, very little interest in the 
Icelandic offer among U.S. negotiators. EUCOM in Stuttgart had already decided 
that there was no further U.S. military need for the system, although NATO would 
have to give its view on the matter. What was important for the U.S. negotiators 
was that the United States had committed itself to maintain the system and radar 
signals from two of its four stations during a 12-month period of notice, ending on 
15 August 2007. The U.S. side thus responded coolly that the future of IADS was 
still under discussion. 
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But If the U.S. government was not willing to fund IADS then what about other 
elements of future U.S. military visibility in Iceland? During the negotiations, the 
Icelanders had made it clear that Keflavík airport would continue to be a contribution 
to the common defence of NATO and would remain open to U.S. and NATO forces. 
The Icelandic government also argued that the U.S. government should maintain 
some facilities and personnel to be able to receive larger forces in time of need. This 
of course tied in with the Icelandic desire for regular arrival of force elements to 
carry out exercises involving air defence (with fighter jets), Search and Rescue as well 
as special forces (e.g. for counter-terrorism). While not commenting on the issue 
of retaining personnel and facilities within the base area the U.S. negotiators had 
responded favourably to the suggestion of hosting regular exercises and suggested 
that something might be arranged similar to the bi-annual Northern Viking exercise 
already held in Iceland.
A consistent problem, for the Icelandic side, throughout the six-month transition 
phase had been to get their U.S. counterpart to provide them with accurate 
information about the winding-down process of base operations. Repeatedly, the 
Icelandic side requested a planned timetable (UTN, 2006d) only to be given one on 
24 May, during the sixth transition meeting, by which time a serious breach of trust 
had already occurred. A few days earlier, the 932 ACS had walked out of the CRC, 
leaving the Radar Agency faced with an unexpected reality: no-one was monitoring 
IADS radar data, or relaying that data onward to NATO command centres in 
Europe and North America. 
The walk out signalled the end of direct U.S. involvement in monitoring signals 
from IADS although the U.S. government was obliged to fund the system until mid-
August 2007. Despite the walk out the technical capabilities of IADS were all in 
place and their functions could be reactivated. Within the Radar Agency a decision 
was made to assume air surveillance previously carried out by the 932 ACS:
We made the decision and of course everybody knew about it, this wasn’t a private 
decision. We decided to continue. We did this the poor man’s way. We used the 
technicians to monitor the signals at the radar sites because they were still partly 
manned. Then we manned the CRC during daytime. Gradually we stopped manning 
the CRC with technicians and they simply became shift workers which made it possible 
to man the CRC 24 hours a day. There were few steps in the process but we never 
stopped, it [air surveillance] never stopped (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2013). 
The recollection of a technician manning IADS gives a valuable insight into how 
the Radar Agency staff took the initiative:
They [932 ACS] just walked out of the CRC and we simply took the ball over. What 
we did first of all was to monitor the airspace, that is the signal and maintain it. Then 
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we had to start from the beginning and establish contact with Norway and U.K., and 
get us into what is called CAOC. We are mostly in contact with the Norwegians and 
the British and we had to build this up from scratch. We simply sat down and opened 
the instruction manuals about how to do this. You just sit down and you know… this is 
what we have and now we are going to do this [….] I am not joking, people were simply 
thrown a ball and told that they had to hold it and that is what we did (Technical crew 
chief IADS, 2014). 
The abandonment of the CRC took the Icelandic authorities by surprise. Actually, 
during a preceding Transition Group meeting the upcoming deactivation of the 932 
ACS had been mentioned. However, the U.S. message had been that:
…in the case of the 932nd Squadron, it will mean that a deactivation ceremony will take 
place but that all functions and facilities will still be there until an agreement has been 
reached to turn over the functions to the GOI [government of Iceland] (UTN, 2006d). 
Understandably this did not sit well with the Icelanders. The embittered Icelandic 
delegates stressed that this should have been brought to their attention much earlier. 
Especially since, according to their sources, base authorities and U.S. embassy staff 
had been aware of the intention to pull the 932 ACS out a full month in advance. 
Adding that “the move is being perceived [by the government of Iceland] as the 
dismantling of Iceland’s air defence through the back door” (UTN, 2006d). 
Continuing, the Icelandic representatives argued that this move was a breach of an 
MoU between the two governments stating that a notice must be provided a year in 
advance and no such notice had been served. 
Holding their line, the U.S. side retorted that the announcement that the defence 
force was leaving Iceland implied that certain functions would no longer be carried 
out in the same fashion as before. Continuing, that the final U.S. position had 
been to declare the radar sites an excess of U.S. needs, although “…considerable 
interagency discussions are going on in Washington, D.C. regarding this subject” 
(UTN, 2006d). Not impressed by such arguments, their Icelandic counterparts 
replied that this was not a U.S. inter-agency matter but a bilateral U.S.-Icelandic 
issue and that the U.S. side should have been explicit about the radar sites. 
How elements within the U.S. military establishment viewed the closure of 
Keflavík base will only be revealed in the distant future but what is certain is that 
after May 2006 connectivity between IADS and the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) was severed, depriving command centres in North 
America of the Recognised Air and Sea Picture of the North Atlantic:
What explains it is a technical problem. They [United States Air Force] operated the 
NATO systems in Iceland by using U.S. crypto keys and connections. They of course 
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stopped supplying us with their crypto keys when they left and we started to run the 
system on NATO crypto keys. The problem is that NORAD in the U.S. does not accept 
NATO crypto keys so the systems [IADS and NORAD] do not mesh together. In the 
end the Canadians acquired NATO crypto keys and the connection between IADS 
and NORAD was restored in 2010 through the Canadian side (Commander Keflavík 
Air Base, 2013).
As the U.S. government had terminated its obligation to operate the system and 
the Icelandic government had no legal framework in place to regulate the functions of 
the Radar Agency IADS now existed within a legalistic limbo. However, the system 
was intended to meet the defence needs of NATO and its members and as soon as the 
U.S. government announced in March that it intended to close Keflavík base NATO 
agencies and other NATO member nations began to show interest in IADS:
Representatives from NATO organizations began to visit us as well as representatives 
from SHAPE. Asking us what they could do to support us. The Norwegians and 
Canadians sent a team of 15 people who stayed here for two weeks to teach us [.…] The 
Norwegians send men over on a regular basis to train us and continue to give enormous 
support. They are actually offering more training than we can absorb [….] The Canadians 
were quick to react and so did the Norwegians and NATO organizations in Belgium. 
They just strolled in and asked what they could do to help. So, NATO began as early as 
the summer of 2006 to do something (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2013).
Although the Radar Agency staff had decided to pick up the ball Iceland was 
without any form of air defences after the removal of the last F-15 fighter jets. 
Soon after the formal handover of Keflavík base two Russian Tupolev-95 bombers 
appeared within Iceland’s MADIZ, the first such flight since 2003. Icelandic officials 
had been informed through NATO intelligence channels beforehand (Former 
senior official within the Icelandic Defence Agency, 2014). Understandably, the 
Icelandic authorities were unsure about how to respond. A senior official involved in 
the transition phase (who would later become a senior official within the Icelandic 
Defence Agency) describes the event in such a way:
No one knew whether the planes would turn back or be intercepted by the Norwegians 
or what [….] eventually the Russians were intercepted by the Norwegians. After that 
some system was put in place so we knew what procedures take place when the Russians 
fly their bombers to Iceland. This event triggered certain things, the ball started to roll 
towards air policing (Former senior official, the Icelandic Defence Agency, 2014). 
Soon after the U.S. departure Icelandic officials within the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs began to discuss within NATO Military Committee how to address Iceland’s 
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lack of air defences as the ability to intercept Russian bombers was of course a 
question of affirming Iceland’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. From NATO’s 
perspective having no interception capabilities, apart from Norway, in the Northern 
Flank of the alliance raised concerns among other NATO members. 
But how could Iceland solve its lack of air defence? The United States had not 
been willing to maintain a continuous fighter presence in Iceland. Therefore, it was 
hardly realistic that other NATO members would be willing to do so. However, a 
compromise might be reached. After consultation between the Icelandic Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force in Ramstein, 
Germany (Senior official, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013) the conclusion was 
reached that since Iceland was not faced with a military threat in the foreseeable 
future a periodical air policing deployment four times a year was best suited to meet 
Iceland’s needs.
The future arrangement of Iceland’s air defence now began to take shape. On 2 
July 2007 NATO Military Committee decided that the operation of IADS had to 
be continued (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007a) and soon after work began to 
integrate IADS into NATINADS. Following the decision, the Icelandic Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs announced later that year in October that regular NATO Air 
Policing missions in Iceland would start in spring 2008 (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 2007b).
6.2. Icelandic institutional defence framework 
In May 2006 the Independence Party and the Progressive Party renewed their 
coalition government, although with certain changes. The Independence Party took 
over the premiership, and while Geir Haarde moved into the Prime Minister’s office 
the Progressive Party assumed responsibility for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 
new government had enough on its plate in addressing the U.S. legacy: redundant 
base facilities had to be disposed of and a permanent solution was needed to fund 
Keflavík international airport. On 26 September the Icelandic government issued a 
statement (Office of the Prime Minister, 2006c) declaring: (1) the establishment of 
a corporate entity designed to facilitate the transfer of buildings within the old base 
area into civilian use, (2) the planned enhancement of the Coast Guard’s Search and 
Rescue capabilities, and (3) planned arrangements to read the radar signals produced 
by the Radar Agency. 
With these first tentative steps taken, the next move was to realign Iceland´s 
defence policy in light of the closure of Keflavík base. In a speech at the NATO 
Summit in Riga in November 2006 Prime Minister Geir Haarde brought up 
Iceland’s lack of air defence, and a month later the Icelandic government sent a 
formal request to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to instruct the 
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NAC to direct the NATO Military Committee to develop alternatives for Iceland’s 
peacetime preparedness needs.
In light of added defence responsibilities further Icelandic representation was 
needed within the NATO decision organizational structure (Icelandic Defence 
Agency, pp. 30, 121, 2010). In 2006 the Icelandic Foreign Minister appointed both 
a representative to SHAPE and NSIP, roles previously handled by the United States.
Unlike other NATO members Icelandic had never ratified the 1951 Agreement 
between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, 
more generally referred to as NATO-SOFA. The agreement defines the legal status 
of military forces of one NATO state when operating on the territory of another 
NATO member. The reason was that the 1951 Defence Agreement made NATO-
SOFA redundant as article 11 of the defence agreement provided that military forces 
from other NATO members in Iceland enjoyed the same legal status as U.S. military 
forces (Parliament, 2007). With the departure of the defence force it was necessary 
to rectify the situation. In March 2007, the government ratified NATO-SOFA and 
the 1995 Partnership for Peace Status of Force Agreement between NATO members 
and countries participating in the Partnership for Peace programme. 
A month later, the Icelandic government took steps to deepen its security 
and defence cooperation with its neighbouring NATO allies. On 26 April 2007 
Foreign Minister Valgerður Sverrisdóttir signed a bilateral security framework with 
her Norwegian counterpart, Jonas Gahr Støre, emphasising joint consultation, 
information sharing and force cooperation in the sea and air around Iceland and 
a joint declaration with the Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller, on increased 
Icelandic-Danish security and defence cooperation. Similar agreements followed 
with the United Kingdom in May 2008 and Canada in October 2010. This deepening 
of defence cooperation with other NATO allies was an attempt to compensate for 
the loss of U.S. military presence, but they were no substitute for the defence force 
or Iceland’s defence relationship with the U.S.
Securing periodical NATO air policing missions, ratifying NATO-SOFA and 
seeking active defence cooperation with Iceland’s geographical neighbours were all 
steps taken less than a year after the closure of Keflavík base but the main task of 
creating a legislative framework for defence tasks in Iceland previously handled by 
the U.S. military had to wait. 
Fortunately, the Icelandic government had been given a breathing space – a gap 
year to absorb and digest. The U.S. was still obliged to finance IADS until mid-August 
2007, and maintain for a year those 83 NATO facilities not immediately taken over 
by the Icelandic government. When that time was up funding was taken over by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but what would happen to the Radar Agency remained 
unclear. As 2007 turned into 2008, the best choice at hand seemed to be the creation 
of a new government agency subordinate to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; or as a 
senior official phrased it:
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The Icelandic government was handed overnight a township of 5,000 people. Who was 
going to be responsible for this? Of course, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, or the 
Office of Defence within the Ministry, while no permanent solution had been found. 
[…] But who was going to go in and check if the lights were on or the buildings were 
heated? No one was doing that. Then pipes start bursting in the buildings during the 
freezing October nights and people are faced with huge damages. This event, in my 
opinion, reinforced the idea that we needed to get the entire package out of this house 
and put it in the hands of a special agency that should be situated within the Keflavík 
base area and take care of this (Senior official, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013).
Following Parliamentary elections in the spring of 2007 the Independence 
Party/Progressive Party coalition came to an end. However, this did not consign 
the Independence Party to opposition. With 43 out of 63 members of Parliament 
the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance formed a new coalition 
government. Haarde retained the post of Prime Minister which he had assumed 
after Ásgrímsson’s retirement from politics in mid-June 2006 and the leader of 
the Social Democratic Alliance, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, took up the post of 
Foreign Minister. 
As the ideological successor to the Social Democratic Party, The Social 
Democratic Alliance was a supporter of Iceland’s membership in NATO. However, 
Social Democratic Alliance party conference resolutions have only made fleeting 
references to NATO and then in the context of the added value Iceland stood to 
gain by cooperating with other sovereign states through international institutions 
(Social Democratic Alliance, 2005). But any mention of the Icelandic-U.S. 
defence relationship or the 1951 Defence Agreement has been absent from Social 
Democratic Alliance party conference resolutions. The silence was understandable 
for two reasons. After all, the Social Democratic Alliance was a fusion of three left of 
centre parties, including members of the radical People’s Alliance. Therefore, the left 
wing of the party would not be comfortable supporting a defence agreement which 
in a previous political live they had opposed.
Secondly, the value of retaining the fighter planes at Keflavík base had remained 
elusive to the leadership of the Social Democratic Alliance. A year after the 2003 
U.S. attempt to remove the fighters from Keflavík base, the Social Democratic 
Alliance set up an internal security and defence policy working group. Its conclusion 
was that far from serving a military role the four remaining fighters at Keflavík base 
were much more a symbolic gesture of U.S. defence commitments to Iceland rather 
than meeting any perceived military threat. Thus, the U.S. should have a free hand 
to reduce its military presence and its responsibility for Keflavík airport (“Skiptar 
skoðanir um loftvarnir,” 2004). The Social Democratic Alliance agenda did not 
include revision of the defence agreement but there was not much political capital 
in retaining the fighters.
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When it came to forming a government, the Independence Party and the Social 
Democratic Alliance did not come across any stumbling blocks in terms of security 
and defence. In fact, no mention was made of NATO or the 1951 Defence Agreement 
in the Independence Party/Social Democratic Alliance coalition manifesto, 
however, it did refer to western cooperation as a permanent cornerstone of Iceland’s 
foreign policy (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007). An alternative expression for 
maintaining the status quo regarding Iceland’s defences. 
With a new government in power the necessity for some kind of a legislative 
framework was surely pressing. Within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, officials 
were pondering alternatives (Senior official Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013a). 
One option discussed was to create a legal framework around the functions of the 
Radar Agency and maintain it as a sub-organization within the Office of Defence at 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Although a viable option the government decided 
that something more radical was needed and chose a different route: 
Yes, the governance had always been within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it 
began formulating a legal framework. My opinion was that this was a child of a past 
era… the Radar Agency that is. Now we were responsible for our own defence and we 
had to lead the way in building up knowledge to deal with this. I did not think it was 
necessarily right that it should be interwoven with other work within the Ministry. 
I wanted to remove it from the Ministry and that is how the idea about an Icelandic 
Defence Agency was born. An agency that would lead in our [Icelandic] security and 
defence matters, and accumulate knowledge (Social Democratic Alliance, former 
member of cabinet, 2014). 
In late November 2007, Foreign Minister Gísladóttir announced the 
forthcoming establishment of an Icelandic Defence Agency (“Varnarmálastofnun 
reki ratsjárstöðvar,” 2007). Within its purview would fall NATO Infrastructure 
in Iceland, the hosting of military exercises in Iceland and the responsibility for 
communicating classified information between Icelandic authorities and NATO. 
By mid-January 2008 the government was prepared to introduce the defence act 
bill (Varnarmálalög) in Parliament. In essence, the purpose of the act was fourfold:
1. Delimit the powers of the Icelandic authorities regarding defence related 
projects; 
2. Distinguish between defence related projects and civilian projects pertaining 
to law enforcement and internal security of the state; 
3. Distinguish between policy and implementation issues in the field of defence; 
and 
4. Facilitate the democratic control of defence related activities (Parliament, 
2008c). 
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It followed that the proposed defence agency would fall within the purview of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On 17 January 2008, Foreign Minister Gísladóttir 
opened the debate on the defence act in Parliament (Parliament, 2008a). After the 
closure of Keflavík base responsibility for IADS and various NATO facilities had 
been transferred to the Icelandic authorities and to carry out these functions the 
defence act would set up a new agency that would also represent Icelandic authorities’ 
vis-a-vis allied forces visiting Iceland.
Delving into the administrative and legalistic premises of the defence act 
Gísladóttir argued that the bill created a clear legal framework for defence tasks 
by safeguarding transparency and administrative controls while building a legal 
firewall between defence on one hand and law enforcement and civil emergency on 
the other. What the defence agency was tasked to do vis-à-vis NATO was set out in 
Article 7 of the defence act:
1. Operate IADS, including NATO communication and radar sites in Iceland;
2. Participate in coordinated NATO air surveillance and air policing in Iceland;
3. Supervise and manage the Security Areas, and facilities within them, owned 
by the Icelandic state and NATO in accordance with Iceland’s Host and User 
Nation responsibilities;
4. Prepare and supervise defence exercises held in Iceland;
5. Implement Host Nation support on behalf of the Icelandic government;
6. Operate data links connected to NATO information systems as well as 
processing information from those systems;
7. Participate in NATO committees and agencies. Although the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs might also appoint representatives from other government 
agencies, in consultation with the relevant Ministry, to sit in a NATO 
committee within the sphere of civilian cooperation;
8. Perform tasks associated with the implementation of the 1951 Defence 
Agreement and the NATO-SOFA Agreement (Parliament, 2008c).
In addition, the defence act defined the defence agency as the main advisory 
authority on defence matters within the Icelandic governance structure. 
On 1 June 2008 the Icelandic Defence Agency opened its doors for the first 
time. In essence it was an amalgamation of a number of institutions. At its core was 
the staff of the now defunct Radar Agency alongside officials transferred from the 
Office of Defence within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the strategic course 
plotted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and tactical execution entrusted to the 
Defence Agency Gísladóttir claimed that “… a new chapter has been opened up 
whereby Icelanders are for the first time wholly responsible for their own security 
and defence” (“Ísland er og verður herlaust land,” 2008). 
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The establishment of the Defence Agency ended the unclear status of the Radar 
Agency within Icelandic public administration. All of its tasks and 38 employees 
were integrated into the new agency (Parliament, 2008d). The Defence Agency was 
fundamentally not the creation of something new but a way to collect defence tasks 
in Iceland under one administrative hat. Tasks that had been carried out in Iceland 
for decades by the U.S. military, either fully or partially. 
The purpose of the defence act was to rationalize the execution and responsibility 
of defence tasks in Iceland and end ambiguities or confusion about them. However, 
the National Commissioner of Police retained its pre-established links to NATO 
and continued to participate in civilian security and civil defence cooperation within 
NATO (Parliament, 2008e). In addition to continue to carry out background checks 
on personnel that required NATO security clearances, although, legal responsibility 
was transferred to the Defence Agency. 
The Defence Agency was headquartered in the ISSF building next to the CRC in 
the heart of the old base area. It acted as a conduit between the civilian and military 
world vis-à-vis visiting NATO forces by providing them with the services they 
might need. Such as cooperation with Icelandic aviation and airport authorities, fire 
services, security, housing etc. As with any new agency, there was a steep learning 
curve. Already in early May 2008 the first NATO Air Policing mission was scheduled 
to arrive in Iceland. The fact that the French air policing squadron arrived before the 
agency became fully active put extra strain on everyone involved:
They start [French NATO Air Policing] before the agency became operational which 
was rather peculiar, but it went really well and the French were very understanding. [….] 
We were so few and everything was happening at the same time. We were not connected 
to the government state accounts or any government system. I had been involved in 
preparing all that in the transition phase but it could not be activated until the agency 
become formally operational [1 June]. [….] We worked around the clock for 24 hrs. 
Some of the staff slept on mattresses because there was no time for them to go home, 
there were simply all hands-on deck. (Former senior official, the Icelandic Defence 
Agency, 2014).
But the staff also had to deal with other teething troubles. One was the question 
of how to bring the NATO crypto keys needed to maintain connectivity between 
IADS and NATINADS to Iceland:
We didn’t have any couriers, so to begin with XXX flew out every month to fetch the 
crypto keys needed to operate the systems. After a bit of a hassle XXX got a lift with 
an Icelandair cargo plane and sat with the box in her lap, couldn’t take her eyes of it. 
[….] After some time, we became acquainted with Danes [Danish Air Force] and they 
offered, free of charge, to pick up the crypto keys and drop them off in Keflavík on their 
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routine flights to Greenland. [….] There were a number of these little things that we 
were able to handle and look after. You start from scratch. You can’t just mail the crypto 
keys and you don’t have any military establishment so how are you going to do things? 
(Former senior official, the Icelandic Defence Agency, 2014).
For Icelanders this was a whole new chapter but the assumption of responsibilities 
was met with encouragement and anticipation from other NATO members:
From day one an unnamed fellow NATO member offered assistance and help which we 
accepted. They were very clear from the start that they were willing to teach, assist and 
guide us as much as we liked. We only had to let them know how much help was needed 
but they expected us to learn. ‘We will make little as no demands for the first year, some 
for the next, further demands after two, and after three years you will just have to do 
this like any other NATO member.’ [….] Expectations and requirements went together 
hand in hand. The requirements were that we would gradually become better and better 
(Former senior official, the Icelandic Defence Agency, 2011). 
In the face of a steep learning curve and teething problems the staff at the Defence 
Agency accumulated knowledge and expertise although it would prove to be short 
lived. 
On the whole the Icelandic government had proved adept in responding to the 
closure of Keflavík base. The U.S. government was still bound by the 1951 Defence 
Agreement to defend Iceland while the Icelandic government had secured itself 
periodic NATO air policing missions in Iceland. At the same time Keflavík airport, 
had been made financially self-sufficient with the creation of a state-owned enterprise 
and a similar solution was worked out for those U.S. base facilities in excess of 
Iceland’s defence needs as they were handed over to a publicly owned development 
company. 
However, unlike previous coalitions government for whom Icelandic defence 
policy had been interchangeable with managing the external relationship with the 
United States, for the new Independence Party/Social Democratic Alliance coalition 
the focal point shifted towards accommodating defence tasks within Icelandic 
public administration previously carried out by the defence force. That work had 
already begun by the previous coalition i.e. setting up a permanent administrative 
framework for Keflavík airport and the old base area, but also through improving 
coordination among government ministries, revising civil defence legislation and by 
strengthening the Coast Guard.
Throughout the decades the existence of Keflavík base had created a special 
status for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs within Icelandic public administration, a 
position that was set to cause friction between ministries and their political masters 
after the closure of Keflavík base. Shortly after the arrival of the defence force in 
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1951 Parliament had designated the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as a point of 
contact for the defence force in all of its relations with Icelandic authorities and 
as such was responsible for administering Icelandic government functions within 
Keflavík airport and the base itself (Parliament, 2008f ). In that capacity the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs held a wide-ranging portfolio (Parliament, 2006b) such 
as: law enforcement, judicial affairs, customs, post and telecommunication and civil 
aviation. 
Of course, with the defence force gone the rational for the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to embody all government functions within the airport and the base area had 
evaporated and while the Ministry for Foreign Affairs retained responsibility for the 
newly designated security area within the heart of the old base area other government 
ministries took over the daily function of Keflavík airport. Responsibility for Keflavík 
airport aviation authority was transferred from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to 
the Ministry for Transportation (Parliament, 2006d), the Keflavík airport Police 
District Commissioner was transferred to the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical 
Affairs (The Icelandic National Audit Office, 2008) while customs administration 
became the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. 
As the Ministry for Foreign Affairs saw its portfolio wane with the departure of 
the defence force other government ministries were gaining new responsibilities and 
funding. Among them the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs. Without a 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs was the closest 
thing Icelanders had to such an establishment. Its security portfolio included: law 
enforcement; Coast Guard; and civil protection (Parliament, 2006e). Therefore, it 
was not surprising that Foreign Minister Gísladóttir, and Justice and Ecclesiastical 
Minister Björn Bjarnason (Independence Party) held separate views about what 
future defence administrative arrangements best suited Iceland.
Aware of the link between the defence force and Search and Rescue capabilities 
in Iceland the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs had started the process of 
improving civil defence coordination and centralisation throughout Iceland before 
the closure of Keflavík base. Revision of the civil defence legislation had already 
begun in early March 2005 and the urgency of completing its revision made its way 
into a 2006 government statement issued to address the tasks at hand following the 
closure of Keflavík base:
To enhance public security, the revision of the Civil Defence Act must include the 
creation of a centre that connects together all those associated with internal security. 
Whether the threat comes from natural disasters or is man-made [….] [its] daily 
operation shall be the responsibility of the Ministry for Justice, and he will introduce a 
new bill in Parliament on Civil Defence and Protection (Office of the Prime Minister, 
2006).
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In October 2007, Bjarnason introduced in Parliament a civil defence bill that 
included provisions for the creation of a centralised search and rescue monitoring 
centre situated in Skógarhlíð in Reykjavík (Parliament, 2007b) and an emergency 
backup centre located at Akureyri in northern Iceland. While the Ministry of Justice 
and Ecclesiastical Affairs was centralising and strengthening its response to natural 
and man-made disasters it could be argued that the creation of a separate legal 
framework around a defence agency might in fact reduce civil protection efficiency 
and centralisation. 
This concern was indeed articulated by Bjarnason in a speech given to the security 
and defence forum Varðberg in spring of 2007 (Bjarnason, 2007). Acknowledging 
that the 1951 Defence Agreement remained the cornerstone of Iceland’s defence 
policy Bjarnason argued that the most pressing concern for Iceland’s security 
had more to do with internal factors such as organized crime terrorism etc. than 
external state centric security threats. In turn, this change was reflected in how 
the security relationship between Iceland and the United States had evolved from 
national defence to homeland security. A fact clearly evidenced in the October 2006 
agreement between Iceland and the United States in which the two sides decided 
to strengthen collaboration between Icelandic and U.S. law enforcement agencies 
such as Coast Guard; police, customs and immigration authorities. All of which fell 
within the purview of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
In line with his thought on the growing importance of internal security institutions 
Bjarnason rejected the need for a separate government agency tasked with operating 
IADS:
I believe that the monitoring of these signals [IADS radar signals] should, on the one 
hand, be the responsibility of air traffic controllers, and on the other hand that of the 
staff of the search and rescue monitoring centre in Skógarhlíð, in addition to which 
they should be fed into the NATO monitoring system. It is completely unnecessary 
to maintain a special monitoring centre to handle the signals gathered with the Radar 
Agency equipment (Bjarnason, 2007a).
In December that year a Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs report 
reiterated Bjarnason’s concerns that a separate government agency, created around 
the function of IADS would be a deviation from ongoing coordination of security 
actors (Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, 2007, p. 10). A step that should 
only be taken after careful consideration. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice and 
Ecclesiastical Affairs was of the opinion that the Coast Guard should have a direct 
line of communication with NATO Maritime Command in Northwood, United 
Kingdom and access to the NATO BICES-information system.
Clearly, what was at stake was what role the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical 
Affairs would have in filling the defence vacuum after the closure of Keflavík base. 
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Through the strengthening of its civil defence mechanism, the expansion of its 
cooperative ties with security agencies in neighbouring countries and arguing in 
favour of gaining control of IADS the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs 
was asserting itself as the leading ministry in matters of security and defence. This 
assertiveness manifested itself through the activity of the Coast Guard that had 
traditionally enjoyed close cooperation with its sister organizations in countries 
bordering the North Atlantic. Now this cooperation deepened. The October 2006 
agreement between Iceland and the United States for enhanced security cooperation; 
the 2007 security and defence framework agreement with Norway; and the joint 
Icelandic-Danish declaration on increased cooperation in the fields of security were 
outreach initiatives that called for active involvement of the Ministry of Justice and 
Ecclesiastical Affairs (Parliament, 2007a) since much of the practical co-operation, 
would be handled by the Coast Guard. 
By late 2007 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and 
Ecclesiastical Affairs were presenting competing viewpoints on what ministry 
should take the lead in becoming the primary ministry in matters of security and 
defence and it would be up to the leaders of the coalition to find a solution: 
The political weight was such… the chairman of the Social Democratic Alliance was the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and if the leader of a coalition partner takes something to 
heart then there is not much you can do [….] if the Prime Minister and the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who are also leaders of the coalition partners, decide on this course 
of action then that has to be accepted (Independence Party, former member of cabinet, 
2014b).
When in January 2008 Foreign Minister Gísaldóttir introduced the defence 
act bill in Parliament the two ministries had reached an amicable understanding. 
Foreign Minister Gísaldóttir affirmed that defence would remain a portfolio 
within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In a speech to Parliament Gísladóttir drew 
a line between the responsibilities of her ministry and the Ministry of Justice and 
Ecclesiastical Affairs as a division between external and internal security whereas the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs shouldered responsibility for defence tasks: 
In our part of the world it is universally accepted that those government bodies 
responsible for law enforcement, and matters of the interior, are not assigned tasks that 
have to do with safeguarding the external security of the state [….] This bill erects a legal 
firewall between those two government functions, i.e. defence tasks on the one hand 
and law enforcement and civil protection on the other hand (Parliament, 2008b).
During the ensuing Parliamentary debates Bjarnason concurred with the major 
points raised by Gísaldóttir (Parliament, 2008b). The bill excluded civilian security 
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agencies such as law enforcement and civil protection while encompassing the 
governance of defence tasks on Icelandic territory, defence cooperation with other 
states and defence organizations i.e. NATO. While excluding civilian security 
agencies Bjarnason rejected any interpretation that the bill would affect contacts 
Icelandic law enforcement agencies had already established with foreign partners.
But was it possible to maintain such a clean-cut division between external 
and internal security? After all, the Coast Guard was in close cooperation with 
naval establishments in neighbouring countries and the Ministry of Justice and 
Ecclesiastical Affairs had reached the conclusion that the Coast Guard would 
benefit by having access to NATO information systems and connections to NATO 
Maritime Command. Eventually, the defence act bill became law and the Defence 
Agency became operational in the spring of 2008. However, the seeds for further 
changes had been planted although that would have to wait until a change of 
government had taken place.
6.3. The Icelandic defence framework 2009-2013
The future of the Defence Agency seemed secure but few months after its creation 
a calamity struck the Icelandic economy. Caught up in the international financial 
maelstrom, the three major commercial banks in Iceland, Glitnir, Kaupthing 
and Landsbanki were unable to re-finance themselves and went into default in 
late September and early October 2008. With a plummeting currency, rising 
unemployment and skyrocketing public debt the collapse threatened to drag the 
Icelandic economy down with it. The political repercussions were equally dramatic. 
In late January 2009, the coalition government was brought down in the aftermath of 
the financial collapse. The Independence Party was out of government, Gísaldóttir, left 
politics and the Social Democratic Alliance, led by Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, formed 
a minority government with the Left Green Movement. The Social Democratic 
Alliance/Left Green Movement coalition was an interim government until elections 
could be held in May that year and as a sign of the times the new government did 
not hold a majority in Parliament – unusual in Icelandic political history. Instead, 
the government was protected from a vote of no confidence by the Progressive Party. 
Following Parliament election the Social Democrats and the Left Greens 
renewed their coalition but this time with a clear majority mandate in Parliament. 
Understandably, most of the government manifesto (Office of the Prime Minister, 
2009) was devoted to proposals intended to tackle Iceland’s economic woes and 
balance the government budget. Still, in matters of defence the new government 
emphasised the need for an Icelandic defence policy founded on a broadly defined 
security concept, therefore, the need for the Defence Agency and NATO air policing 
missions in Iceland would have to be re-evaluated.
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But how much of that decision could be attributed to rational calculation of 
savings and costs as the new government was frantically seeking ways to balance 
the post-collapse government budget or the result of political bargaining between 
the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left Green Movement? As the ideological 
successor to the People’s Alliance the Left Green Movement was adamantly opposed 
to the defence relationship with the United States and Icelandic membership in 
NATO. The first Left Green Movement manifesto following their 1999 national 
convention did not devote discussion on an Icelandic defence policy or the defence 
relationship with the United States (Left Green Movement, 1999). The party was 
still reforming after the break-up of the People’s Alliance but by 2001 the Left Green 
Movement national convention made de-militarization of Iceland its formal policy 
(Left Green Movement, 2001) and called for immediate negotiations between the 
Icelandic and U.S. government for the removal of the defence force and for Iceland 
to leave NATO. 
For the Left Green Movement the eventual closure of Keflavík base was a stepping 
stone towards a pacifist Icelandic foreign policy that would see Iceland outside of 
military alliances. Therefore, it was not surprising that during the defence act bill 
discussions in Parliament in 2008 the Left Green Movement passionately opposed 
the creation of an Icelandic defence agency (Parliament, 2008b). Their criticism was 
levied at Gísaldóttir for introducing a bill that would tie Iceland into the military 
component of NATO while opening the country up for free access of NATO forces. 
Iceland should stay outside of military alliances as the country was in no need of 
military forces and the costs associated with funding a defence agency would be of 
better use if it was allocated to law enforcement agencies. 
It would be up to the chairman of the Left Green Movement, Steingrímur 
J. Sigfússon, to summarise his, and his fellow Left Green Movement member’s 
opposition to the defence act bill (Parliament, 2008h). During Parliamentary 
discussions, Sigfússon briefly outlined the geopolitical changes since the end of the 
Cold War before criticising Gísaldóttir for introducing the bill without previously 
establishing a bi-partisan consultation process and conduct a thorough risk 
assessment to define Iceland’s defence needs. On a political note, Sigfússon criticised 
the bill for pushing Iceland into military functions of NATO of which it had never 
participated, thus changing Iceland’s status as a passive member of NATO. While 
further adding his concern that the allocated budget to defence would in coming 
year’s balloon out of control. 
Left Green Movement hostility to the defence act and the creation of the Defence 
Agency was thus well established. In Parliament the Left Green Movement was isolated 
in its opposition as they were the only members of Parliament who voted against the 
bill. Therefore, when coalition negotiations began in January 2009 between the Social 
Democratic Alliance and the Left Green Movement it was to be expected that the 
2008 defence act and the Defence Agency would be a topic for discussion. 
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Coalition governments are based on compromises and the May 2009 government 
manifesto of the Social Democratic Alliance/Left Green Movement coalition 
bore witness to the fact that both sides had to give way on issues in which they 
had previously invested political capital. Before the 2008 financial crash the 
Social Democratic Alliance had been a champion for Icelandic European Union 
(EU) membership and after the crash its leadership began to view an Icelandic 
membership of the EU as way out of the economic morass ( Jóhannesson, 2009, p. 
306). Therefore, the Left Green Movement had to give way on their opposition to 
Icelandic application to the EU and accept the Social Democratic Alliance position 
that Iceland should begin accession negotiations as soon as possible (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 2009). Reciprocally, the Social Democratic Alliance agreed to revise 
the function of the Defence Agency and NATO Air Policing missions in Iceland. 
But why make it a government policy to reassess the function of a government 
agency less than a year after it was established? The most obvious reason was 
a desperate need to balance the government books. Secondly, in March 2009 
an interdisciplinary security and defence commission (appointed in 2007 by 
Foreign Minister Gísladóttir) delivered the first ever risk assessment for Iceland. 
The commission concluded that risks stemming from other sources such as 
environmental disasters, financial instability, organized crime etc. overshadowed 
military threats, and in terms of severity and likelihood were not a pressing concern 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009). Consequently, reducing costs within the most 
recent category of government expenditure: defence seemed a palatable option.
The phrasing revise, however, did not do justice to the actual negotiations between 
the two parties regarding the fate of the Defence Agency and revision of the defence 
act. For the Left Green Movement that only a year before had opposed the defence 
act on the basis that it entrenched Iceland within the military components of NATO 
nothing less than its abolition was on the table for the Social Democratic Alliance 
to accept: 
It was a clear demand by us the Left Greens to abolish the agency and we had our way 
of course [….] we felt that most of its functions was unnecessary and that it should be 
shut down. Regarding the radar sites and receiving the signals we felt that others could 
do it and we looked immediately to the Coast Guard (Left Green Movement, former 
member of cabinet, 2015).
Although the demand was not to eliminate all of its tasks, the Left Green 
Movement perceived the Defence Agency as a quasi-military institution that needed 
to be put down and its functions relocated to more acceptable organizations:
The Defence Agency was defined on a purely military basis and around those people 
[Staff of the Defence Agency] everything evolved around a military threat, NATO, 
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and military cooperation. We wanted to push that aside and relocate those functions 
that remained into agencies that were defined as being civilian (Left Green Movement, 
former member of cabinet, 2015).
For the Social Democratic Alliance shutting down the Defence Agency had 
been one of the compromises needed for the Social Democratic Alliance/Left 
Green Movement coalition to take off, but why did the Social Democratic Alliance 
so readily accept the demand? One reason was an electoral pressure on the Social 
Democratic Alliance and the Left Green Movement to form a government. Prior to 
the elections, the Social Democratic Alliance and Left Green Movement leaders had 
signalled that they were willing to continue the coalition after the election (“Áhugi 
á lengra samstarfi,” 2009). Following the elections, the Social Democratic Alliance 
and the Left Green Movement gained the combined majority of the electoral votes 
and a clear mandate to form a government. While the Social Democratic Alliance 
increased its share of the vote from 26.8% to 29.8%, the Left Green Movement 
grew from 14.3% to 21.7%, their best result in any parliamentary election to 
date (“Þingmeirihluti fyrir aðildarumsókn að ESB,” 2009). At the same time, the 
electorate mercilessly punished the Independence Party which lost a third of its 
electoral support, shrinking from 36.6% to 23.7%.
Another reason for the abrupt U-turn was a change of leadership within the Social 
Democratic Alliance. The Defence Act and the creation of the Defence Agency 
had been carried out under former Social Democratic Alliance leader, Ingibjörg 
Sólrún Gísladóttir. However, in September 2008, Gísladóttir was diagnosed with 
a brain tumour and was still undergoing treatment in January 2009 when she took 
the decision to relinquish the leadership role of the Social Democratic Alliance and 
retire from politics. When negotiations took place between the two parties about 
a future Social Democratic Alliance/Left Green Movement coalition, Gísladóttir 
had already left the political scene and the party reins passed on to her successor. 
Eventually it would become the responsibility of Gísladóttir’s Social Democratic 
Alliance replacement at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Össur Skarphéðinsson, 
to revise the defence act and abolish the Defence Agency. Skarphéðinsson had 
previously served as chairman of the Social Democratic Alliance from 2000 until 
being unseated in 2005 by Gísladóttir who ran against and defeated Skarphéðinsson 
in a bid for the party leadership. Clearly, her successor at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs had not invested the same amount of political capital in the Defence Agency 
and not as attached to its survival. 
Already in early February 2009, Foreign Minister Össur Skarphéðinsson had 
hinted that savings might not be restricted to reducing funds allocated to the Defence 
Agency, but might include abolishing it altogether (“Sparnaður til athugunar,” 2009). 
Later that month, the Chairman of the Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, the 
Left Green Árni Þór Sigurðsson, (“Varnarmálastofnun kannski lögð niður,” 2009) 
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went even further by stating that the agency would be shut down and its functions 
relocated within pre-existing civilian institutions, such as the Coast Guard and civil 
aviation authorities. 
Apparently, the post-financial collapse government had already reached a 
decision about the future of the Defence Agency. With a full mandate following 
the 2009 spring elections, the renewed Social Democratic Alliance/Left Green 
coalition set about implementing its policy. The closure was to be combined with a 
far-reaching restructuring of public administration that would include a reduction 
of government ministries from twelve to nine. Eventually, on 4 December 2009 the 
government formally agreed to abolish the Defence Agency and transfer its tasks 
to institutions within a restructured Ministry of the Interior. After the government 
had reached its decision, in early December 2009, a working group was established 
headed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Its mandate was to evaluate how best to 
integrate defence tasks with other government agencies. 
The group handed in its proposals in early March 2010. Its conclusions were that 
the tasks of the Defence Agency alongside the Coast Guard and the Maritime Traffic 
Authority should be relocated within a new agency subordinate to the Ministry of 
the Interior. Regarding Icelandic representation within NATO the working group 
suggested a division of labour between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the soon 
to be Ministry of the Interior: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would continue to 
handle NATO’s political aspects, such as representing Iceland in the NAC while 
the Ministry of the Interior would be responsible for the military aspect of NATO 
cooperation. Thus, when the transition would be complete, the Ministry of the 
Interior would assume the de facto role as Iceland’s Ministry for Defence from the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Indeed, there was clear added value for the Coast Guard and the National 
Commissioner of Police to take those tasks over (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2010, pp. 17-18). The Coast Guard would improve its situational awareness in the 
North Atlantic by being able to disseminate the Recognised Air and Sea Picture 
produced by IADS and the National Commissioner of Police would improve its risk 
assessments and analysis for general national security purposes by gaining access to 
NATO information systems. 
During the interim period the working group suggested that (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 2010, p. 24) the Coast Guard should assume responsibility for: (1) IADS, air 
surveillance, and implementing air policing missions; (2) organising and managing 
defence exercises; (3) implementing Host Nation Support; (4) participation in 
relevant NATO committees and agencies; and (5) responsibility for implementing 
the 1951 Defence Agreement. The National Commissioner of Police was to be 
allotted the tasks of (1) National Security Authority; (2) running security clearances 
on required personnel, security grade classified information and (3) participate in 
relevant NATO committees and agencies. Additionally, both government bodies 
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were expected to process and disseminate information from NATO information 
systems.
But what view did the two agencies tasked to shoulder these additional responsibilities 
have towards the proposed change? In its assessment given to Parliament, the Coast 
Guard argued (Parliament, 2010f ) that the creation of the Defence Agency had in fact 
hampered their cooperation with military authorities in neighbouring allied countries 
(the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Danish Navy in the seas around Iceland) since 
the Defence Agency had insisted on being the only intermediary between government 
agencies in Iceland and foreign military bodies. Consequently, following the closure 
of the Defence Agency that relationship should return to what it had been before. In 
addition, the Coast Guard agreed that its information about maritime traffic in the 
seas around Iceland would improve by taking over IADS. 
From its vantage point, the National Commissioner of Police raised no 
objections to assume the role of National Security Authority. However, the National 
Commissioner of Police did argue these two agencies dealt with different aspects of 
security that constitute a necessary separation between military functions on the one 
hand and law enforcement and internal security on the other (Parliament, 2010b). 
Therefore, the suggested abolishment of The Defence Agency raised concerns about 
“A fundamental misunderstanding about what defence issues is natural to integrate 
with civilian tasks such as civil defence and internal security”. Clearly, the National 
Commissioner of Police had some reservations about the government’s decision to 
close down the Defence Agency and amalgamate its functions with pre-existent 
civilian agencies. 
In early December 2010, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the 
Interior acquiesced to the recommendations of the working group and transferred 
the bulk of the defence tasks to the Coast Guard and the National Security Authority 
role to the National Commissioner of Police. The agreement between the two 
ministers was intended as a short-term arrangement until a formal decision could 
be reached about future division of responsibilities between the two ministries. Of 
course, the conditions for such a merger rested on the assumption that Parliament 
would set a new legal framework replacing the Defence Act of 2008 (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 2010, pp. 22-23) and during the transition period the reallocation 
of defence tasks would be coordinated with the establishment of the new Ministry 
of the Interior and its new anticipated security and defence agency. 
On 30 March 2010, Foreign Minister Skarphéðinsson introduced in Parliament 
amendments to the 2008 Defence Act abolishing the Defence Agency effective 
from 1 January 2011 (Parliament, 2010e). As soon as the changes were ratified by 
Parliament the Foreign Minister appointed a transition group responsible for the 
daily management of the Defence Agency until its closure. As an interim step the 
amendments included a clause making it lawful for the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to outsource tasks that by law were its responsibility to another Ministry.
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Despite these changes, Skarphéðinsson emphasised that they would not affect 
Iceland’s defence commitments, that is to say the implementation of defence tasks 
handled by the Defence Agency. The planned restructuring was, however, raising 
some concerns among fellow NATO allies. In early December 2010 Fréttablaðið 
reported that U.S. authorities were fighting against the closure of the Defence 
Agency and that the U.S. ambassador in Reykjavík, Carol Van Voorst, was putting 
pressure on Skarphéðinsson not to do so (“Bandaríkin börðust gegn lokun 
Varnarmálastofnunar,” 2010). Although the report – based on leaked embassy cables 
– may have exaggerated the extent of U.S. opposition it was clear that Ambassador 
Voorst had genuine concerns about the effect the financial crisis would have on 
Icelandic defence related expenditure. 
In November 2008 Voorst had expressed concerns to the State Department that 
huge public debt and fiscal restraints were making cuts in the Icelandic defence 
budget a “… tempting target for parliament not accustomed to having to fund 
defense” (Wikileaks, 2009a). During the February 2009 meeting, referred to by 
Fréttablaðið, Skarphéðinsson informed Voorst that his government was under 
financial strain, and that he was looking at integrating some of Defence Agency tasks 
with the Icelandic Coast Guard. Gauging for the U.S. position towards the change 
Skarphéðinsson inquired whether it mattered if those tasks would be carried out by 
some other government agency. To which Voorst replied that the security structure 
set in place following the 2006 Defence Force departure was “… a flexible, relatively 
cheap instrument that has served Iceland and its allies well”. Adding further that: 
Iceland and the IDA [Defence Agency] have developed an excellent reputation 
with NATO militaries that have deployed here. It is important to maintain those 
relationships and the rhythm of exercises and deployments in order to keep standards 
of proficiency and facilities maintenance high (Wikileaks, 2009b)
In her concluding remarks to the State Department, Voorst expressed her concern 
that: 
Skarphedinsson has no built-in loyalty to the IDA [Defence Agency], and though sold 
on the importance of NATO, he has at times been a reluctant advocate of the idea that 
Iceland should fund its own defense. The lure of being able to cut nearly 10 percent 
from the MFA’s budget may simply be too much for the mercurial Skarphedinsson to 
resist (Wikileaks, 2009b).
But the U.S. ambassador was not the only one having reservations about the merit 
of closing down the Defence Agency. In Parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
was divided in its opinion towards the proposed transfer of defence tasks from 
the Defence Agency. The majority was in favour of the transfer and the goal of 
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reorganising the Coast Guard and the National Commissioner of Police in a new 
agency within the planned Ministry of the Interior (Parliament, 2010a). 
Unified in its opposition to the plan, the minority of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee split in two and handed in separate opinions. The first minority 
(Parliament, 2010b) questioned the utility of closing down the Defence Agency and 
parcelling out administrative responsibility for its tasks given that those tasks would 
continue to be carried out within the old base area and by the same staff as before. 
The decision was also criticised on the grounds that one of the main arguments for 
the establishment of the Defence Agency had been to ensure separation between the 
implementation of tasks whose very nature were fundamentally different: defence 
tasks intended to provide security against external state threats and internal security 
carried out by civilian security agencies. The objectives of the amendments were 
also criticised for being too vague and the first minority noted that they gave the 
Foreign Minister the authority to move defence and security related tasks to other 
agencies without explaining the expected benefits of change. Good administrative 
practices, they argued, called for making adaptations to the Defence Act after the 
proposed Ministry of the Interior had been established, instead of placing Iceland’s 
security and defence matters in a status of uncertainty. The statement of the second 
minority (Parliament, 2010c) went even further and criticised the government for 
being politically motivated in shutting down the Defence Agency and for closing it 
down without a long-term strategy in sight.
The decision to transfer defence tasks from the Defence Agency to the Ministry 
of the Interior in January 2011 brought an end to a clear separation between civilian 
and military security agencies as championed by Gísaldóttir in the autumn of 2007, 
but the change resonated well with Bjarnason’s arguments for a closer synergy 
between the Coast Guard and defence tasks carried out by the Defence Agency. 
However, the idea to create a new defence agency within the soon to be created 
Ministry of the Interior was not supported by the soon to be Left Green Minister 
of the Interior Ögmundur Jónasson. In September 2010 Jónasson was quoted in a 
newspaper interview as saying that “There has never been an intention to create a 
new government agency. Instead we are closing down an agency and those tasks that 
will be continued will be assigned appropriately (“Hefur ekki lofað að vera þægur,” 
2010).”
By early December 2010 a dispute echoing the previous tug of war between 
Gísladóttir and Bjarnason was in full swing. Behind the scenes the new Foreign 
Minister Skarphéðinsson and the new Minister of the Interior Jónasson argued 
whose ministry should be in charge of the orphaned tasks of the soon to be defunct 
Defence Agency. What was at stake was different interpretation of whether closing 
down the Defence Agency translated into scrapping the defence tasks or relocate 
them. The Left Green Movement was of the former opinion while the Social 
Democratic Alliance was of the latter: 
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We wanted, the Left Green Movement wanted to shut down the Defence Agency. The 
Social Democratic Alliance was in agreement, and then the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
introduced a bill to that effect, but all of its tasks would remain more or less intact [….] 
now the lines had become rather unclear, but our position [Left Greens] was always 
clear [….] There were different visions. They [Social Democratic Alliance] wanted to 
maintain a lot of Defence Agency tasks associated with cooperation within NATO. We 
were against that and wanted to restrict ourselves to civilian tasks, those tasks associated 
with the military alliance [NATO] we wanted out (Left Green Movement, former 
member of cabinet, 2016).
For the Left Green Movement, the main issue was not the structure itself, but 
the defence tasks carried out within that structure i.e. air surveillance, NATO air 
policing etc. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Alliance and Foreign Minister 
Skarphéðinsson wished to continue to operate those defence tasks the Defence 
Agency had performed. The outcome was a mid-December, temporary agreement 
between the two ministers that followed the original plan and transferred the day 
to day operation of the bulk of defence tasks to the Coast Guard and the National 
Commissioner of Police but their legal responsibility remained with the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. Neither Skarphéðinsson nor Jónasson were willing to relent and 
the result was an administrative limbo between two ministers with vastly different 
views on what Iceland’s defence policy should be.
Because of this peculiar situation, sooner or later, there was bound to be a head 
on collision between Jónasson and Skarphéðinsson. In the spring of 2012, as a part 
of a government fiscal restraint programme, the Ministry of Finance requested 
government ministers for reduction in their budgets. For the Ministry of the Interior 
the request was a budget cut of 528 million ISK. Jónasson’s proposed cutbacks 
centred on scrapping NATO air policing missions in Iceland and shut down the 
radar screens and the command centre of IADS. For Skarphéðinsson this amounted 
to a backdoor attempt by Jónasson to drag Iceland out of NATO. During a cabinet 
meeting on 15 June 2012 the two ministers came to blows with Skarphéðinsson 
refusing to accept the proposed cut:
I did not respond quietly, told him [ Jónasson] that his proposals were irresponsible, 
a breach of the coalition manifesto and they showed that he was not to be trusted for 
this facet of defence. I concluded by saying that a right course of action would be if all 
affairs relating to the defence of Iceland should be removed from the Ministry of the 
Interior and returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and those handling defence 
made employees of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Skarphéðinsson, 2013, p. 194).
Despite predictable opposition by the Left Green Movement to defence tasks 
Skarphéðinsson suspected that there was more behind Jónasson’s bid than met the 
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eye. After all, he stood little change of getting his proposal through cabinet – let 
alone Parliament. However, the proposal exerted pressure on the Finance Minister 
whose constituency stood to lose jobs if IADS would be shut down and by putting 
pressure on the Finance Minister, the argument went, Jónasson would reduce 
pressure for cuts at his own ministry. 
Apart from disagreeing with Jónasson on political grounds there were also 
arguments pertaining to international obligations towards other NATO members 
that Skarphéðinsson levied against the proposal (Skarphéðinsson, 2013, p. 219). 
After all, shutting down IADS and cancelling NATO air policing missions in 
Iceland would be a dramatic reversal of Icelandic foreign policy that would have to 
be discussed in the Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee. Jónasson backed down 
and a few days after presenting his first proposal he returned with a watered-down 
version. Instead of shutting the entire system down he now proposed to turn off 
two out of four radar screens while keeping IADS operational. The fundamental 
arguments raised by Skarphéðinsson remained the same and with the Prime Minister 
and other Social Democratic Alliance ministers siding with Skarphéðinsson (Left 
Green Movement, former member of cabinet, 2016) Jónasson’s proposal stood no 
change of passing through cabinet.
Despite Skarphéðinsson’s speculation that the proposal was a ploy by Jónasson to 
draw demands for budget cuts away from his own ministry Jónasson had been true 
to his party policy and ideals. The Left Green Movement had no desire to continue 
air policing missions and operate IADS since those functions served purely defence 
purposes. Moreover, the proposal was fully in line with a parliamentary resolution 
presented by the Left Green Movement that previous year calling for a national 
referendum on Icelandic membership in NATO (Parliament, 2011). The resolution 
never made its way through parliamentary procedures to be voted on by members of 
Parliament, but clearly the Left Green Movement held dear its opposition to NATO. 
The result was that the two ministers were never able to work out their differences 
and settle the defence tasks permanently within the Ministry of the Interior, or 
revert them back under control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The coalition had been precarious from the start and the two parties differed on 
other issues apart from defence. Domestic politics were to a large extend framed 
within the seismic aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis that drove the government 
agenda, but Iceland’s defence policy and its implementation were not the only 
foreign policy issue that created difficulty for the Social Democratic/Left Green 
Movement coalition. Less than a year away from parliamentary election in 2013 
the relationship between the two parties had become strained. The Left Green 
Movement experienced mutiny among some of its members in Parliament as 
dissenters argued that the party leadership had sold out its principled opposition 
to Icelandic EU membership by supporting accession talks with the union 
(Torfason, 2016, pp. 171-179). Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Alliance was not 
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without its own dissenters who argued that in pacifying its Left Green Movement 
coalition partner its leadership had moved to far to the left and away from its social 
democratic roots. As a result, the indecision and paralysis that characterised the 
permanent location of defence tasks within a permanent administrative framework 
was perfectly understandable. The decision to close the Defence Agency had been 
politically driven fuelled by the Left Green Movement ideological opposition to 
Iceland’s defence policy. But although the Social Democratic Alliance was willing 
to acquiesce to Left Green Movement demands to alter the administrative form of 
Iceland’s defence tasks the Social Democratic Alliance remained firm in its decision 
to retain their substance. 
One of the stated purposes of the closure of the Defence Agency and the relocation 
of its tasks had been to reduce costs and in December 2010 Skarphéðinsson had 
declared in Parliament that the intended closure would save the government 500 
million ISK (Parliament, 2010d). A substantial amount given that the Defence 
Agency had been allocated 1.2 billion ISK in the 2009 government budget 
(Parliament, 2008g, p. 58). 
Figure 2 Distribution of government cost for defence tasks in million ISK 2008-2013 (Icelandic 
Audit Office, 2013, p. 13).
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of government costs for defence related tasks 
between 2008 and 2012. The graph does not depict total amount accredited in the 
government budgets for the year 2009 and onward but total expenditures. This is 
because according to article 16 of the 2008 Defence Act the Defence Agency was 
authorised to lease out NATO infrastructure and equipment to offset maintenance 
costs provided that all security requirements were met (Parliament, 2008c). This 
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arrangement was continued by the Coast Guard (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 
2013). Therefore, revenue must be offset against expenditure to gauge the real costs 
incurred. Given this factor, Skarphéðinsson may have been a bit too sanguine in 
stating the savings made. Government costs (expenditures minus revenues) fell from 
1,094 million ISK in 2009 to 936 million ISK in 2010, a saving of 158 million ISK. 
After the Defence Agency had been broken up total costs fell further in 2011 to 870 
million ISK and 868 million ISK in 2012. Thus, in nominal value, the government 
was able to save 8% of the total incurred costs by its decision to close down the 
agency (Icelandic Audit Office, 2013, p. 14); by adjusting to inflation between 2010 
and 2012, the savings rise to 15.7%. 
Despite savings made, there was still unfinished business to attend to. The 
December 2010 agreement between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of the Interior was only supposed to be valid until 15 March 2011 by which 
time the two ministries should have worked out a final arrangement (Icelandic 
Audit Office, 2013, p.25). However, the supposedly interim division of political and 
functional responsibility between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of the Interior became set in place and was not resolved for the following three years 
the government remained in office.
A 2012 government rearrangement of the Icelandic ministries reaffirmed the 
responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for:
Defence, membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the defence 
agreement between Iceland and the United States, communication and cooperation 
with foreign countries, military authorities and international organizations in the field 
of security and defence, defence areas, the safety area within Keflavík airport and other 
safety areas, including management of facilities and property of NATO in Iceland, 
including the Icelandic radar and air defence system (IADS) (Parliament, 2012). 
Instead of relieving the supremacy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in matters 
of defence it had instead been entrenched. So where did this leave the people and 
tasks situated within agencies that answered to the Ministry of the Interior but by 
law were the responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs? 
The administrative limbo affected the National Commissioner of Police and the 
Coast Guard differently. For the National Commissioner of Police, the uncertainty 
did not impair its ability to carry out the role of National Security Authority. 
Performing background checks and issuing NATO security clearances was a well 
understood task by its staff, although, the role included added responsibilities 
compared to the pre-2006 era. Certain key buildings within the Security Area, the 
CRC and the ISSF, fell under NATO security classification and consequently the 
National Commissioner of Police was required to certify that the Coast Guard was 
complying with correct standards and procedures in handling classified NATO 
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information and equipment (Senior official National Commissioner of Police, 
2014). While the National Commissioner of Police had become the national quality 
controller for correct handling of classified information, the NATO Office of 
Security maintained external quality control during regular visits carried out during 
on-site inspections and by reviewing the National Security Authority competences 
of the National Commissioner of Police. In October 2012 the government adopted 
NATO security standard C-M(2002)49 into Icelandic legislation (Government 
Gazette, 2012) making the National Security role transparent and framed within an 
Icelandic legal framework. 
For the Coast Guard, the added value in incorporating IADS was that the Coast 
Guard was able to connect to NATO’s Allied Maritime Command in Northwood in 
the U.K. thereby gaining access to information about traffic on the seas not visible in 
other systems, i.e. allied submarines and warships, as well as non-allied naval vessels 
detected through NATO surveillance (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2013). 
Equally, the Coast Guard was able to report the movements of its own ships and 
aircraft into NATO systems. With real-time situational awareness in the seas around 
Iceland the Coast Guard was in the position to request assistance from nearby allied 
vessels in case of civilian accidents occurring at sea. 
However, the tasks embedded within the Coast Guard were meeting complicated 
administrative entanglements. As the deadlock continued between the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior responsibility for NATO tasks 
remained fragmented. A situation that had been anticipated but only expected 
to last for a brief interim period. As a result, those responsible for implementing 
defence tasks within the Coast Guard were left serving two different ministries:
We are in a sense like a contractor […] The Defence Department [within the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs] is the Chief of Defence, head of defence in Iceland. The 
Defence Department runs the Icelandic Permanent representation at NATO and our 
representation in SHAPE. This year [2013] we [Government of Iceland] began to man 
the NATO Infrastructure Programme […] and we have been sending in applications 
worth millions of dollars [for upgrading facilities and IADS] and someone needs to 
lobby for them and follow them through. If the Ministry of Interior wishes to take over 
the entire package then they must be prepared to man the permanent representation 
in Brussels as well as represent us in SHAPE (Commander Keflavík Air Base, 2013). 
This tangled situation was also echoed by those within the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs:
We [Ministry for Foreign Affairs] are responsible and the Coast Guard is executing in 
our name, but we don’t have any money. The funding which should have been here [in 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs] was scattered, but work is underway to try to get it 
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back. That means we will have much better control on things, but we are never secure 
that the funding intended for defence and air policing is used for that purpose while it is 
not in our hands. […] This has to be looked after, but we never go through the Ministry 
of Interior, we simply contact the Coast Guard directly. We are in direct contact with 
the director [Icelandic Coast Guard] and those on operational levels performing the 
tasks. […] In effect, we come in as a second ministry for the Icelandic Coast Guard. A 
very peculiar arrangement, but it works as long as the relationship with the Ministry of 
Interior is amicable (Senior official, Ministry for foreign Affairs, 2013).
Of course, this stalemate was not what the working group had in mind when 
it recommended integrating defence tasks of the Defence Agency with the Coast 
Guard and the National Commissioner of Police. 
This obtuse legal environment caught the attention of the Icelandic Audit 
Office. In May 2013 it published a report questioning why the formal transfer of 
defence tasks had not been completed. According to the report, the closure of the 
Defence Agency and relocation of its tasks to the Coast Guard and the National 
Commissioner of Police had contributed to greater efficiency and savings, which 
after all was the stated goal. However, the uncertainty prevented the Coast Guard 
from long term planning with regard to maintenance of equipment and facilities 
(Icelandic Audit Office, 2013, p 4) and the two ministries still disagreed about what 
ministry should have primacy in matters of defence. The entanglement was further 
compounded by the fact that funding from the government budget for defence tasks 
were allocated directly to the Icelandic Coast Guard and National Commissioner 
of Police leaving supervision and control with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
creating “unclear responsibilities and authority that prevented efficient and effective 
implementation and systematic monitoring of the tasks at hand” (Icelandic Audit 
Office, 2013, p. 24). 
The two ministries gave conflicting assessments to the National Audit Office 
about the root cause of the problem. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs claimed that 
by law they remained responsible for matters of defence; meanwhile, the Ministry 
of Interior argued that the basis for administrative transfer of defence related tasks 
had been the 2010 agreement between the two ministries. That transfer had not 
been completed which explained the lack of clear division of responsibility and 
administrative control (Icelandic Audit Office, 2013, pp. 19, 23). Clearly, the two 
ministries were marooned within the transition phase and unable to complete the 
transfer of defence tasks to the Ministry of Interior or revert back to an administrative 
arrangement whereby the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would resume sole 
responsibility for their implementation. The ensuing result was counterproductive 
in the sense that it prevented proper oversight as well as budgetary control by either 
of the two ministries.
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6.4. Conclusion
From a Neorealist point of view, the main priority of the Icelandic government 
following the closure of Keflavík base was to ensure successful transfer of base facilities 
and the continuation of its defence function within an Icelandic administrative 
framework. The purpose to bolster domestic defence capabilities while at the same 
time deepening defence cooperation with Iceland’s regional partners through 
framework agreements with Denmark, the U.K., Canada and Norway which 
provided training and support to the operators of IADS as early as the summer 
of 2006. Iceland’s increased defence cooperation with its neighbours in the North 
Atlantic was a reaction to the closure of the base but did of course not replace the 
defence guarantee inherent in the 1951 Defence Agreement.
The piecemeal steps taken by the government of Iceland during the hand over 
process were at first aimed at ensuring the continued function of Keflavík airport 
and then gradually assuming full responsibility for all NATO infrastructure in 
Iceland, including IADS and the responsibility to safeguard those facilities 
and defence functions. The next logical step was to gather those tasks within a 
legal framework and a government agency to ensure their legal mandate and an 
established chain of command. After the Defence Agency had been set up and 
experience gained in receiving NATO forces in Iceland through NATO Air 
Policing missions it became apparent that domestic defence capabilities would be 
increased even further by fusing the functions of the Defence Agency and the 
Coast Guard by abolishing the Defence Agency and moving most of its tasks to 
the Coast Guard.
The Institutional perspective will lead us down an equally rationalist path of 
thinking. Following the closure of Keflavík base successful integration of defence 
functions in Iceland with the wider NATO defence institutional structure became 
a necessity. Responsibility for NATO Infrastructure and NATO’s eyes in the North 
Atlantic (IADS) had to be taken over by the Icelandic government and the system 
integrated into the European side of NATO military institutional structure since the 
system was no longer connected with NORAD. All these steps were essential before 
actual arrangements could be made to set up regular NATO Air Policing missions 
in Iceland provided by individual NATO members through NATO institutional 
frameworks. 
Equally, as support of individual NATO members such as Norway was 
important in the early hours of integration so was the support of NATO agencies 
in Brussels that provided guidance and help to the former employees of the Radar 
Agency in their assumption of IADS. As the integration process was completed the 
government of Iceland began to participate in the work of NSIP to be able to apply 
for funding for defence infrastructure projects and appointed a representative to 
SHAPE.
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However, to explain the pulleys and levers of decision making in matters of 
defence during the period of 2006-2013 it is necessary to go beyond the state centric 
schools of Neorealism and Institutionalism. 
The Political Economic approach views state preferences as being moulded by 
various actors in society, be they individuals, groups, institutions or ideas. After 
the closure of Keflavík base implementation of defence tasks become an internal 
domestic issue whereby the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice 
and Ecclesiastical Affairs – and their political masters – competed for dominance 
over the portfolio of defence. Different ministries, headed by either of the ruling 
party, came up with substitutes to make up for the vacuum left by the closure of 
Keflavík base, i.e. expand the activities of the Coast Guard; build bilateral security 
frameworks with neighbouring countries and incorporate the defence tasks into an 
Icelandic administrative structure.
The decision in 2010 to shut down the Defence Agency and transfer its defence 
tasks to the Coast Guard and the National Commissioner of Police was the final 
episode in a domestic interagency rivalry ongoing since the establishment of the 
Defence Agency. The Defence Agency controlled IADS and was connected to 
NATO information systems that would benefit the Coast Guard if integrated into 
its daily work. Additionally, the Defence Agency had caused problems for the Coast 
Guard to interact with its traditional partners in the North Atlantic, the Danish 
Navy and Norwegian Coast Guard, by insisting on being the point of contact for all 
foreign military authorities. Shutting down the Defence Agency and transfer most 
of its tasks to the Coast Guard would restore its usual channels of communication 
and grant it control of IADS. 
Similar arguments can be made regarding the decision to transfer the National 
Security Authority role to the National Commissioner of Police. For decades, 
the Icelandic police had carried out vetting and granting of security clearances 
for Icelandic nationals, and maintained security for the radar stations outside of 
Keflavík base. Even after the closure of Keflavík base and the establishment of the 
Defence Agency, the role of National Security Authority remained partially with 
the National Commissioner of Police, as security vetting of individuals continued 
to remain in its hands. Consequently, it made sense for the Ministry of Interior to 
also solidify the National Security Authority within the National Commissioner of 
Police. 
The Social Constructivist reading gives a different account to the decision-
making process following the closure of Keflavík base. The Independence Party had 
throughout the post-war and Cold War period been a staunch supporter of NATO 
membership and close defence relationship with the United States. The same applied 
to the core of the Social Democratic Alliance which before the creation of the party 
in 1999 had been members of the Social Democratic Party. However, the financial 
crash of 2008 and the following shake up in politics saw the more radical elements 
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of the Social Democratic Alliance seize power within the party and form a coalition 
government with the Left Green Movement who as an ideological successor to the 
People’s Alliance was adamantly opposed to Icelandic defence cooperation with the 
U.S. and membership of NATO. 
Left Green hostility to the Defence Agency was a well-established fact and by 
abolishing the agency they were working towards decoupling Iceland from joint 
NATO defence mechanisms and even going so far as to suggest shutting down 
the IADS system partially or fully which would have lost NATO surveillance 
capabilities in the North Atlantic and sent shock waves through the alliance. The 
move was thwarted by the Social Democratic Alliance minister for Foreign Affairs 
but the stalemate that followed left the functional implementation of defence tasks 
within the Left Green controlled Ministry of the Interior while the responsibility 
for those tasks remained with the Social Democratic Alliance controlled Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. 
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7. Conclusions
The purpose of this dissertation is to answer three research questions through 
the method of process tracing and the theoretical lenses of Neorealism and 
Institutionalism. These questions are:
1. What benefits and international leverage did Iceland gain through its defence 
relationship with the U.S. historically?
2. What goals did U.S. and Icelandic policymakers have in the 2005/2006 base 
negotiations and why was Keflavík base closed down?
3. How did Icelandic decision makers adapt to the closure of the base in the years 
that followed until national elections in spring 2013?
Before providing answers to each question it is necessary to outline the main 
points raised by Neorealism and Institutionalism in chapter 1 about the nature of 
the international system and the role of alliances. 
Neorealists argue that the international system consists of states and while 
states vary in capabilities their fundamental concern is their own survival within 
an anarchical international system. The best bet for a small state to ensure its own 
survival is to build up its own defence capabilities, form an alliance with other states 
against a larger power or to bandwagon with a larger state. However, it is not power 
as such that states balance against but a particular threat, which is determined by 
a number of factors such as intentions of another state, capabilities and territorial 
proximity.
Neorealists acknowledge the existence of alliances but maintain that institutions 
are established and thrive because of the willingness of a hegemonic state within 
the system to maintain stability and foster cooperation. If a hegemon is replaced by 
another state than the survival of institutions depends on the willingness of the new 
hegemon to maintain stability. The nature of alliances such as NATO where one 
large member dwarfs the other should more aptly be described as security guarantees 
as the power contribution of other members is so small that it does not in any way 
affect the overall power balance in the international system.
However, the picture is more nuanced than that since alliances, in particular 
between a large and small state, can take on an asymmetrical form whereby the 
larger state provides a security guarantee to the smaller state in exchange for political 
support or benefits such as military bases. This bartering of security for autonomy 
is likely to produce an alliance that will survive after the particular threat that the 
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alliance was formed against has receded. More so if the alliance makes provisions 
for cooperation in other areas than defence as that increases the cost of abrogation. 
However, the fundamental question whether a particular alliance will survive or not 
depends on the level of external threat the states are facing, the military capabilities 
of its members, shared policy goals among the allies and the availability of substitute 
allies. How much autonomy in exchange for security small states are willing to 
surrender is debateable but if that process goes too far a particular state risks 
subordinating itself to the larger state, that is to say severely restrict its autonomy in 
exchange for security.
Institutionalists build on Neorealism but argue that international institutions and 
the cooperation that takes place within them cannot be discarded as the extension 
of the will of a particular hegemon. Institutionalism focuses on how states benefit 
by fostering trust by cooperating through institutions while the state is viewed as the 
primary unit of an anarchical international system. Through institutions members 
will expect certain benefits such as lower transaction costs, mechanisms to pool 
resources together and a pattern of expected behaviour by its members which in 
turn reduces uncertainty about state actions. Therefore, the motivation to create a 
security institution is not only to provide members with a more effective balancing 
against any possible aggressor, but has also the added benefit of building trust among 
the members themselves.
Whether members are willing to invest in a security institution or not depends 
on durability and issue density as members are more willing to pay for an institution 
that is intended to deal with a long-term security problem and addresses several 
security issues within a given policy area. Within institutions a culture of norms and 
procedures develops of collective rules, behaviour and the sharing of different tasks 
within the alliance. Members that do not comply with certain norms will be deemed 
by the other members as a defector from agreed behaviour.
An institutional account as to why NATO survived the Cold War differs 
fundamentally from the Neorealist perspective. Institutionalists would argue that 
continued usage of NATO procedures and mechanisms to deal with new security 
issues was less expensive than starting from scratch. Therefore, its members will 
continue to rely on its institutional functions to address security and defence 
challenges as long as the alliance is able to do so at a lower cost than any alternative 
arrangements.
Question 1: What benefits and international leverage did Iceland gain through its 
defence relationship with the U.S. historically?
Militarily weak and on the outskirts of Europe, Iceland began to emerge as an 
independent nation in the early 20th century. The course had already been set with 
the Union Act in 1918 towards full independence from Denmark but the 1941 
Defence Agreement with the U.S. ensured that Iceland emerged from the war with a 
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prosperous economy and fully recognised by the allies as a sovereign state.  
From a Neorealist perspective, eager to safeguard their newfound independence 
after the Second World War, Icelandic decision makers followed closely discussions 
among their fellow Nordics in 1948 of the creation of a Nordic defence alliance. 
As the discussions broke down Iceland sided with Norway and Denmark and 
entered a defence agreement with the U.S. to balance against any possible Soviet 
aggression. Because of Iceland’s unique status as a state with no armed forces of its 
own Iceland and the U.S. signed a defence agreement in 1951 whereby the U.S. 
assumed responsibility for the defence of Iceland on behalf of NATO, free of cost to 
Iceland. Thus, from a Neorealist perspective the defence relationship took on a clear 
asymmetrical form, the U.S. provided Iceland with a security guarantee in return for 
benefits i.e. a military base in Iceland. 
True to the tenant of Neorealism the defence relationship with the U.S. proved 
effective in countering threats, albeit in a different form than originally envisioned. 
During the mid-1950s and the early 1970s Icelandic decision makers threatened to 
shut down Keflavík base in order to exert pressure on the British government to give 
way in their fisheries dispute with Iceland. The Cod Wars were framed by the British 
government as primarily an international legal dispute while Icelandic decision 
makers took the position that it was an existential political struggle.
The overarching threat remained the Soviet Union but Iceland had a rather 
unusual relationship with the Eastern block and established trade relations with 
the Soviet Union in the early 1950s that continued until its collapse in 1990. With 
the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the emergence of its successor states 
the rational for the U.S. defence relationship was gone but both sides continued 
to maintain the 1951 Defence Agreement while the U.S. scaled down its military 
presence at Keflavík base throughout the 1990s.
Shining the Institutional light on the defence relationship between Iceland and the 
U.S. it is clear that although situated within the institutional framework of NATO 
the alliance was secondary to the bilateral defence relationship. During exploratory 
talks before accession in March 1949 it was clear that for Icelandic decision makers 
the ideal arrangement had been U.S. and British security guarantees but it was clear 
from the U.S. side that any such guarantees separate from NATO membership 
were not on the table. Therefore, joining NATO was a necessary precondition for a 
defence relationship with the United States. As a NATO member it can be argued 
that Iceland held a privileged status. Without armed forces, Iceland was not expected 
to contribute soldiers or equipment to the alliance collective defences and did not 
take a seat in the NATO Military Committee until the early 1980s and exempt from 
making financial contributions to NSIP, although benefitting handsomely from its 
funding towards defence infrastructure in Iceland throughout the years. 
Icelandic decision makers were equally adept at using Iceland’s membership of 
NATO to achieve victory in Cod Wars of the 1950s and the 1970s. arguing its 
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case within the NAC in conjunction to threaten to close down Keflavík base. A 
diplomatic victory that was achieved through the institutional forum of NATO. 
From 1949 until the late 1980s, the U.S.-Icelandic defence relationship and 
NATO membership served Iceland well, both on Neorealism and Institutionalism 
terms. However, the ability of Iceland to manoeuvre was dictated by the nature of 
the bipolar international system and Iceland’s geographical position as the linchpin 
in NATO’s defence of its Northern Flank. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and emergence of the unipolar international system, with the United States as the 
only remaining superpower, Iceland’s fortunes quickly changed. In the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s, Iceland’s strategic importance had been reduced to irrelevance in 
the minds of military thinkers in the United States and NATO. The days of utilising 
the U.S.-Icelandic defence relationship and NATO to attain foreign policy goals had 
clearly passed and it became increasingly difficult for Iceland to maintain the status 
quo.
Question 2: What goals did U.S. and Icelandic policymakers have in the 2005/2006 
base negotiations and why was Keflavík base closed down?
With the end of the Cold War the strategic importance of Iceland dwindled fast. 
As theorists of Neorealism would predict the defence bond between Iceland and 
the U.S. began to fray as the defence interests of the two states began to diverge. 
Throughout the 1990s the government of Iceland was able to control the process 
of downsizing at Keflavík base by negotiating two consecutive MoU’s with the U.S. 
government but the shock that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks called 
for reorientation of U.S. defence policy as international terrorism became the main 
source of external threat. 
For Icelandic decision makers their policy towards the base remained the same 
throughout the 1990s and until its closure in 2006. The government of Iceland was 
willing to make some concessions and entertained ideas of sharing costs associated 
with running Keflavík airport while demands from the U.S. side for Icelandic 
takeover of non-military base function were rejected. 
Therefore, from a Neorealist perspective, when the two sides met in 2005 to 
negotiate for further burden sharing of Keflavík base they were talking to each 
other from very different positions. For the U.S. the external threat had shifted and 
with-it new policy goals had materialized, with little role for Iceland, that called 
for U.S. military resources to be directed towards Iraq and Afghanistan. While the 
government of Iceland was unwilling through most of the negotiation process to 
discuss burden sharing in any meaningful way and wished to focus instead on cost 
reduction. The negotiations revealed a number of weaknesses on the Icelandic side. 
First of all the lack of an overarching strategic view based on an assessment of the 
Icelandic security environment and how continued U.S. military presence in Iceland 
factored into that view, and secondly a believe that the United States would not 
163
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
decide unilaterally to close the base and thirdly, a long history of threatening the 
United States with abrogating the defence agreement and shutting down the base for 
political leverage gave the Icelandic decision makers a misplaced sense of negotiating 
from strength – when clearly, they were not.
Eventually, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld eliminated all funding 
to Keflavík base independent of ongoing negotiation manoeuvres being carried out 
by the Department of State. Rumsfeld’s initiative undercut any Icelandic policy 
readjustment. From a Neorealist perspective, the Icelandic decision makers had 
failed to take stock of the changed security environment and form a defence policy 
that factored in a clear role for continued U.S. military presence in Iceland.
From an Institutional perspective the 2005/2006 defence negotiations were 
fundamentally a bilateral affair between Iceland and the United States. Strictly 
speaking, Keflavík base was a NATO base since U.S. defences were provided on 
behalf of NATO and considerable investment had flowed throughout the years 
from common NATO funding to the base and defence facilities in Iceland, but 
the negotiations were not brought up in the North Atlantic Council nor did either 
side wish to involve the alliance in any formal way. Neither did the U.S. or Iceland 
bring up the importance of Keflavík base for the defence of NATO or other NATO 
members during the negotiation process. However, reminiscent of the interventions 
of NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns during the Cod Wars of the 1970s, Foreign 
Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson sought informal help from NATO Secretary General 
George Robertson in the spring of 2003 to persuade President Bush to postpone the 
removal of the four remaining F-15 fighter jets from Keflavík base. 
Moving beyond the state centric approaches of Neorealism and Institutionalism 
the alternative perspective of Political Economy and Social Constructivism offer up 
different explanations to the negotiation goals and motives of the Icelandic decision 
makers.
From a Political Economic point of view the line between domestic politics and 
foreign policy goals is blurry as domestic politics shape foreign policy goals. On that 
view there were considerable domestic political reasons to maintain Keflavík base, 
irrespective of the wider regional or global security environment. The international 
airport in Keflavík was an outgrowth of Keflavík base and funded and maintained 
by the U.S. military free of charge to the Icelandic authorities. All defence facilities 
in Iceland were the responsibility of the U.S. and funded either directly by the U.S. 
or through common NATO funding and the defence force maintained a rescue 
helicopter squadron that also flew civilian rescue missions in Iceland at the request 
of the Icelandic Coast Guard.
In addition, the defence force had been an important contributor to the Icelandic 
economy since the early 1950s and employed a large number of people in Iceland 
in the early 2000s. The closure of the base would be felt through the economy, 
both in terms of higher unemployment numbers in the Reykjanes region and lower 
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revenue among local businesses servicing the defence force. Higher unemployment 
in rural Reykjanes coupled with economic hardship for local businesses could easily 
translate into drop in popularity for the business-oriented Independence Party and 
the agrarian Progressive Party. 
Therefore, there was a lot at stake for the leadership of the Independence Party/
Progressive Party coalition to ensure as much of the status quo as possible and follow 
the same policy of focusing on cost-reduction at the base without jeopardizing 
continued stationing of the F-15’s and avoid as much as possible any burden-sharing 
commitments at Keflavík base. 
Looking at the defence negotiations through the lens of Social Constructivism 
brings attention to the identity of the main decision makers i.e. the sets of meaning 
an actor has about himself and his understanding and expectations about the social 
world. From 1991 until 2004 the government of Iceland was led by Prime Minister 
Davíð Oddsson. At first, in an Independence Party/Social Democratic Party 
coalition. Following the 1995 elections the Social Democratic Party was swapped 
with the Progressive Party and Halldór Ásgrímsson took up the position of Minister 
for Foreign Affairs while Oddsson continued in his role as Prime Minister. The two 
would swap seats in the autumn of 2004 until the autumn of 2005 when Oddsson 
left politics. Following poor municipal election results for the Progressive Party in 
June 2006 Ásgrímsson followed suit and retired from politics in August that same 
year. 
During his 14-year tenure in government, both as Prime Minister and Minister 
for Foreign Minister, Oddsson drove a consistent policy of no burden sharing at 
the base focusing instead on cost reduction whereby the U.S. government would 
have some scope to reduce its presence at Keflavík base while being dependant on 
Icelandic approval as evidenced in the MoU’s of 1994 and 1996. It was only in 2004, 
after beating off an attempt by the Pentagon a year earlier to remove the fighters, that 
Oddsson was willing to discuss possible burden sharing and then only in the context 
of the civilian functions of Keflavík airport. 
While unwilling to open up discussions on base burden sharing Oddsson 
repeatedly threatened, both publicly and privately, that his government would 
terminate the 1951 Defence Agreement if the four remaining fighter jets would be 
removed from the base. Oddsson stayed true to his position and there was no reversal 
of policy until Oddsson left politics to be replaced with Geir Hilmar Haarde.
But why this brinkmanship? How to explain this unshaken belief that the most 
effective course of action would be to threaten to terminate the defence agreement to 
prevent further reduction of U.S. military presence at the base. Social Constructivism 
implores us to look at the meaning, understanding and expectations about the 
defence relationship held by key Icelandic decision makers. Oddsson (born in 1948) 
and Ásgrímsson (born 1947) belonged both to the post-independence generation 
and grew up in the 1950s and the 1960s and reached early adulthood during the 
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Cod Wars of the 1970s. Both were educated in Iceland apart for two years (1971-
1973) that Ásgrímsson spent in Bergen and Copenhagen pursuing advanced studies 
in accounting. 
For Oddsson and Ásgrímsson threatening to terminate the defence agreement, 
and deprive the U.S. the use of Icelandic territory, was a tried and tested method 
to achieve foreign policy goals, whether to extort financial assistance from the U.S. 
in the 1950s or put pressure on the British government to give way during the Cod 
Wars. But underpinning that logic was a belief that U.S decision makers would 
not view the threat as a bluff, or that losing access to Iceland mattered at all in U.S. 
strategic calculations.
After Oddson left the scene and was replaced by Haarde a breakthrough was made. 
Haarde offered full Icelandic assumption of Keflavík airport and to provide Search 
and Rescue capabilities to the defence force. Demands that had been completely 
unacceptable to Oddson. It was during his February 2006 meeting with Secretary 
of State Rice that Haarde raised the discussions from the traditional squabbles 
of burden sharing and framed them within the correct strategic context i.e. what 
added value does U.S. military presence in Iceland have for Icelandic security and 
defence interests. This different approach should not be so surprising. After all, 
Haarde (born in 1951) had a fundamentally different background than Oddsson 
and Ásgrímsson. Born to an Icelandic mother and a Norwegian father Haarde was 
educated in economics and international relations at prestigious universities in 
the U.S. during most of the 1970s (1971-1977) before returning back to Iceland. 
As a graduate of Brandeis University and John Hopkins University Haarde was 
socialized to Atlanticism to a higher degree than Oddsson and Ásgrímsson and 
sharing the same educational background as the pool of U.S. career foreign service 
members and U.S. policy makers. Although Rice and her officials seemed receptive 
to continue negotiations along the lines proposed by Haarde it was simply too late. 
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld who was rumoured by Icelandic decision makers to 
have the impression of Icelanders as being greedy and inflexible after serving as the 
U.S. ambassador to NATO 1973-1974 had already decided to kill all funding to 
Keflavík base. 
Question 3: How did Icelandic decision makers adapt to the closure of the base in the 
years that followed until national elections in spring 2013?
With Rumsfeld’s unilateral decision to shut down the base Icelandic decision 
makers were confronted with a juncture point. From a Neorealist point of view 
assuming responsibility for those tasks was fundamental to Icelandic defences. 
By outsourcing the responsibility for its defences to the U.S. Iceland had gone far 
in exchanging autonomy for security guarantees. The U.S. had constructed and 
maintained defence infrastructure in Iceland and provided military forces to defend 
the island if that would ever be needed. The only Icelandic involvement in the day to 
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day business of the defence force had been IADS maintenance work carried out by 
the Icelandic quasi-governmental Radar Agency. An agency set up in the mid-1980s 
to increase Icelandic involvement in its own defence but funded and regulated by 
the U.S. Air Force.
Taking over responsibility for IADS, Host and User Nation for NATO facilities 
in Iceland and all responsibilities associated with National Security Authority 
in Iceland was for the Icelandic government an increase of autonomy over its 
own defences while forming the backbone for the continuation of the defence 
relationship with the U.S., after all, the use of Keflavík airport and relevant defence 
infrastructure continued to be Iceland’s contribution to collective defence and open 
to other NATO members.  
The main pillar of Iceland’s defence policy had been shaken but instead of 
terminating the defence agreement both the U.S. and Icelandic government agreed 
to reinterpret it in such a way that physical presence of U.S. military forces was no 
longer required, and that the United States would continue to provide Iceland with 
defences with moveable forces outside of Iceland. With a reconstituted first pillar, 
Iceland successfully continued to bandwagon with the United States, in line with 
Neorealist school of thought.
From a Neorealist perspective collecting defence related tasks left by the defence 
force within a clearly regulated government agency was a move to bolster domestic 
defence capabilities while at the same time deepening defence cooperation with other 
NATO members bordering the North Atlantic, Denmark, Norway the U.K. and 
Canada. The decision at a later stage to merge most tasks of the Defence Agency with 
the Coast Guard was a continuation of the same policy of strengthening domestic 
defence capabilities by transferring control over IADS and NATO communication 
links over to the Coast Guard.
From an Institutional perspective it became critical for Icelandic decision makers 
to integrate NATO defence infrastructure in Iceland with the wider NATO defence 
organizational structure, in particular IADS as it served as NATO’s eyes in the 
North Atlantic and a precondition for receiving future NATO Air Policing missions 
in Iceland. The system was reconnected with the European part of NATO defence 
structure as its connectivity with NORAD was severed when the defence force 
departed.
The departure of the defence force from Iceland had clearly made the second 
pillar of Iceland’s defence policy ever more important. From an Institutional point of 
view the function of defence infrastructure in Iceland remained important for other 
NATO members. In particular IADS as it fed information about military air traffic 
in the North Atlantic to other NATO control centres. Picking up where the U.S. left 
off and continue to maintain defence facilities in Iceland and relay information from 
IADS would be expected by other alliance members, choosing not to do so would 
have deemed Iceland a defector from agreed behaviour by other alliance members.
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After the initial shock that followed the closure of the base the defence tasks 
assumed by Iceland were formalised. NATO became a forum for deepened 
security cooperation in the North Atlantic as Iceland negotiated for closer defence 
cooperation with its North Atlantic NATO neighbours. Additionally, NATO 
became the forum for Iceland to secure for itself visible air defences through regular 
NATO Air Policing missions, a need driven by renewed Russians bomber flights 
into the North Atlantic immediately following the closure of Keflavík base. To 
solidify Iceland’s integration into the second pillar Iceland set up a domestic defence 
structure, the Icelandic Defence Agency, to handle those tasks previously within the 
first pillar and carried out by the U.S. defence force at Keflavík base.
However, with the financial crash of 2008 another juncture point opened up and 
the government was forced to rethink its strategy and the state centric theories of 
Neorealism and Institutionalism are insufficient to provide an adequate analysis 
of the decision-making process regarding the future institutional arrangement of 
defence tasks in Iceland. To do that we have to resort to our alternative theories of 
explanation: Political Economic thought and Social Constructivism. 
From a Political Economic approach, the permanent placement of defence 
related tasks was characterised by a continuous tug of war between different groups 
in position to shape state preferences. At first between the Independence Party 
controlled Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and later between the Social 
Democratic Alliance controlled Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Left Green 
controlled Ministry of the Interior.
With the 2008 financial crash the dimension of cost saving and the necessity 
to balance the government budget became an issue of consideration but the 
decision-making process continued to be framed as predominantly a power struggle 
between two different ministries headed by different political masters. While 
the Independence Party and Social Democratic Alliance were able to come to an 
understanding about a division of labour between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs the following Social Democratic 
Alliance/Left Green Movement coalition did not. 
From a Political Economic perspective there were advantages to move some 
defence related tasks and integrate them with the Ministry of the Interior controlled 
Coast Guard. Narrowly avoiding a national default, the government had to revaluate 
Iceland’s defence structure with the explicit goal of getting the same added value 
but with less costs. NATO Air Policing missions were maintained while the defence 
tasks of the Defence Agency were integrated into the Coast Guard and the National 
Commissioner of Police. 
Not only could the two pre-existing government structures carry out the tasks of 
the Defence Agency successfully, but by doing so that the efficiency of their own core 
tasks would be strengthened. For the Coast Guard that meant increased surveillance 
in the seas around Iceland, and for the National Commissioner of Police that change 
168
Pétursson: The Defence Relationship of Iceland and the United States and the Closure of Keflavík base
translated into improved intelligence gathering. Working with what little resources 
it had, Iceland was forced to alter its domestic security structure. However, in doing 
so it made sure that its institutional arrangements with NATO remained intact, 
therefore, despite financial constraints and domestic politics Iceland could not be 
accused of defecting from its responsibilities as a NATO member while fulfilling 
Icelandic defence requirements.
However, the decision to close the Defence Agency and disperse its tasks 
within different agencies was first and foremost politically driven as it was a key 
precondition set by the Left Green Movement for a coalition government with the 
Social Democratic Alliance. Therefore, a Social Constructivist analysis is needed to 
fully understand the decision behind shutting down the Defence Agency and merge 
its functions with the Coast Guard. 
As the ideological successor to the People’s Alliance the Left Green Movement 
was adamantly opposed to the U.S. defence relationship and Iceland’s membership 
in NATO. The left Greens saw the assumption by the Icelandic government of 
defence tasks left over by the defence force and the creation of the Defence Agency 
as entrenching Iceland into NATO military structures in which it had never 
participated before. To the Left Greens this was anathema and the abolition of the 
Defence Agency with the explicit aim of killing those tasks, IADS etc. became the 
price that the Social Democratic Alliance would have to pay in order to set up a 
Social Democratic Alliance/Left Green coalition government. 
Willing to go along with the Left Greens it quickly materialized that the leadership 
of the Social Democratic Alliance had no intention of seeing those defence tasks 
abolished. Foreign Minister Össur Skarphéðinsson was happy to do away with the 
organizational structure set up by his predecessor, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, 
but shutting them down altogether was not acceptable as that meant abandoning 
Iceland’s obligation to other alliance members. 
The ensuing stalemate and legalistic limbo whereby the implementation of defence 
tasks remained with the Coast Guard and subservient to the Left Green controlled 
Ministry for the Interior while legal responsibility remained with the Social 
Democratic Alliance controlled Ministry for Foreign Affairs was a manifestation 
of the distrust between Minister of the Interior Jónasson who wished to end those 
functions altogether and Foreign Minister Skarphéðinsson who had no intention to 
see them go. 
This dissertation has been a study into the defence relationship between Iceland and 
the United States, the 2005/2006 defence negotiation process and the adaptation of 
defence tasks in Iceland by the government of Iceland that prior to 2006 had been 
the responsibility of the U.S. defence force at Keflavík base. Through this study the 
empirical knowledge has been expanded about the nature of the defence relationship 
between Iceland and the U.S., the defence tasks carried out at Keflavík base prior to 
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2006 and the first seven years after Keflavík base closed down. This study has also 
increased empirical knowledge about the 2005/2006 defence negotiations and why 
they resulted in the closure of Keflavík base. 
In a wider theoretical sense, as a study into the defence relationship of one of 
the smallest states in the international system and its largest power, the state centric 
perspectives of Neorealism and Institutionalism, given the NATO dimension, 
seemed the most appropriate theoretical approach. However, as the preceding 
discussion has shown those state centric theories are severely limited in explaining 
the causal relationship in decision making extending from the 2005/2006 defence 
negotiations and onwards to the closure of the Defence Agency and transfer of defence 
tasks to the Coast Guard. To fully understand the chain of events it is necessary to 
compliment the Neorealist and Institutional approaches with alternative theories 
that go beyond the state approach in assessing state preferences. 
Yet again the security environment has shifted following the 2014 Russian 
annexation of Crimea. Russia is again viewed as an adversary by the U.S. and other 
NATO members and the strategic importance of Iceland is yet again rising as the 
only land barrier from free movement of Russian navy vessels of the Northern 
Fleet, submarines in particular, from their bases in Murmansk into the North 
Atlantic, placing them in position to threaten allied control over the Sea Lines of 
Communication, and underwater communication cables, in the North Atlantic 
between North America and Europe. 
It is inevitable that Iceland will play an important role in any current or future 
NATO or U.S. military planning for the North Atlantic. However, the days of 
permanent stationing of U.S. military forces in Iceland is not on the horizon and 
any future permanent stationing of such forces must be preceded by a clearly defined 
role for such forces based on an Icelandic threat assessment and defence policy that 
enjoys broad political support among the major political parties in Parliament.  
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